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xii 
Summary 
 
 
The investment management industry has proven to be a fertile ground for theoretical and 
empirical research over the past forty years, particularly in relation to the nature and 
quantification of risk.  However, the dominance of the U.S. industry has meant that much of 
the academic research has focused on the U.S. market. This thesis investigates aspects of 
investment risk using alternative data to that used in much of the prior published research.  
 
This thesis contains an extensive analysis of aspects of risk related to both the demand side 
and the supply side of the managed funds market in Australia.  Among the demand side 
characteristics, attitudes towards risk and their impact on asset allocation decisions will be an 
important determinant of investors’ financial well-being, particularly in retirement. 
Accordingly, the first part of the thesis examines the financial risk tolerance of investors, 
exploring the relationship between subjective financial risk tolerance and a range of 
demographic characteristics that are widely used as a basis for heuristically derived estimates 
of investors’ attitudes towards financial risk.  
 
The second part of the thesis contains an analysis of the supply side of the industry, focusing 
on risk-shifting behavior by investment fund managers. Since the time when performance and 
risk-shifting behavior of fund managers was first put under the spotlight 40 years ago, it is 
possible to identify an evolving strand in the research where performance assessment is 
examined within the framework of the principal-agent literature. One focus that has emerged 
in this literature is the adaption of the tournament model to the analysis of investment 
manager behavior, wherein it is hypothesized that fund managers who were interim losers 
were likely to increase fund volatility in the latter part of the assessment period to a greater 
extent than interim winners.  
xiii 
 
Against this background, the second part of the thesis examines risk-shifting behavior by 
Australian fund managers. Both the ability of fund managers to time the market and the 
applicability of the tournament model of funds management to a segment of the Australian 
industry are examined.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. General Motivation 
 
The global managed fund industry has recorded substantial growth over the last 15 years. 
Total assets of open-end investments companies worldwide have increased from $US1.1 
trillion in 1990 to $US 16.2 trillion in 2004, with U.S. funds accounting for 50-60 percent of 
those assets over the period.1 During this time Australian managed funds have increased their 
share of the world total managed fund assets from 1.2 percent to 3.9 percent.  While this 
seems a small share compared to the U.S. total, in 2004 it places Australia as the fourth 
largest market worldwide behind Luxembourg (8.6 percent) and France (8.5 percent), and 
ahead of Italy (3.2 percent), the United Kingdom (3.1 percent), Ireland (2.9 percent) and 
Japan (2.5 percent). 
 
The growth in managed funds in Australia has to a large extent been driven by changes to the 
retirement income system in Australia. The Australian Government’s retirement provision 
policies have the aim of shifting the burden of funding retirement incomes from the public 
sector to the private sector. To facilitate this, a system of mandatory superannuation 
contributions for employees was introduced through Federal Government legislation in July 
1992, and employers are now required to contribute 9% of an employee’s wage to a 
superannuation fund account. As a consequence, superannuation funds have become the 
principal retirement savings vehicle for Australians, and the dominant component of the 
managed funds industry in Australia, increasing from around 65 per cent of the $AUS 192 
billion of total managed funds in 1989 to around 83 per cent of the $AUS 813 billion of  total 
funds under management in 2004.2 
                                                 
1 Source: Investment Company Institute Mutual Fund Factbook, 1996 and 2005. 
2 Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Statistical Tables, Table B18 Managed Funds, June 2005. 
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The shift to private sector funding of retirement incomes and the concomitant growth of 
investment funds has had two effects, one effect manifesting on the investor, or demand side 
of the industry, and the other effect  impacting on the asset management, or supply side. 
 
Firstly, on the demand side, individuals have been forced to become more financially aware, 
if not financially literate, as they have had greater responsibility for their future financial 
welfare imposed on them. While their involvement in securing an adequate retirement income 
might fall short of direct responsibility for investment decision-making, there has nevertheless 
has been an increasing interest in investment markets and the relationship between investment 
risk and return. Inevitably, attitudes towards bearing investment risk and the consequences for 
future financial welfare of differences in attitudes to bearing this risk have received increased 
attention. 
 
Secondly, on the supply side, the growth in the amount of investment funds has meant that the 
structure, conduct and performance of the investment management industry have come under 
much closer scrutiny. In particular, the competitive conduct of the fund management industry 
and the risk-adjusted performance of managed funds have been subject to extensive 
examination by academic researchers and regulatory bodies. 
 
1.2. Risk and Return in the Investment Management Industry 
 
The seminal work of Markowitz (1952, 1959) is widely considered to have revolutionized the 
investment management process and, consequently, the investment management industry. 
Markowitz’s portfolio theory provides a means for investors and investment managers to 
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quantify and link investment risk and returns, and to identify and construct portfolios that, 
through appropriate combinations of assets, offer an optimal trade-off of risk and return.  
 
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying Markowitz’s work is that investors are risk-
averse, meaning that they require higher returns in compensation for bearing higher risk. 
Given the well documented positive relationship between investment risk and return, it is 
evident that a precondition for identifying the optimal risk-return trade-off for an investor is to 
establish the investor’s degree of risk aversion. In the practitioner community, risk aversion 
usually takes the guise of its inverse, risk tolerance. Portfolio selection therefore involves 
constructing or selecting a portfolio that offers a risk-return combination that matches the risk 
tolerance of the investor. 
 
The managed fund industry offers products that represent different risk-return trade-offs. Risk 
tolerance and return expectations for a managed fund are predefined, and typically expressed 
in the funds’ stated objectives. An investor selects a fund based upon its advertised 
characteristics and objectives. Because of the predefinition of the risk-return trade-off offered 
by the fund, the crucial objective of fund management is maximization of return in 
conjunction with maintenance of the advertised risk profile. 
 
The centrality of the risk-return relationship to investment management is therefore manifest 
in the process of identifying managed investment funds that correspond to the varying risk 
tolerances of investors. This core relationship also provides a unifying foundation upon which 
the economic concepts of the supply-side and the demand-side of markets can be used as a 
framework in this thesis to examine aspects of risk and investment.  
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1.3. Motivation for Investigating the Australian Managed Funds Industry 
 
While the growth of the managed fund industry has been a worldwide phenomenon, the 
dominance of the U.S. industry has inevitably meant that much of the academic research has 
focused on the U.S. market. The geographic narrowness of academic studies of mutual funds 
was commented on recently by Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2005), and concerns about data 
snooping in finance research because of the focus on U.S. data were raised some time ago, 
initially by Leamer (1980) and later by Lo and MacKinley (1990).  
 
The contribution of this thesis is therefore to investigate aspects of investment risk using 
alternative data to that used in much of the prior published research. While, as noted above, 
the Australian managed funds industry is the fourth largest in the world, there has been little 
academic investigation of either investors’ attitudes to risk or fund managers’ manipulation of 
fund risk in the Australian market.  
 
1.4. Investment Risk From The Demand Side 
 
The flow of retirement savings in the financial system can be viewed as creating a demand for 
suitable investment products. One of the defining characteristics of this demand is the 
existence of differing attitudes towards risk on the part of investors. 
 
Financial risk tolerance is a term widely used in the personal financial planning industry to 
refer to an investor’s attitude towards risk. It can be defined as the amount of uncertainty or 
investment return volatility that an investor is willing to accept when making a financial 
decision (Grable, 2000; Grable and Lytton, 1999). This thesis uses a database consisting of 
psychometrically derived financial risk tolerance scores as well as respondents’ demographic 
characteristics to examine the relationship between subjective financial risk tolerance and a 
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range of demographic characteristics that are widely used as a basis for heuristically derived 
estimates of investors’ attitudes towards financial risk.  
 
1.5. Investment Risk From The Supply Side 
 
As noted above, the managed fund industry offers a supply of products characterized by 
predefined risk-return trade-offs. While this attribute serves to differentiate products in the 
marketplace, it also acts as a constraint upon the extent of a fund manager’s ability to alter the 
risk profile of a portfolio.  
 
The well documented positive relationship between return and risk means that fund managers 
have an incentive to increase the risk profile of their portfolios in the search for higher returns. 
One way to achieve higher returns is through successful market timing, also known as 
macroforecasting.  Timing ability is characterized as a decision by a manager to be in or out 
of the equity market, where being out of the (higher risk) equity market implies being in the  
(lower risk) fixed income market. As a result of fund managers effecting changes in the risk 
level of the portfolio, the relationship between portfolio returns and market returns will be 
non-linear. This thesis explores this non-linearity and identifies changes in the systematic risk 
of a sample of Australian equity funds through the use of a quadratic regression technique and 
the application of a ‘dual beta’ market model specification. 
 
Another facet of risk-changing behavior by fund managers is explored through the tournament 
model of fund management. The literature on tournaments has its origins in the personnel 
economics area and initially focused on employment contracts. The extension of the 
tournament model to the funds management area began with Brown, Harlow and Starks 
(1996), who characterized the managed funds industry as a multi-period, multi-game 
tournament and focused on the possible strategic responses of funds identified at interim 
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ranking stages as likely to be ultimate “winners” or “losers”. Brown et al. (1996) 
hypothesized that fund managers who were interim losers (below the median performance for 
the first part of the assessment period), were likely to increase fund volatility in the latter part 
of the assessment period to a greater extent than interim winners. This strategy of increasing 
volatility was based on the expectation that higher volatility gave the losing manager a better 
chance of a major performance reversal that would redeem their ranking and, hence, secure a 
major tournament prize at year end. 
 
This thesis contributes to the fund management literature by exploring tournament behavior 
among managers of Australian multi-sector growth funds. Two analyses are undertaken,  
firstly using a non-parametric contingency table analysis and secondly using a regression-
based approach. 
 
1.6. Scope and Structure of The Thesis 
 
This thesis explores aspects of investment risk in financial markets from both the demand side 
and the supply side. The thesis comprises six research essays presented in Chapters 2 to 7.  On 
the demand side there are three essays dealing with investor risk tolerance and on the supply 
side three essays dealing with changes to portfolio risk initiated by fund managers. Since each 
chapter explores a separate research issue the relevant literature is reviewed within each 
chapter. Overall, the thesis forms a substantial analysis of aspects of investment risk. An 
overview of each chapter is presented below. 
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1.6.1. Demand Side Essays 
 
The first essay, in Chapter 2, examines the relationship between subjective financial risk 
tolerance and a range of demographic characteristics that are widely used as a basis for 
heuristically derived estimates of investors’ attitudes towards financial risk.  There is a large 
body of extant research that has focused on the use of demographic characteristics to predict 
investor risk tolerance.3  The sample used in this Chapter comprised 3124 respondents who 
completed a risk profile in January-February 2002. The contribution of this paper is to provide 
further evidence on the validity of these heuristics by examining the relationship between a 
psychometrically derived measure of subjective risk tolerance and responses to questions on 
eight demographic characteristics.  Our results indicate that gender, age, income and net 
wealth are important determinants of an individual’s attitude towards risk. However, 
education, marital status and the number of dependents were all found to be insignificant in 
determining risk tolerance in the sample group. 
 
Chapter 3 continues the demand side focus and provides further evidence as to the behavior 
and ‘determinants’ of investor risk tolerance.  In addition to an analysis of the relationship 
between risk tolerance and general demographics, special attention is given to issues 
surrounding age and marital status.  While most studies in this area use small samples, the 
database used in this study consists of a psychometrically derived financial risk tolerance 
score (RTS) for over 20,000 surveyed individuals as well as each respondent’s demographic 
characteristics.  Analysis of the data reveals that while peoples self-assessed risk tolerance 
and the psychometrically-derived RTS generally accord, there is considerable variation with a 
tendency for respondents to under-estimate their risk tolerance. The practical implication of 
this analysis is that financial planners and investment advisors who rely largely on subjective 
                                                 
3 For a survey see Grable and Lytton (1998) and Grable and Joo (1999). 
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assessments of risk tolerance run the risk of suggesting inappropriate, and in the majority of 
cases overly conservative, investment strategies for their clients. 
 
The analysis of the relationship between investor demographics and risk tolerance confirms 
the findings of the first study, that gender, income, age and wealth are significantly associated 
with financial risk tolerance.  A detailed investigation of the relationship between risk 
tolerance and age suggests that a negative relationship between age and risk tolerance exists 
which, while in line with generally held industry beliefs, contradicts some of the more recent 
research findings.  Further, the relationship between age and risk tolerance was found to 
exhibit a significant nonlinear structure. A negative relationship between risk tolerance and 
marital status was identified also. 
 
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of the very large database of psychometrically-derived risk 
profiles of adult Australians aged between 20 and 80 years, and provides evidence that 
women differ from men in their attitude to financial risk taking. Regression analysis of risk 
tolerance scores (RTS) on the demographic characteristics of gender, marital status, number 
of dependents, age, education, income, combined income and net assets reveals each of these 
characteristics to be significant determinants of risk tolerance, with the first four 
characteristics having a negative relationship with RTS. The impact of gender was explored 
through dummy variable enhanced regression analysis constructed to test the increment in 
each demographic coefficient derived from being female relative to the base case of being 
male. Evidence of non-linearity in the relationships between RTS and demographic 
characteristics was also examined. 
 
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that women do differ from men 
in their attitude to financial risk taking. This finding is based on the analysis of the database 
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consisting of psychometrically-derived risk profiles for around 20,000 adult Australians.  As 
much of the extant literature uses US data, our use of Australian data provides an important 
response to the concerns raised by Jiankoplos and Bernasek (1998) that much of what we 
know about investor risk tolerance could be country specific. As Australia shares a number of 
demographic and cultural similarities with other developed countries, we believe our results 
are relevant for these countries as well. 
 
1.6.2. Supply Side Essays 
 
Chapters 5 through 7 focus on risk shifting behavior by fund managers. Chapter 5 examines 
the market timing ability of a segment of the Australian investment fund industry, namely, 
equity trusts, over the period 1988 to 1997. The approach followed involves running both 
quadratic excess returns market model and dual-beta excess returns market model regressions. 
In addition, some specification tests are applied. The results suggest that for the sample over 
the period examined, there is little evidence of market timing ability. Further, there is no clear 
dominance of one market timing model over the other.  The study finds however, that a cubic 
market model specification does fit the data quite well for nearly one third of the sample. 
 
Chapter 6 builds on Taylor’s (2003) extension of the tournament model of Brown et al. 
(1996). Taylor (2003) proposes that using an exogenous (endogenous) benchmark will induce 
losing (winning) managers to gamble. This presents two competing testable hypotheses that 
are investigated in the current study. A non-parametric Cross-Product Ratio methodology is 
applied to a sample of Australian multi-sector growth funds covering the period 1989 to 2001. 
Generally, the study finds evidence in support of Taylor’s model. Specifically, when an 
exogenous benchmark is used the support is particularly evident for the Calendar-year 
analysis. Viewed as a whole, the analysis involving endogenous benchmarks is also quite 
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supportive – particularly so for the Financial-year investigations (and to a lesser extent also 
with the Calendar-year results). Overall, the findings are consistent with the view that the 
Australian financial press and investors are particularly fixated on Financial and Calendar-
year investment performance. 
 
Chapter 7 further investigates the tournament induced risk-shifting behavior of Australian 
multi-sector growth funds. In this study a regression-based methodology is used to examine 
tournaments based on the calendar year, the financial year and an October-September year. 
Apart from the standard tournament hypothesis, the following hypotheses are explored: (a) a 
stability hypothesis; (b) a non-linearity hypothesis; (c) a fund age hypothesis; and (d) a fund 
size hypothesis. The findings can be summarized as follows. First, there is evidence in favour 
of the risk shifting tournament hypothesis when tournaments are defined with a September 
year end, but in the opposite direction for financial year end tournaments. Second, sub-period 
investigation revealed a strong pattern of less negative (more positive) association between 
interim performance and risk shifting for the September-based (Financial year) tournaments. 
Third, with regard to non-linearity, there are two cases with some prevalence: September year 
end tournaments tend to be typified by extreme losers (winners) who increasingly 
(decreasingly) chase high (low) risk and Financial year end tournaments tend to be typified by 
extreme losers (winners) who decreasingly (increasingly) chasing low (high) risk. Fourth, the 
analysis suggests that while fund age doesn’t matter in either the September or Financial year 
end tournament scenarios, in the case of Calendar years the conventional tournament effect 
seems to be coming from the more established funds. In contrast, well-performing younger 
funds tend to chase higher risk. Finally, the ‘fund size’ hypothesis for (a) the September year 
tournaments suggests that, if anything, it is intermediate sized funds pursuing risk shifting 
tournament; (b) the Calendar year there is little evidence of risk shifting behaviour, regardless 
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of fund size; (c) the Financial year there is a general tendency, regardless of fund size, toward 
positive risk shifting.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the overall conclusions of the thesis, summarizes the major findings of the 
empirical analysis and contributions to the existing literature in finance, and indicates 
directions for future research. 
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Part A:  Demand Side Studies 
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Chapter 2: An Exploratory Investigation of the Relation Between 
Risk Tolerance Scores and Demographic Characteristics4 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Financial risk tolerance is a term widely used in the personal financial planning industry to 
refer to an investor’s attitude towards risk. It can be defined as the amount of uncertainty or 
investment return volatility that an investor is willing to accept when making a financial 
decision (Grable, 2000; Grable and Lytton, 1999) or the extent to which an individual is 
prepared to risk experiencing a less attractive outcome in the pursuit of a more attractive 
outcome (Davey, 2000). As such, financial risk tolerance may be considered to be the inverse 
of the concept of risk aversion that has played such a central role in financial economics.  
While risk tolerance and risk aversion may be considered to be two sides of the same coin, the 
former is generally considered to be more intuitive and, as such, a more relevant concept for 
use in communicating opinions about risk in the adviser-client context. 
 
Risk tolerance is an important concept which has implications for both financial service 
providers and consumers.  For the latter, risk tolerance is one factor which may determine the 
appropriate composition of assets in a portfolio which is optimal in terms of risk and return 
relative to the needs of the individual (Droms, 1987).  In fact, the well-documented home 
country bias of investors may be a manifestation of risk aversion on the part of investors (see 
Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994 and Simons, 1999).  For fund managers, Jacobs and Levy (1996) 
argue that the inability to effectively determine investor risk tolerance may lead to 
homogeneity among investment funds.  Further, Schirripa and Tecotzky (2000) argue that the 
                                                 
4 Parts of this chapter are drawn from a paper published by the candidate: Hallahan, T., Faff, R. and McKenzie, 
M. (2003). An Exploratory Investigation of the Relation between Risk Tolerance Scores and Demographic 
Characteristics, Journa of Multinational Financial Management, 13, 483-502 
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standard Markowitz portfolio optimisation process can be optimised by pooling groups of 
investors together with different attitudes to risk into a single efficient portfolio that maintains 
the groups average risk tolerance.   
 
Despite its importance in the financial services industry, many unanswered questions exist 
with respect to the ‘determinants’ of risk tolerance.5  Although a number of factors have been 
proposed and tested, a brief survey of the results reveals a distinct lack of consensus.  First, it 
is generally thought that risk tolerance decreases with age (see Wallach and Kogan 1961; 
McInish 1982; Morin and Suarez 1983; and Palsson 1996) although this relationship may not 
necessarily be linear (see Riley and Chow 1992; Bajtelsmit and VanDerhai 1997).  Intuitively 
this result can be explained by the fact that younger investors have a greater (expected) 
number of years to recover from the losses which may be incurred with risky investments.  
Interestingly, there is some suggestion that biological changes in enzymes due to the aging 
process may be responsible (see Harlow and Brown, 1990).  More recent research however, 
finds evidence of a positive relationship or fails to detect any impact of age on risk tolerance 
(see Wang and Hanna 1997; Grable and Joo 1997; Grable and Lytton 1998, Hanna, Gutter 
and Fan, 1998; Grable 2000, Hariharan, Chapman and Domian, 2000; and Gollier and 
Zeckhauser, 2002).  
 
A second demographic which is frequently argued to determine risk tolerance is gender and 
Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996), Palsson (1996), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), 
Bajtelsmit, Bernasek and Jianakoplos (1999), Powell and Ansic (1997), Grable (2000), and 
Grable and Joo (2000) find support for the notion that females have a lower preference for 
risk than males.  However, Grable and Joo (1999) and Hanna, Gutter and Fan (1998) find that 
                                                 
5 The term ‘determinants’ is used to refer to the identification of factors/variables that reveal a strong and 
systematic association with risk tolerance. 
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gender is not significant in predicting financial risk tolerance, and Ackert, Church and Englis 
(2002) produced inconclusive results. 
 
Education is a third factor which is thought to increase a person’s capacity to evaluate risks 
inherent to the investment process and therefore endow them with a higher financial risk 
tolerance (see Baker and Haslem, 1974; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Sung and Hanna, 1996).  
Shaw (1996) derives a model which suggests an element of circularity in this argument 
however, as the relative risk aversion of an individual is shown to determine the rate of human 
capital acquisition.  
 
Income and wealth are two related factors which are hypothesised to exert a positive 
relationship on the preferred level of risk (see Friedman 1974; Cohn, Lewellen, Lease and 
Schlarbaum 1975; Blume 1978; Riley and Chow 1992; Grable and Lytton 1999; Schooley 
and Worden 1996; Shaw 1996; and Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg 2001).  For the latter, 
however, the issue is not clear cut.  On the one hand, wealthy investors can more easily afford 
to incur the losses resulting from a risky investment and their accumulated wealth may even 
be a reflection of their preferred level of risk.  Alternatively, wealthy people may be more 
conservative with their money while people with low levels of personal wealth may view 
risky investments as a form of lottery ticket and be more willing to bear the risk associated 
with such payoffs.  This argument is analogous to Bowman’s (1982) proposition that troubled 
firms prefer and seek risk.  
 
Marital status has also been postulated to impact on financial risk tolerance, however, the 
exact nature of the relationship is not clear.  One view asserts that single people are more risk 
tolerant than married individuals because they have less responsibilities than married people, 
particularly in respect to dependents, and face less social risk (that is, potential loss of esteem) 
when undertaking risky investments (Roszkowski, Snelbecker and Leimberg, 1993). On the 
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other hand, it has also been suggested that married individuals have greater risk taking 
propensities because of a greater capacity to absorb unfavourable outcomes. The empirical 
research fails to provide any insights as to which of these competing theories may be valid.  A 
number of studies have failed to identify any significant relationship between marital status 
and financial risk tolerance (McInish, 1982; Masters, 1989; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995).  As 
such, the relationship between marital status and risk tolerance is an issue that remains 
unresolved. 6   
 
The contribution of this study is to provide further evidence on the validity of these heuristics 
by examining the relationship between a psychometrically derived measure of subjective risk 
tolerance and responses to questions on eight demographic characteristics. Specifically, cross-
sectional regression analysis is used to quantify the effect of the demographic characteristics 
on risk tolerance. 
 
2.2. Measuring Financial Risk Tolerance 
 
Risk tolerance, reflecting a person’s attitude towards taking on risk, is a complex 
psychological concept. Jackson, Hourany and Vidmar (1992) contend that risk tolerance has 
four dimensions: financial, physical, social and ethical. Moreover, they find that there appears 
to be consistency in decision-making within, but not across, each of these dimensions. Callan 
and Johnson (2002) note that it has long been accepted in the field of social psychology (see, 
for example, Secord and Backman, 1964) that attitudes have two components: a spoken 
component comprising a person’s beliefs and an unspoken component reflecting a person’s 
feelings and emotions. Consequently, the measurement of financial risk tolerance needs to 
capture both these aspects of the attitudinal construct. 
                                                 
6 Other factors which have been found to impact on risk tolerance and are not included in this study are: race (see 
Leigh, 1986; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; and Xiao, Alhabeeb, Gong-Soong and Haynes, 2000) the desire to 
leave an estate and expectations about the adequacy of pension income (see Schooley and Worden, 1996). 
 17
 
The three main methods for measuring financial risk tolerance involve one or a combination 
of: assessing actual behavior (Schooley and Worden, 1996, for example, find that portfolio 
allocations may be used to infer attitudes to risk); assessing responses to hypothetical 
scenarios and/or investment choices (see Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro, 1997 and Hey, 
1999); and subjective questions (see Hanna, Gutter and Fan, 1998 for a survey of these 
different techniques).7   
 
The use of the latter of these approaches – experimental questionnaire data – remains the 
primary method for assessing financial risk tolerance. However, because of the complexity of 
the attitudinal construct, a sophisticated psychological testing instrument is required to 
elucidate a person’s attitude to financial risk. 
 
Psychometrics is that area of psychology dealing with the design and analysis of 
measurements of human characteristics. Perhaps the most prominent example of psychometric 
testing is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, an attitudinal and personality test widely used in 
the recruitment and personnel areas. and Johnson (2002) provide an overview of the issues 
involved in constructing an appropriate psychometric instrument to measure financial risk 
tolerance. A good attitudinal test will meet accepted psychological standards for both face 
validity (perceived relevance of the questions) and predictive validity (prediction of later 
performance or behaviour), reliability (consistency in results for repeated tests of the same 
person), as well as having appropriate test norms so that subjects’ test scores can be 
interpreted against an appropriate reference group. 
 
FinaMetrica Ltd.8 is an Australian company that uses such an approach to measure the 
preferred level of risk of an investor and have kindly provided the enlarged database to be 
                                                 
7 An interesting alternative involves the use of insurance contracts to measure risk tolerance (Dreze, 1987).  
8 At the time the research was undertaken, FinaMetrica Ltd. operated under the name ProQuest Ltd. 
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analysed in our study.  The FinaMetrica Personal Financial Profiling system is a proprietary, 
commercially provided computer-based risk tolerance measurement tool. It is a psychometric 
attitude test comprising 25 questions that generate a standardized Risk Tolerance Score (RTS) 
on a scale of 1 – 100, with higher scores indicating higher risk tolerance. The test, which has a 
univariate factor structure, has been subject to usability, reliability and norming trials by the 
University of New South Wales and has been found to have reliability statistics in excess of 
international psychometric standards. The test has been normed against a reference group of 
5000 Australians.9 Accompanying the risk tolerance test is a set of eight demographic 
questions requesting information on year of birth, gender, postcode, education, income, 
marital status, number of dependents and net assets.  Details of the demographic questions are 
provided in Appendix 2.1.  The FinaMetrica Personal Financial Profiling system is available 
commercially to the financial planning industry and can be completed in hard-copy form or 
accessed through the Internet. 10 
 
 
2.3. Data and Sampling 
 
 
The data used in this exploratory study was made available by FinaMetrica. The sample 
provided comprised 3124 Australian respondents who completed the test in January – 
February 2002. Approximately 60 per cent of the respondents were identified as having 
completed the test in response to an invitation made to readers of Personal Investor magazine, 
20 per cent of the respondents were identified as clients of financial advisers and the 
remainder was classified by FinaMetrica as non-specific. The Personal Investor readers 
completed the test by visiting the magazine’s website where they could then access an internet 
link to the FinaMetrica website. Clients of financial advisers either completed the test online 
or completed a hard copy of the questionnaire sent to them in advance of meeting with their 
                                                 
9 This information is available through the following link on the FinaMetrica web site: www.risk-profiling.com. 
10 See www.FinaMetrica.com.au for further information about the FinaMetrica system. 
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adviser. Following consultation with FinaMetrica, respondents who recorded their age as less 
than 20 years or older than 80 years, and respondents who generated a RTS outside the range 
20-95 were omitted from the analysis, as such responses were not considered plausible. A 
group of 121 respondents were excluded on these criteria, leaving a sample of 3003, 
comprising 2105 males and 898 females.  
 
As noted above, the FinaMetrica database furnishes details as to the respondent’s gender, age, 
education, income, marital status, net assets, home state as well as their FinaMetrica Risk 
Tolerance Score (RTS hereafter).  It is acknowledged that the sample is not a representative 
cross-section of society since it is primarily sourced from readers of Personal Investor 
magazine.  These individuals however, may represent a cross section of people who seek 
investment and personal financial planning advice and so embody a reasonable cross-section 
of those in society who are likely to seek professional investment and personal financial 
planning advice. 
 
Table 2.1 summarises the demographics data and the average survey participant was a 31 – 40 
year old university educated married male who earns $50,000 to $100,000 and has net assets 
of $150,000 to $500,000.  The atypical respondent was a 60+ year old low income unmarried 
female with less than $50,000 in net assets who did not complete high school.  Table 2.2 
presents summary information of the risk tolerance score for each demographic sub grouping.  
The left hand side of each panel summarises the RTS for each demographic and the right hand 
side of each panel summarises the age (in years) for each demographic group.  Panel A shows 
that the average RTS across the sample was 62.24.  Males (64.39) exhibit a significantly 
greater tolerance for risk compared to females (57.18).11  People who are unmarried (63.04) 
are more willing to bear risk compared to their married (62.04) counterparts, although this 
                                                 
11 The ANOVA test for the equality of means is used in this paper at a 5% significance level. 
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difference is not statistically significant.  The right hand side of Panel A reveals that the mean 
age of the survey respondents was 43.91 years and the average male survey participant (44.69 
years) is significantly older than the average female (42.09 years).  Finally, married 
respondents (46.20 years) were approximately ten years older compared to those who were 
unmarried (36.51).  
Table 2.1 Summary of the FinaMetrica Dataset by Demographics 
 
 Number of observations % of sample 
Panel A: Gender 
   Males 2105 70% 
   Females 898 30% 
Panel B: Age 
< 30 years old 580 19% 
31-40 years old 715 24% 
41-50 years old 686 23% 
51-60 years old 688 23% 
>60 years old 334 11% 
Panel C: Education (highest qualification attained) 
Did not complete high school 164 5% 
High School 375 12% 
Trade/Diploma 661 22% 
University 1803 60% 
Panel D: Income 
< $30,000 485 16% 
$30,000-$50,000 593 20% 
$50,000-$100,000 1125 37% 
$100,000-$200,000 553 18% 
>$200,000 247 8% 
Panel E: Marital status 
Married (incl. Defacto) 2280 76% 
Unmarried 723 24% 
Panel F: Net assets 
< $50,000 390 13% 
$50,000-$150,000 416 14% 
$150,000-$500,000 966 32% 
$500,000-$1,000,000 660 22% 
>$1,000,000 571 19% 
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Table 2.2  Risk Tolerance Score Summary 
 
Panel A: Full sample/gender/marital Status 
Risk tolerance score Age (years)  
Full sample Males Females Married Unmarried Full sample Males Females Married Unmarried 
 Mean 62.24 64.39 57.18 62.04 63.04 43.91 44.69 42.09 46.20 36.51 
 Median 62.00 64.00 57.00 62.00 64.00 44.00 44.00 42.00 46.00 31.00 
 Maximum 94.00 94.00 91.00 94.00 91.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 78.00 
 Minimum 22.00 23.00 22.00 22.00 23.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 
 Std. Dev. 12.24 11.62 12.17 12.19 12.27 13.16 13.10 13.13 12.05 13.87 
 Skewness -0.18 -0.20 -0.05 -0.16 -0.26 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.80 
 Kurtosis 2.97 3.12 2.83 3.01 2.91 2.16 2.17 2.13 2.22 2.65 
Panel B: Age-based subgroups 
 Risk tolerance score Age (years) 
Years  < 30 31-40 41-50 51-60 > 60 < 30 31-40 41-50 51-60 > 60 
 Mean 64.58 65.92 63.27 59.17 54.48 25.96 35.48 45.69 55.39 65.84 
 Median 65.00 66.00 63.00 59.00 55.00 26.00 36.00 46.00 55.00 64.00 
 Maximum 93.00 93.00 94.00 94.00 91.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 79.00 
 Minimum 26.00 31.00 23.00 22.00 23.00 21.00 31.00 41.00 51.00 61.00 
 Std. Dev. 11.78 11.63 10.98 12.41 11.47 3.02 2.84 2.82 2.77 4.68 
 Skewness -0.23 -0.16 -0.23 -0.08 -0.1 -0.24 -0.03 -0.13 0.04 0.99 
 Kurtosis 3.07 2.65 3.58 2.92 2.87 1.70 1.79 1.86 1.9 3.12 
Panel C: Education-based subgroups 
 Risk tolerance score Age (years) 
Education  
DNC* 
 
High Sch. 
 
Trade/Dip University 
 
DNC* 
 
High Sch. 
 
Trade/Dip University 
 Mean 57.58 58.13 60.83 64.10 50.82 46.05 47.39 41.53 
 Median 58.00 58.00 61.00 64.00 54.00 48.00 48.00 40.00 
 Maximum 91.00 92.00 94.00 94.00 76.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 
 Minimum 23.00 23.00 22.00 25.00 22.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 
 Std. Dev. 14.04 13.03 12.62 11.29 12.85 13.45 12.70 12.70 
 Skewness -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.29 -0.16 -0.01 0.33 
 Kurtosis 2.45 2.78 2.99 2.95  2.13 2.29 2.21 2.27 
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Panel D: Income-based subgroups 
 Risk tolerance score Age (years) 
Income Band < $30,000 $30,000-
$50,000 
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
>$200,000 < $30,000 $30,000-
$50,000 
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
>$200,000 
 Mean 55.42 60.69 63.84 66.41 64.68 45.05 43.43 43.28 44.13 45.84 
 Median 56.00 61.00 64.00 66.00 65.00 48.00 43.00 43.00 44.00 46.00 
 Maximum 92.00 91.00 94.00 93.00 94.00 79.00 79.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 
 Minimum 22.00 23.00 23.00 35.00 31.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 22.00 22.00 
 Std. Dev. 12.54 11.85 11.46 10.64 11.84 16.75 14.92 12.01 10.42 9.60 
 Skewness 0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.09 
 Kurtosis 2.74 2.98 3.05 2.90 2.87 1.69 1.89 2.20 2.39 2.82 
Panel E: Net assets-based subgroups 
 
 Risk tolerance score Age (years) 
N.A. Band < $50,000 $50,000-
$150,000 
$150,000-
$500,000 
$500,000-
$1,000,000
>$1,000,000 < $50,000 $50,000-
$150,000 
$150,000-
$500,000 
$500,000-
$1,000,000
>$1,000,000
 Mean 62.23 64.93 61.99 61.68 62.52 27.89 35.26 44.01 50.01 53.01 
 Median 63.00 66.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 26.00 32.00 43.00 50.00 54.00 
 Maximum 93.00 91.00 93.00 94.00 94.00 60.00 78.00 79.00 79.00 78.00 
 Minimum 26.00 23.00 22.00 28.00 28.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 22.00 
 Std. Dev. 11.65 12.97 12.60 11.50 11.61 7.56 10.21 11.47 10.35 9.65 
 Skewness -0.10 -0.42 -0.29 0.04 -0.03 1.87 1.34 0.46 0.09 -0.23 
 Kurtosis 3.17 3.15 2.97 2.81 2.89 6.62 4.88 2.56 2.61 2.96 
 
 Note: * -  did not complete high school.
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Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that the highest average RTS is exhibited by the 31 – 40 year age 
group (65.92).  Most interestingly, the relationship between the willingness to bear risk and 
age appears to be nonlinear.  The average RTS increases as people reach their 30’s most likely 
as a result of individuals gaining confidence and experience in the investment process.  As 
people enter their 40’s however, they become more conservative and their willingness to bear 
risk declines at an increasing rate.  The right hand side of Panel B presents the average age 
within each age sub grouping.  The mean age falls very close to the middle of each sub 
grouping (ie. in the 31 – 40 subgroup, the mean age was 35.48 years) and the descriptive 
statistics are very similar across all subgroups.  This gives confidence that the distribution of 
our sample respondents is consistent across the spectrum of ages and so the results are 
unlikely to be driven by the occurrence of outliers or a lack of observations in a particular 
grouping. 
 
Panel C presents the RTS classified by education level and as is to be expected, the more 
educated a person is, the greater their willingness to bear risk.  The mean age within each 
education level sub grouping reveals an interesting trend as those who did not finish high 
school (50.82 years) were on average significantly older compared to respondents who had 
completed university (41.53 years).  This is consistent with the general trend towards higher 
levels of education in Australian society and more people finishing school. 
 
The average RTS of survey participants categorised by their personal income (Panel D) shows 
that peoples’ attitudes to risk differ across income levels.  More specifically, for income 
brackets up to $200,000, average RTS and income display positive correlation. One possible 
interpretation of this finding is that individuals with higher incomes are better able to absorb, 
and are therefore more tolerant of, investment return variability. However, reported personal 
income in excess of $200,000 displays an average RTS somewhat lower than the RTS for the 
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$100-$200,000 income group.  It could be argued that this cross-sectional concavity in the 
income-RTS relationship is consistent with the economic concept of diminishing marginal 
utility of money - the more money people have, the less value they place on an additional 
dollar of income.  From Panel D, it would appear that individuals with an income in excess of 
$200,000 are willing to settle for a lower risk/return compared to those with an income of 
$100,000 to $200,000.  One could speculate that this may be because they value the potential 
additional investment returns less because of their lower marginal utility of money. 
 
Panel E presents the RTS categorised by Net Assets and the mean RTS is similar across all 
levels of asset holdings, except for the $50,000 - $150,000 which is significantly higher.  
Thus, individuals who have accumulated this level of assets are significantly different from all 
other holders of net assets as they are willing to take on higher levels of risk. 
 
2.4. Modelling the Determinants of Risk Tolerance 
 
In order to test the determinants of risk tolerance, a number of different demographic factors 
may be considered.  The data collected from the Personal Investor Magazine survey provides 
information as to gender, age, education, marital status, number of dependents, personal 
income, combined family income and net assets.  [This demographic data is collected as part 
of the FinaMetrica Risk Profiling process.] It is possible to quantify the effect of each of these 
demographic characteristics on the risk tolerance of an individual using statistical analysis.  
The model to be tested in this paper hypothesises that the RTS for individual i is a function of 
each of these demographic characteristics, ie.: 
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where RToli is the financial risk tolerance score for individual i provided by FinaMetrica 
based on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a value of zero to 100 
and;  
DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female;  
AGE is the age of the respondent (in whole years); 
NDEP is the number of people in the family whom are financially dependent on the 
respondent; 
DMARRIED is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the respondent is married (legally 
or defacto);  
DEDU captures the completed level of education of the respondent and includes did not 
complete high school (DEDU1), completed high school (DEDU2), trade/diploma (DEDU3), 
or university (DEDU4) level education; 
 DINC shows the respondent’s income as, < $30,000 (DINC1), $30,000 - $50,000 (DINC2), 
$50,000-$100,000 (DINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DINC4) or > $200,000 (DINC5);  
DCINC indicates if the respondent’s combined family income is, <$30,000 (DCINC1), $30,000 - 
$50,000 (DCINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DCINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DCINC4), or > 
$200,000 (DCINC5);  
DNASS takes a value of unity if the respondent’s net assets are <$50,000 (DNASS1), $50,000 - 
$150,000 (DNASS2), $150,000-$500,000 (DNASS3), $500,000-$1,000,000  (DNASS4) or > 
$1,000,000  (DNASS5).  
 
This model may be estimated using cross-sectional regression analysis and results are 
presented in Table 2.3.  The constant term in this model captures the omitted case which is an 
unqualified male with a personal and family income of less than  $30,000 and net assets of 
less than $50,000.  The RTS for this representative individual is 68.77 and the RTS for 
individuals who differ from our base case can be assessed by considering the significance and 
sign of the estimated coefficients in the model.  Gender is a significant determinant of risk 
tolerance and a female will exhibit a RTS of 6.8 points less compared to a demographically 
equivalent male.  Similarly, age is also a significant determinant of the RTS and risk tolerance 
declines around 3 score points for every passing decade.   
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Table 2.3 Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance Score on Demographic Variables 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. 
α  68.7765 2.20 31.28 0.000 
DFEM -6.8714 0.59 -11.66 0.000 
AGE -0.3101 0.03 -12.27 0.000 
NDEP -0.1413 0.17 -0.81 0.417 
DMARRIED -0.7449 1.64 -0.45 0.650 
DEDU2 -1.2268 1.17 -1.05 0.295 
DEDU3 -0.9134 1.08 -0.85 0.398 
DEDU4 0.5431 1.04 0.52 0.603 
DINC2 2.8231 0.95 2.97 0.003 
DINC3 3.7074 1.00 3.73 0.000 
DINC4 4.8002 1.21 3.98 0.000 
DINC5 2.8078 1.69 1.66 0.097 
DCINC2 3.6509 1.43 2.56 0.011 
DCINC3 3.0035 1.44 2.09 0.037 
DCINC4 3.4428 1.55 2.22 0.027 
DCINC5 3.4002 1.84 1.85 0.064 
DNASS2 3.8825 1.20 3.23 0.001 
DNASS3 3.8952 1.14 3.42 0.001 
DNASS4 4.4567 1.24 3.60 0.000 
DNASS5 5.4596 1.34 4.09 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  = 0.2134         DW  = 1.91         F-stat = 31.58 (P-value = 0.000) 
Wald Tests of Coefficient Equality : (DINC2 = DINC3 = DINC4 = DINC5)                P-value = 0.125 
                                                           (DINC4 = DINC5)                                          P-value = 0.117 
                                                           (DCINC2 = DCINC3 = DCINC4 = DCINC5)         P-value = 0.849 
                                                           (DNASS2 = DNASS3 = DNASS4 = DNASS5)       P-value = 0.191 
                                                           (DNASS4 = DNASS5)                                     P-value = 0.154 
 
The dependent variable of this regression is the financial risk tolerance score for individual i provided by 
FinaMetrica based on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a value of zero to 100. The 
independent variables are defined as follows: DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female; 
AGE is the age of the respondent (in whole years); NDEP is the number of people in the family whom are 
financially dependent on the respondent; DMARRIED is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the 
respondent is married (legally or defacto); DEDU captures the completed level of education of the respondent and 
includes did not complete high school (DEDU1), completed high school (DEDU2), trade/diploma (DEDU3), or 
university (DEDU4) level education; DINC shows the respondent’s income as, < $30,000 (DINC1), $30,000 - $50,000 
(DINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DINC4) or > $200,000 (DINC5); DCINC indicates if the 
respondent’s combined family income is, <$30,000 (DCINC1), $30,000 - $50,000 (DCINC2), $50,000-$100,000 
(DCINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DCINC4), or > $200,000 (DCINC5); DNASS takes a value of unity if the respondent’s 
net assets are <$50,000 (DNASS1), $50,000 - $150,000 (DNASS2), $150,000-$500,000 (DNASS3), $500,000-
$1,000,000  (DNASS4) or > $1,000,000  (DNASS5). 
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The series of dummy variables capturing the level of income of an individual (DINC) were all 
individually significant and positive as were the combined family income (DCINC) and net 
asset (DNASS) dummy variables.12  The estimated results indicate that the RTS of an individual 
generally increases as income and assets increase however, this effect does not appear to be 
uniform.  More specifically, a combined family income of >$30,000 is found to add 
approximately 3 points to the RTS as the estimated coefficient for DCINC2-5 ranges from 3.00 to 
3.65.  A Wald test of coefficient equality fails to reject the null hypothesis DCINC2 = DCINC3 = 
DCINC4 = DCINC5 at the 10% level.  The estimated coefficients for the DINC2-5 and DNASS2-5 series 
of dummy variables however, are less uniform.  For the former, higher levels of income are 
found to be associated with successively higher RTS except for the top income bracket.  
Although the increment to the RTS over the base case is still positive (DINC5 = 2.80), it is less 
than that found for the income bracket preceding it (DINC4 = 4.80).  A Wald test of coefficient 
equality between DINC5 and DINC4 generates a P-value of 0.11. A similar pattern is exhibited by 
the dummy variables capturing net assets and a Wald test of the equality of the DNASS4 = 
DNASS5 variables generates a P-value of 0.15. 
 
Not all of the demographic characteristics tested in equation (2.1) were found to be 
significant.  The level of education of an individual, their marital status and the number of 
dependents were all found to be insignificant in determining the RTS of our sample group. 
 
2.5. The Relationship Between Risk Tolerance and Age  
 
The model specified in equation (2.1) specifies a monotonic relationship between age and 
RTS.  It is possible that the RTS may decline geometrically with age however, and to test this 
hypothesis, age may be partitioned into a series of arbitrarily determined dummy variables.  
More specifically, five sub groupings were created which take on a value of unity where the 
                                                 
12 The DCINC5 variable was significant at the 10% level. 
 28
respondents age is 18 – 30 (DAGE1), 31 to 40  (DAGE2), 41 to 50  (DAGE3), 51 to 60  (DAGE4) or 
greater than 60 years (DAGE5).  Thus a modified version of equation (2.1) may be tested which 
takes the form: 
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where all variables are defined as per equation (2.1).  In this revised model, the base case 
becomes an unqualified male who is less than 30 years of age, with a personal and family 
income of less than $30,000 and net assets of less than $50,000.  The estimation results of this 
model are presented in Table 2.4 and excluding the series of dummy variables capturing age, 
the same pattern of coefficient signs and significance are observed in this revised model.  In 
terms of the age dummy variables, the 31 to 40 age grouping generally exhibits a 1.6 point 
lower RTS which is significant at the 10% level.  For the remaining age subgroups, the 
average RTS is significantly less than that of the base case and most importantly decreases at 
an increasing rate.  A Wald test of the equality of the estimated age dummy variable 
coefficients clearly rejects the null hypothesis of equality.  Thus, the evidence presented by 
this model suggests that the decline of the RTS as age increases is not linear.  
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Table 2.4 Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance Score on Demographic Variables 
(Age is Discrete) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. 
α0 60.4675 2.02 29.93 0.000 
DFEM -6.8307 0.59 -11.52 0.000 
DAGE2 -1.6245 0.91 -1.79 0.074 
DAGE3 -4.1182 0.98 -4.20 0.000 
DAGE4 -7.6958 1.00 -7.71 0.000 
DAGE5 -11.3967 1.16 -9.79 0.000 
NDEP -0.2201 0.19 -1.18 0.238 
DMARRIED -1.1606 1.65 -0.70 0.481 
DEDU2 -1.1928 1.18 -1.01 0.310 
DEDU3 -0.7867 1.08 -0.73 0.467 
DEDU4 0.7038 1.05 0.67 0.502 
DINC2 2.8673 0.95 3.01 0.003 
DINC3 3.7531 1.00 3.76 0.000 
DINC4 4.8817 1.21 4.03 0.000 
DINC5 2.9232 1.69 1.72 0.085 
DCINC2 3.6648 1.43 2.56 0.011 
DCINC3 3.0742 1.45 2.13 0.034 
DCINC4 3.5313 1.56 2.26 0.024 
DCINC5 3.4308 1.85 1.86 0.063 
DNASS2 3.3860 1.21 2.79 0.005 
DNASS3 3.0519 1.17 2.60 0.009 
DNASS4 3.4516 1.27 2.72 0.007 
DNASS5 4.4914 1.35 3.33 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.2104          DW = 1.91         F-stat = 26.75 (P-value = 0.000) 
Wald Tests of Coefficient Equality  :  (DAGE2 = DAGE3 = DAGE4 = DAGE5)        P-value = 0.000 
 
The dependent variable of this regression is the financial risk tolerance score for individual i provided by FinaMetrica 
based on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a value of zero to 100. The independent variables 
are defined as follows: DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female; DAGE captures the age of the 
respondent in discrete groups and includes age is: 18 – 30 (DAGE1), 31 to 40  (DAGE2), 41 to 50  (DAGE3), 51 to 60  
(DAGE4) or greater than 60 years (DAGE5); NDEP is the number of people in the family whom are financially dependent 
on the respondent; DMARRIED is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the respondent is married (legally or 
defacto); DEDU captures the completed level of education of the respondent and includes did not complete high school 
(DEDU1), completed high school (DEDU2), trade/diploma (DEDU3), or university (DEDU4) level education; DINC shows the 
respondent’s income as, < $30,000 (DINC1), $30,000 - $50,000 (DINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DINC3), $100,000-$200,000 
(DINC4) or > $200,000 (DINC5); DCINC indicates if the respondent’s combined family income is, <$30,000 (DCINC1), 
$30,000 - $50,000 (DCINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DCINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DCINC4), or > $200,000 (DCINC5); DNASS 
takes a value of unity if the respondent’s net assets are <$50,000 (DNASS1), $50,000 - $150,000 (DNASS2), $150,000-
$500,000 (DNASS3), $500,000-$1,000,000  (DNASS4) or > $1,000,000  (DNASS5). 
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Further evidence as to the potential nonlinear relationship between age and the RTS may be 
ascertained by testing a quadratic model.  To restrict the focus of this model, only the RTS 
and age (expressed as a continuous variable) are considered and as such, the model to be 
tested takes the form: 
 
iiii AgeAgeRTol εβββ +++= 2210      (2.3) 
 
The estimated regression results are presented in Table 2.5.  The significance of all of the 
estimated coefficients provides clear evidence of nonlinear effects in the relationship between 
age and RTS, which reinforces the evidence of equation (2.2).  A better understanding of this 
nonlinearity may be obtained using the estimated coefficients of equation (2.3).  Figure 2.1 
presents a plot of the predicted RTS for each year of age and the nonlinearity is clearly 
evident.   
 
Table 2.5  Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance Score on Demographic Variables 
with Quadratic Age (Continuous Variable) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. 
β 56.5749 2.25 25.17 0.000 
AGE 0.5646 0.10 5.40 0.000 
AGE2 -0.0091 0.00 -7.92 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  =  0.0885         DW = 1.901         F-stat =  154.51 (P-value = 0.000) 
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Figure 2.1 Plot of Predicted Risk Tolerance Score Across Age 
from Quadratic Model 
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Thus, our results confirm the basic proposition that as people get older, their risk tolerance 
declines at an increasing rate.  While the standard discounting argument can be used to justify 
this observation, the more recent literature provides an interesting alternative hypothesis, 
which suggests that biological changes in enzymes due to the aging process may be 
responsible (Harlow and Brown 1990). 
 
In addition to nonlinearity in the relationship between age and RTS, it is possible that other 
similar effects may be present in the data.  For example, there may be some form of 
interrelationship between wealth and age that has not been taken into account in the models 
tested so far.  To investigate this matter further, the interrelationship between age and sole and 
family income as well as wealth was investigated and significant effects were found to be 
associated with incomes and net assets.  A parsimonious model that focuses on these 
interrelationships may be specified as:  
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The estimated output for equation (2.4) is presented in Table 2.6 and an interpretation of this 
output suggests that high income (DCINC5) or low net assets (DNASS1) impact on the base case 
(ie. the constant), but also the relationship between age and RTS (ie. the slope).  Specifically, 
the decline in RTS as age increases is lessened for those individuals that fall into these two 
extreme sub groupings.  Figure 2.2 presents a plot of the relationship between RTS and age 
for the base case as suggested by the estimates presented in Table 2.6.  The impact of the 
DCINC5 and DNASS1 variables on this relationship are also presented in Figure 2.2 and the 
change in the slope generated by the two significant coefficients is clearly visible.  Thus, in 
addition to the nonlinearities which exist between age and RTS, evidence is also present to 
suggest that this relationship changes for high income and low asset individuals. 
 
Table 2.6 Parsimonious Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance Score on 
Demographic Variables Interacting with Age (Continuous Variable) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. 
χ 74.8115 1.37 54.47 0.000 
DFEM -6.7579 0.56 -11.87 0.000 
AGE -0.3279 0.02 -15.02 0.000 
DINC2 3.9068 0.82 4.73 0.000 
DINC3 4.9277 0.75 6.50 0.000 
DINC4 6.6933 0.87 7.61 0.000 
DINC5 4.2842 1.48 2.88 0.003 
DCINC5 -9.7001 3.07 -3.15 0.001 
DNASS1 -11.071 3.86 -2.86 0.004 
DCINC5*AGE 0.2319 0.06 3.49 0.000 
DNASS1*AGE 0.2223 0.11 1.85 0.063 
Adjusted R-squared  =  0.2091          DW = 1.908          F-stat = 46.101 (P-value = 0.000) 
 
The dependent variable of this regression is the financial risk tolerance score for individual i provided by 
FinaMetrica based on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a value of zero to 100. The 
independent variables are defined as follows: DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female; 
AGE is the age of the respondent (in whole years); DINC shows the respondent’s income as $30,000 - $50,000 
(DINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DINC4) or > $200,000 (DINC5); DCINC indicates if the 
respondent’s combined family income as  > $200,000 (DCINC5); DNASS takes a value of unity if the respondent’s 
net assets are <$50,000 (DNASS1). 
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Figure 2.2  Plot of Predicted Risk Tolerance Score Across Age for Three Different 
Representative Cases 
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Note: This Figure displays three illustrative cases from the regression equation 
estimated for Table 2.6. ‘Case 1’ is a male with an income of < $30,000; a combined 
family income of < $200,000; and net assets of >$50,000. ‘Case 2’ is the same as 
Case 1 except that the combined family income is > $200,000. ‘Case 3’ is the same as 
Case 1 except net assets are less than $50,000. 
 
2.6. Risk Tolerance and Wealth 
 
Section 2.5 clearly establishes age as an important determinant of an individual’s attitude to 
risk.  The evidence presented in section 2.4 however, also suggests that income and wealth are 
important determinants.  To investigate the influence of these factors on the RTS, a 
parsimonious version of equation (2.1) may be estimated in which only the most salient 
features of equation (2.1) are retained.  From the discussion in section 2.4, gender, age, 
income and net wealth are important determinants of the RTS.  The Wald tests of combined 
family income suggests that the effect of a family income of greater than $30,000 on RTS are 
uniform and as such may be incorporated into the base case.  Thus, DCINC1 is included in the 
model and the model to be tested may be specified as: 
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The estimation results of this parsimonious model are presented in Table 2.7 and all of the 
estimated coefficients are significant and retain their sign compared to their counterparts 
presented in Table 2.3.   
Table 2.7  Parsimonious Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance Score on 
Demographic Variables 
  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. 
φ 71.2458 1.49 47.80 0.000 
DFEM -6.7593 0.56 -12.03 0.000 
AGE -0.3153 0.02 -13.16 0.000 
DINC2 2.8807 0.93 3.09 0.002 
DINC3 3.9814 0.86 4.58 0.000 
DINC4 5.4870 0.97 5.62 0.000 
DINC5 3.4938 1.19 2.91 0.003 
DCINC1 -2.9650 1.29 -2.28 0.022 
DNASS2 3.6536 1.19 3.06 0.002 
DNASS3 3.5141 1.11 3.15 0.001 
DNASS4 4.1513 1.21 3.42 0.000 
DNASS5 5.1597 1.30 3.96 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.2020         DW  =  1.901          F-stat = 71.57 (P-value = 0.000) 
 
The dependent variable of this regression is the financial risk tolerance score for individual i provided 
by FinaMetrica based on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a value of zero to 100. The 
independent variables are defined as follows: DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female; 
AGE is the age of the respondent (in whole years); DINC shows the respondent’s income as, < $30,000 (DINC1), 
$30,000 - $50,000 (DINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DINC4) or > $200,000 (DINC5); DCINC 
indicates if the respondent’s combined family income is, <$30,000 (DCINC1), DNASS takes a value of unity if the 
respondent’s net assets are $50,000 - $150,000 (DNASS2), $150,000-$500,000 (DNASS3), $500,000-$1,000,000  
(DNASS4) or > $1,000,000  (DNASS5). 
 
One advantage of this parsimonious model is that it is relatively easy to estimate a matrix 
which shows the RTS for males and females as age and income varies.  Table 2.8 provides 
this information and Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provide a plot of this data to aid in the interpretation.  
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Table 2.8  Predicted Financial Risk Tolerance Scores from Parsimonious Model 
(of Table 2.7) – Combined Income > $30,000 and Net Assets < $1 
million 
 
 
Age (years) 
Income 
($000s) 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 
Panel A: Males 
< 30 63 62 60 59 57 55 54 52 51 49 
30 – 50 66 65 63 62 60 58 57 55 54 52 
50 – 100 67 66 64 63 61 59 58 56 55 53 
100 – 200 69 67 66 64 63 61 59 58 56 55 
>200 67 65 64 62 61 59 57 56 54 53 
Panel B: Females 
< 30k 57 55 53 52 50 49 47 46 44 42 
30 – 50 59 58 56 55 53 52 50 48 47 45 
50 – 100 61 59 57 56 54 53 51 50 48 46 
100 – 200 62 61 59 57 56 54 53 51 49 48 
>200 60 59 57 55 54 52 51 49 47 46 
 
Note  :  The base case from the parsimonious model of Table 2.7 is a male with an income below $30,000, a 
combined family income of more than $30,000 and net assets of less than $50,000. The predicted financial risk 
tolerance score in this table can be converted to the case of: 
(a) a family income less than $30,000 by deducting 3 index points  
(b) net assets of between $50,000 and $500,000 by adding 3 index points 
(c) net assets of between $500,000 and $1 million by adding 4 index points.  
(d) net assets of greater than $1 million by adding 5 index points. 
 
The figures provide a neat graphical interpretation of the lessons highlighted by the earlier 
models with respect to gender and age.  The surface for women lay entirely below the surface 
for men reflecting their general lower level of tolerance for risk.  Further, the downward slope 
of the surfaces reflects the decline in risk tolerance with age.  An interesting feature of these 
surfaces is their concavity with respect to income.  As income increases, the RTS of both men 
and women increases until the top income bracket where the average RTS declines somewhat 
irrespective as to age or gender.  This suggests that individuals whose income exceeds 
$200,000, are more concerned with the security of their investments compared to those 
earning $100,000 to $200,000.  This is an interesting result and suggests that the very wealthy 
in society are more cautious with respect to investment possibly as they are more concerned 
with protecting their wealth rather than increasing it. 
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Figure 2.3  Male Predicted Financial Risk Tolerance Scores from Parsimonious 
Model (Table 2.7) 
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Figure 2.4  Female Predicted Financial Risk Tolerance Scores from Parsimonious 
Model (Table 2.7) 
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2.7. Conclusion 
 
The FinaMetrica Personal Financial Profiling system has provided an opportunity to 
undertake a large sample examination of the relationship between subjective risk tolerance 
and demographic factors. While the sample group is not representative of the population at 
large, it is representative of those individuals likely to be active investors. The analysis 
provides insight into the effect of certain demographic characteristics on individuals’ attitudes 
towards risk. The validity of widely used demographics such as gender, age, income and 
wealth as determinants of risk tolerance is supported, although the relationships found are not 
as simple as implied by the demographic heuristics. The R2 values for the regressions, most of 
which are in the range 0.2-0.3, can be interpreted as evidence that variations in demographic 
characteristics, while relevant, are unable to fully explain variations in financial risk tolerance. 
Risk tolerance exhibits a concave relationship with income across all age groups, and 
irrespective of gender.  
 
 
It is interesting to note that education, marital status and dependents, which have been found 
to be significant in previous studies, were not found to be significant determinants of an 
individual’s attitude towards risk in this study. Accordingly, this finding is the subject of 
further examination, using a much larger sample, in Chapter 3.  
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Appendix 2.1 ProQuest Demographic Questionnaire 
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Chapter 3: An Empirical Investigation of Personal Financial Risk 
Tolerance – Extended Analysis With a Large Database13 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The exploratory analysis in Chapter 2 found that the gender, age, income and wealth 
demographics were determinants of financial risk tolerance, although the relationships found 
were not as simple as implied by the demographic heuristics. However, education, marital 
status and dependents, which have been found to be significant in previous studies, were not 
found to be significant determinants of an individual’s attitude towards risk in that study. 
 
The purpose of the research in this chapter is to provide further evidence as to the behavior 
and ‘determinants’ of investor risk tolerance.  In addition to an analysis of the relationship 
between risk tolerance and general demographics, special attention shall be given to issues 
surrounding age and marital status.  To this end, a database has been compiled which consists 
of a psychometrically derived financial risk tolerance score (RTS) for over 20,000 surveyed 
individuals as well as each respondent’s demographic characteristics.  This data shall be 
analysed to provide further empirical insights into the nature of investor risk tolerance.   
 
The remainder of this Chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 3.2 details the risk tolerance 
database and sample used in this paper.  Section 3.3 presents the results of econometric 
analysis into the determinants of risk tolerance as well as some observations as to the nature 
of risk tolerance among investors.  Section 3.4 summarises our findings.   
 
 
                                                 
13 Parts of this chapter are drawn from a paper published by the candidate: Hallahan, T., Faff, R. and MacKenzie, 
M. (2004). An Empirical Investigation of Personal Financial Risk Tolerance, Financial Services Review, 13, 57-
78. 
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3.2. Sample Description 
 
The FinaMetrica database used in this study consists of the RTS and associated demographics 
for individuals who have completed the test over the period May, 1999 to February 2002. The 
majority of these data are sourced from clients of personal financial planners who take this 
test as a first step in constructing a personalised financial plan.  Access to the survey is online 
via the FinaMetrica website. A subset of the data (approximately 1900 observations) were 
respondents who completed the test in response to an invitation made to readers of Personal 
Investor magazine. The Personal Investor readers completed the test by visiting the 
magazine’s website where they could then access an internet link to the FinaMetrica 
website.14 
 
Following the approach discussed in Section 2.2, respondents who recorded their year of birth 
implying an age of less than 20 years or older than 80 years, and respondents who generated 
an RTS outside the range 20-95 were omitted from the analysis, as such responses were not 
considered plausible.15 A total of 356 respondents were excluded on these criteria, leaving a 
sample of 20,415.  Almost all respondents are Australian, with approximately only 0.5% 
giving an international home address. 
 
A summary of the demographic information for the investors captured in this database is 
presented in Table 3.1.  Unfortunately, not all of the respondents who completed the survey 
and received an assessment of their financial risk tolerance also completed all of the 
demographic questions.  As such, the number of observations for each demographic will be 
less than the total size of the RTS database.  The ‘typical’ respondent in the survey is a 
                                                 
14 The Personal Investor data does not significantly differ from the main database. 
15 Application of the age filter resulted in the exclusion of 129 observations while the RTS boundary excluded a 
further 66 responses. 
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married university educated male who is 51 – 60 years old with an annual income of $50,000 
- $100,000 and net assets of $150,000 - $500,000.   
 
Table 3.1 Summary of the FinaMetrica Dataset by Demographics 
 
 
 Number of 
Observations 
% of Sample 
Panel A: Gender 
Males 14444 70.75 
Females 5971 29.25 
Total Responses 20415  
Panel B: Age 
< 30 years old 2359 13.67 
30-40 years old 3957 22.93 
41-50 years old 4012 23.25 
51-60 years old 4399 25.49 
>60 years old 2528 14.65 
Total Responses 17255  
Panel C: Education (highest qualification attained) 
Did not Complete High School 1369 8.00 
High School 2878 16.81 
Trade/Diploma 4292 25.07 
University 8582 50.13 
Total Responses 17121  
Panel D: Marital Status 
Married (incl. Defacto) 13217 77.66 
Unmarried 3802 22.34 
Total Responses 17019  
Panel E: Income 
< $30,000 3454 20.53 
$30,000-$50,000 3989 23.71 
$50,000-$100,000 5340 31.74 
$100,000-$200,000 3018 17.94 
>$200,000 1025 6.09 
Total Responses 16826  
Panel F: Net Assets 
< $50,000 2118 12.87 
$50,000-$150,000 2349 14.27 
$150,000-$500,000 5884 35.75 
$500,000-$1,000,000 3481 21.15 
>$1,000,000 2629 15.97 
Total Responses 16461  
 
More specifically, Panel A of Table 3.1 reveals that males (70.75%) represent a higher 
proportion of the database compared to females (29.25%).  Panel B shows that a relatively 
small number of investors aged less than 30 years are represented in the database while the 
majority (25.49%) are aged 51- 60.  This is to be expected given that people are more 
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concerned with their ability to provide for themselves the closer retirement looms.  As such, 
the likelihood of an individual seeking advice from a financial planner and undertaking the 
FinaMetrica survey increases with age which is reflected in these demographics. 
 
The highest educational qualification attained for the respondents is summarised in Panel C of 
Table 3.1 and just on half of the individuals who answered this demographic question had 
completed university.  This result may be biased as individuals who did not complete some 
form of tertiary education may not be inclined to answer.  One interesting issue this 
demographic information raises is whether more educated individuals have more money and 
so they are more likely to need to services of a financial planner and hence undertake the 
FinaMetrica survey.  This is an empirical issue, which will be considered later in this chapter. 
 
The majority of the survey respondents are married (77.66%), and when combined with the 
earlier evidence as to the gender composition of the database, this demographic information 
tends to reinforce the notion that males are the primary source of financial decision making in 
households.  Finally, Panel E and F summarise the income and wealth composition of the 
database, respectively.  Almost half of the respondents answering this question earn $50,000 
or less (44%) while 56% own assets of between $150,000 and $1,000,000.  Taken in 
conjunction with the age information discussed earlier, this tends to suggest that the typical 
survey respondent is nearing or at retirement and is asset rich and income poor.   
3.3. Empirical Analysis 
 
Analysis of the dataset has two facets: investigating the relationship between subjective and 
objective estimates of risk tolerance (Section 3.3.1), and exploring the relationship between   
demographic variables and risk tolerance scores (Section 3.3.2). 
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3.3.1. Self-Assessed Risk Tolerance 
 
The FinaMetrica survey contains a question in which respondents are asked to estimate their 
RTS ex ante.16  It is interesting to consider the relationship between their self-assessed risk 
tolerance (SRTS) and that estimated by the FinaMetrica survey.  As a first step in the analysis, 
it was found that the average difference between the RTS and SRTS is 5.33 (σ = 8.49).  This 
suggests that individuals typically underestimate their risk tolerance score by approximately 5 
points. In unreported results the indication is that the younger, more educated and higher 
income respondents have a greater tendency to underestimate their financial risk tolerance. 
 
Recall that the RTS is measured on a scale from 0-100 and so it would appear that most 
peoples’ assessment of their capacity to bear risk accords to their revealed preferences as 
indicated by their answers to the survey.  This is not true of all respondents however, as the 
maximum difference was 74 points and the minimum difference was –63 points.17  A 
histogram of the data is presented in Figure 3.1. The analysis revealed that 803 individuals 
were correct in their estimation of their own RTS, 4691 individuals overestimated and 14,921 
underestimated their RTS.  Thus, for some individuals, their answers to the survey suggested 
a risk tolerance far different from their own perception of their ability to absorb risk and the 
majority tended to underestimate their risk tolerance to varying degrees.   
 
                                                 
16 The actual question reads: “This questionnaire is scored on a scale of 0 to 100.  In practice, however, the 
scores range from around 20 to around 80, with the average being 50.  When the scores are graphed they follow 
the familiar bell-shaped curve of the Normal Distribution (diagram provided).  About two-thirds of all scores are 
within 10 points of the average.  What do you think your score will be?” 
17 These extreme values are not the norm and 99% of the differences fell in the range of ±25 points.  FinaMetrica 
consider approximately ±20 points to be within the bounds of possibility. 
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Figure 3.1  Histogram of the Difference Between Actual and Self-Assessed Risk 
Tolerance Score 
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Further insights to this relationship may be gained by estimating a regression equation 
between SRTS and the FinaMetrica RTS.  The estimated regression output may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
              SRTS   =   4.12  +   0.838 RTS  
                                                            t-statistic:   (15.19)  (185.67) 
R2 = 0.628, F-stat (p-value) = 0.000 
 
The estimated coefficients verify the significant positive association between people’s own 
perception of their risk tolerance and the RTS.  On average, a respondent’s self-assessed RTS 
is approximately 4.12 points plus 83.8% of their actual RTS.   
 
Another way in which the consistency between individuals expressed and revealed risk 
preferences may be established is to cross reference their RTS with their answer to a question 
from the FinaMetrica survey in which respondents were asked to choose the most appealing 
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portfolio from a selection each of which is composed of a different mix of high, medium and 
low risk/return assets: 18 
  
Portfolio Risk/Return 
 High Medium Low 
1 0% 0% 100% 
2 0% 30% 70% 
3 10% 40% 50% 
4 30% 40% 30% 
5 50% 40% 10% 
6 70% 30% 0% 
7 100% 0% 0% 
 
 
Figure 3.2 presents information as to the number of respondents (Z-axis) selecting each of the 
seven portfolios (Y-axis) grouped by RTS (X-axis).  Portfolio 4, which contains the most 
even mix of the three asset classes, is the most popular choice among investors (6986 or 34% 
of the observations).  The RTS of individuals selecting this portfolio ranged from 20 to 90, 
however the majority (3327 observations) possessed a RTS of between 50 – 59.  The second 
most popular portfolio was number five which was a more aggressive portfolio with a 
relatively higher weighting of high risk/high return assets (4981 observations).  Portfolios 
three and six were preferred by a similar number of investors (3309 and 3284, respectively) 
while relatively few investors chose portfolios one, two or seven (160, 834 and 807, 
respectively).  Thus, the responses of investors are logically consistent as the ‘average’ 
investor (in terms of RTS) most commonly selected the ‘average’ portfolio (in terms of the 
most even mix of assets). 
 
                                                 
18 The actual question reads: “Most Investment portfolios have a spread of investments - some of  the 
investments may have a high expected returns but with high risk, some may have medium expected returns and 
medium risk, and some may be low risk/low return (For example, shares and property would be high risk/high 
return, whereas cash and term deposits would be low risk/low return).  Which spread of investments do you find 
the most appealing? Would you prefer all low risk/low return, all high risk/high return or somewhere in 
between?” (table presented) 
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Figure 3.2  Investor Risk Tolerance and Portfolio Composition 
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This figure presents information as to the number of respondents (Y-axis) selecting one of seven 
portfolios (Z-axis) grouped by RTS (X-axis).  Each portfolio contains a different mix of 
low/medium/high risk assets with successively higher numbered portfolios weighted more toward the 
high risk/return asset. 
 
Given the increasing risk associated with each successively higher numbered portfolio, logic 
suggests that the average RTS of investors preferring each portfolio should also increase. This 
would be consistent with the peak of the surface for each portfolio occurring at a higher RTS.  
It is not easy to distinguish these peaks from Figure 3.2 due to the different number of 
observations in each portfolio.  As such, Figure 3.3 shows investors preferences for each 
portfolio grouped by RTS where the Y-axis is expressed as a percentage of the total number 
of investors choosing each portfolio.  Portfolio 1 contains the low risk/return spread of 
investments and it was most frequently selected (40%) by investors with an RTS of between 
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20 – 29.  For higher portfolios, which exhibit a higher level of risk/return, the most frequently 
observed RTS of individuals selecting that portfolio successively increases which is consistent 
with our expectations.  This highest risk/return portfolio (portfolio 7) was most commonly 
selected by individuals with a RTS of 80 – 90 (40%).  These results suggest that people tend 
to choose a portfolio which is consistent with their inherent propensity to bear risk.    
 
Figure 3.3  Investor Risk Tolerance and Portfolio Composition (Percentage) 
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This figure presents information on the percentage of the total number of investors (Y-axis) selecting 
one of seven portfolios (Z-axis) grouped by RTS (X-axis).  Each portfolio contains a different mix of 
low/medium/high risk assets with successively higher numbered portfolios weighted more toward the 
high risk/return asset. 
 
In general, the results serve to confirm the rationality of individual’s choices.  Investors 
responses to individual questions, which represent their expressed preferences, are broadly 
consistent with their overall level of risk tolerance, ie. their revealed preference.19   
                                                 
19 It is acknowledged there is an element of endogeneity to this analysis as the answers to these two questions are 
used to generate the FinaMetrica estimate of RTS but it is considered to be an interesting outcome nonetheless.   
 55
 
3.3.2. The Role of Demographic Factors 
 
The FinaMetrica database contains information on a number of different demographic factors 
for each respondent, namely, age, number of dependents, gender, marital status, education, 
personal income, combined family income and net assets. As discussed in Section 3.1, past 
research involving these variables has provided conflicting results. Accordingly, hierarchical 
regression was employed to assess which of the variables make a significant contribution to 
the prediction of risk tolerance. The hierarchical regression was structured with the interval-
level variables for the demographic characteristics of age and the number of dependents 
constituting the base-case regression. In light of the results of Riley and Chow (1992) and 
Bajtelsmit and VanDerhai (1997, a test for the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship 
between age and risk tolerance was included in the form of a quadratic age term. The 
remaining demographic characteristics, that is, gender, marital status, education, income, 
combined income and net assets, which enter the FinaMetrica database as ordinal-level 
variables, were dummy coded and entered sequentially as separate sets of predictors, judged 
in order of importance having reference to past research.  
 
The results of estimating this model are presented in Table 3.2. The incremental change in the 
reported R2 values indicates the contribution toward prediction of each of the ordinal-level 
independent variables. Consistent with the bulk of prior research, the greatest change in the R2 
values above the base-case is associated with the introduction of the first variable, gender, as 
an explanatory variable. Interestingly, the subsequent addition of marital status fails to 
increase the explanatory power of the regression. The increments to the R2 values generated 
by the sequential introduction of the remaining variables show a pattern of monotonic 
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increase, confirming that these variables make a significant contribution to the prediction of 
risk tolerance scores. 
 
Table 3.2 Heirachical Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance on Demographic 
Variables  
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R2 = 0.239 
F-stat = 257.53 
P-value = 0.000 
 
 
The final hierarchical regression model contains the full set of predictors and provides a 
quantification of the relationship between each of the demographic characteristics and RTS 
according to the following specification: 
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where RTSi is the financial risk tolerance score for individual i provided by FinaMetrica based 
on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a possible value between 0 
and 100 and: 
• DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female;  
• AGE is the age of the respondent; 
• AGE2 is a quadratic age term 
• NDEP is the number of people in the family whom are financially dependent on the 
respondent; 
• DMARRIED is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the respondent is married 
(legally or defacto);  
• DEDU captures the completed level of education of the respondent and includes did not 
complete high school (DEDU1), completed high school (DEDU2), trade/diploma (DEDU3), 
or university (DEDU4) level of education; 
• DINC shows the respondent’s income as, < $30,000 (DINC1), $30,000 - $50,000 (DINC2), 
$50,000-$100,000 (DINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DINC4) or > $200,000 (DINC5);  
• DCINC indicates if the respondent’s combined family income is, <$30,000 (DCINC1), 
$30,000 - $50,000 (DCINC2), $50,000-$100,000 (DCINC3), $100,000-$200,000 (DCINC4), 
or > $200,000 (DCINC5);  
• DNASS takes a value of unity if the respondent’s net assets are <$50,000 (DNASS1), 
$50,000 - $150,000 (DNASS2), $150,000-$500,000 (DNASS3), $500,000-$1,000,000  
(DNASS4) or > $1,000,000  (DNASS5).  
 
The results of estimating this model are presented in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3 Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance on Demographic Variables 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value. 
α0 62.3874 1.1413 54.66 0.000 
DFEM -6.2031 0.2032 -30.53 0.000 
AGE 0.0344 0.0528 0.65 0.515 
AGE2 -0.0037 0.0006 -6.68 0.000 
NDEP -0.1921 0.0734 -2.62 0.009 
DMARRIED -2.2212 0.3972 -5.59 0.000 
DEDU2 0.6674 0.3750 1.78 0.075 
DEDU3 2.0019 0.3561 5.62 0.000 
DEDU4 3.2289 0.3479 9.28 0.000 
DINC2 0.9968 0.2766 3.60 0.000 
DINC3 2.9354 0.2911 10.08 0.000 
DINC4 3.5479 0.3405 10.42 0.000 
DINC5 2.7522 0.5851 4.70 0.000 
DCINC2 0.7248 0.4198 1.73 0.084 
DCINC3 1.7483 0.3915 4.47 0.000 
DCINC4 2.8219 0.4220 6.69 0.000 
DCINC5 3.0323 0.5578 5.44 0.000 
DNASS2 1.6275 0.3556 4.58 0.000 
DNASS3 1.4132 0.3437 4.11 0.000 
DNASS4 3.1242 0.3867 8.08 0.000 
DNASS5 3.9484 0.4289 9.21 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  =  0.2384         F-stat =  257.53 (P-value = 0.000) 
Wald Tests of Coefficient Equality:  (DINC2 = DINC3 = DINC4 = DINC5)                        P-value = 0.000 
                                                 (DINC4 = DINC5)                                          P-value = 0.130 
                                                           (DCINC2 = DCINC3 = DCINC4 = DCINC5)                 P-value = 0.000 
                                                 (DNASS2 = DNASS3 = DNASS4 = DNASS5)            P-value = 0.000 
                                                 (DNASS4 = DNASS5)                                      P-value = 0.006 
 
This table presents a summary of the estimated regression output for the equation: 
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where RTSi is the FinaMetrica RTS for individual i, Age is the age expressed in years, NDEP is the 
number of financial dependents, D are dummy variables for gender (FEM), marital status 
(MARRIED), education (EDU), income (INC) and combined income (CINC), and α are the 
coefficients to be estimated. 
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The constant term in this model of 62.39 captures the omitted case which is an unqualified 
unmarried male with no dependents and having a personal and family income of less than  
$30,000 and net assets of less than $50,000. The RTS for individuals who differ from the base 
case can be assessed by considering the significance and sign of the estimated coefficients in 
the model.  Gender is a significant determinant of risk tolerance and a female will exhibit an 
RTS of 6.20 points less compared to a demographically equivalent male.  Similarly, age 
(squared) and marital status are found to be significant determinants of the RTS. While 
marriage simply decreases the RTS by two points, the relationship between age and RTS is 
revealed as more complex: the regression output shows that the age variable is nonsignificant, 
while the nonlinear age term is highly significant. This provides clear evidence as to the 
presence of nonlinear effects in the relationship between age and RTS: the negative sign of 
the coefficient on the quadratic age variable term (α3) indicates that risk tolerance declines at 
an increasing rate as age increases.  
 
 As the constant term in the model is based on an age of zero, the RTS for a representative 
individual aged, for example, 20 years becomes 60.91 (62.39+400*-0.0037).  Figure 3.4 
provides a comparative plot of the relationship between age and RTS in the linear (as given 
by an unreported estimation of equation 3.1 minus the quadratic term) and nonlinear (as given 
by equation 3.1 above) case.  The nonlinear nature of this relationship can clearly be seen and 
reveals the extent to which the change in RTS for a change in age increases the older the 
individual concerned.  The relationship between RTS and the other demographic variables 
included in this regression equation are entirely consistent with those discussed in Section 3.2 
and so a more detailed discussion of these non-age variables is excluded for the sake of 
brevity.  
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Figure 3.4 Forecast RTS using a Linear and Nonlinear Age Variable 
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This diagram forecasts the risk tolerance score for different aged investors.  The nonlinear 
forecast represents the base case individual of Table 3.3 plus an adjustment for age as 
given by the quadratic age coefficient in that table.  The linear forecast represents the base 
case individual of Table 3.3 where the model is estimated excluding the quadratic age 
coefficient.   
 
 
The series of dummy variables capturing the level of income of an individual (DINC) were all 
individually significant and positive as were the net asset (DNASS) dummy variables.  The 
estimated results indicate that the RTS of an individual generally increases as income and 
assets increases.  A Wald test of coefficient equality rejects the null hypothesis of coefficient 
equality for the income, combined income and net asset dummy variables, respectively.  This 
positive relationship between income, assets and risk tolerance does not appear to be uniform.  
Specifically, higher levels of income are found to be associated with successively higher RTS 
except for the top income bracket.  Although the increment to the RTS over the base case is 
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still positive (DINC5 = 2.75), it is less than that found for the income bracket preceding it 
(DINC4 = 3.55).  A Wald test of coefficient equality however, between DINC4 and DINC5 
generates a p-value of 0.130 which suggests this difference is not statistically significant.  
 
Not all of the demographic characteristics tested in equation (1) were found to be significant.  
In terms of the level of education of an individual, at least a trade/diploma level of education 
was required before a significant increase (at the 5% level) in RTS was observed.  Further, the 
number of dependents was found to be significantly associated with RTS for the sample 
group, although the impact on RTS is small in magnitude.   
 
Overall, these results suggest that gender, age, number of dependents, marital status, tertiary 
education, income and wealth are all related to risk tolerance.  The results for gender, 
education and income are consistent with the earlier literature.  However, the positive 
relationship for wealth and RTS contrasts with the results of Bernheim et al (2001) who found 
no relationship between risk tolerance and wealth.   
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3.3.3. Age and Risk Tolerance 
 
The negative relationship between age-squared and RTS, discussed in the previous section, is 
a particularly interesting result: while consistent with the findings from the smaller sample 
study presented in Chapter 2, it nevertheless conflicts with much of the current literature 
which has found that a positive or no relationship between age and risk tolerance exists (see 
Wang and Hanna 1997; Grable and Joo 1997; Grable and Lytton 1998, Hanna et al., 1998; 
Grable 2000, Hariharan et al., 2000; and Gollier and Zeckhauser, 2002), although the 
presence of non-linearity is consistent in that regard with the findings of  Riley and Chow 
(1992) and Bajtelsmit and VanDerhai (1997).  
 
Further insights on the relationship between age and RTS may be gained by focusing the 
analysis on those individuals who recorded their age as over 60.  Table 3.4, Panel A reveals 
this group of retired and semi-retired individuals generated the lowest RTS of 51.02 and 
exhibited the smallest variation of scores (compared to unreported results for similar analysis 
of the full dataset).  This is not to suggest that this age group of investors do not exhibit a 
diversity of risk profiles.  A histogram of the RTS for this subgroup of our data is presented in 
Figure 3.5 and shows that 60+ investors are a very heterogenous group with a wide 
distribution of RTS ranging from extremely conservative to highly risk tolerant.   
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Figure 3. 5 Histogram of Risk Tolerance Scores For Individuals Over 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the distribution of risk tolerance scores for respondents aged 60+ 
 
 
This result may provide some insights as to why there is a no clear consensus as to the impact 
of age on risk tolerance.  Given there is such a wide range of RTS to be found within this age 
group, the results could be sample dependent and a sufficiently large sample may be 
necessary to avoid bias.   
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Table 3.4 Risk Tolerance Score Summary for Respondents Aged Over 60 
 
 
Panel A: Risk Tolerance Score for all 60+ investors by Sample, Gender and Marital 
Status 
 All Males Females Married Unmarried 
 Mean 51.02 53.20 45.74 51.61 48.03 
 Median 51.00 53.00 45.00 51.00 47.00 
 Maximum 91.00 91.00 81.00 91.00 90.00 
 Minimum 20.00 20.00 21.00 20.00 21.00 
 Std. Dev. 11.64 11.34 10.60 11.50 11.86 
Panel B: Risk Tolerance Score by Education-Based Subgroups 
 
Education DNC* 
 
High School 
 
Trade/Diploma University 
 Mean 47.34 47.97 51.20 54.96 
 Median 46.00 48.00 50.00 55.00 
 Maximum 83.00 82.00 90.00 91.00 
 Minimum 20.00 21.00 22.00 21.00 
 Std. Dev. 11.51 11.16 11.45 11.01 
Panel C: Risk Tolerance Score by Income-Based Subgroups 
 
Income Band 
< $30,000 $30,000-
$50,000 
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
>$200,000 
 Mean 47.11 51.37 55.85 57.70 56.17 
 Median 47.00 52.00 55.00 58.00 56.00 
 Maximum 82.00 83.00 90.00 91.00 83.00 
 Minimum 20.00 20.00 25.00 26.00 31.00 
 Std. Dev. 10.67 10.63 11.47 12.02 10.95 
Panel D: Risk Tolerance Score by Net Asset-Based Subgroups 
Net Asset Band < $50,000 $50,000-
$150,000 
$150,000-
$500,000 
$500,000-
$1,000,000 
>$1,000,000 
 Mean 50.70 45.64 47.66 52.03 56.72 
 Median 49.00 45.00 47.00 51.00 56.00 
 Maximum 82.00 85.00 89.00 88.00 91.00 
 Minimum 28.00 25.00 20.00 22.00 22.00 
 Std. Dev. 13.25 10.94 11.57 10.68 10.62 
 
 Note: * DNC – did not complete high school. 
 
 All of these RTS pairs are significantly different except the average RTS between: 
(1)  DNC and High School  
(2)  The following income bands   
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
>$200,000 
(3)  The following net asset bands  
< $50,000 $50,000-$150,000 
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A comparison of the RTS for these predominantly retired individuals to that of the whole 
sample (Table 3.3) reveals that their risk tolerance is lower across all demographic groupings.  
Beyond this general observation, the same patterns are observed in terms of gender, education 
and income as were found across the entire database.  Two notable exceptions are: First, the 
RTS of married 60+ investors is higher than those who are unmarried which is the opposite of 
the trend for the full sample discussed in Section 3.3.  Second, the U-Shaped trend in the RTS 
across asset-based subgroupings is asymmetric in this case.  Panel D of Table 3.4 reveals that 
RTS falls and then increases as assets levels rise, which is consistent with the trend (identified 
in unreported results) for the full dataset.  The asymmetry exists in that the RTS increases to 
56.72 in the case of investors with assets of >$1,000,000 which is statistically higher than (at 
the 5% level of significance) the RTS of those individuals in the lowest asset grouping 
(50.70).  Across the whole sample, these two average RTS values were closer in value (61.34 
and 60.56 for the lowest and highest groupings respectively). There are sufficient 
observations to suggest that this anomaly is not a function of sample size, but no obvious 
reason exists for this outcome.  
 
The impact of the various demographic variables on RTS for respondents aged over 60 may 
be formally assessed by estimating equation 3.1 for this subgroup of our data.  The regression 
output is summarised in Table 3.5 and the coefficients relating to the gender, number of 
dependents and marital status are substantively unchanged to those observed in Table 3.3. A 
notable feature of the data is the relationship between RTS and age: in contrast to the results 
for the full dataset, the coefficient for the age variable (α2) is negative and significant and the 
coefficient for the quadratic age variable (α3) is positive and significant, indicating that RTS 
for this group decreases at a decreasing rate, rather than the increasing rate which 
characterises the full dataset. However, a minimum RTS is reached at age 75. Another 
interesting feature of this data relates to the nonsignificance of the completed high school 
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education variable (DEDU2), the $30,000 - $50,000 (DINC2) and the >$200,000 (DINC5) income 
variables.  Further, a significant negative relationship between two of the net asset dummy 
variables and RTS is found in contrast to the positive relationship estimated for the entire 
sample. 
Table 3.5  Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance on Demographic Variables for 
Respondents Aged Over 60 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
α0 158.3557 43.6252 3.63 0.000 
DFEM -5.5949 0.5319 10.52 0.000 
AGE -2.9099 1.2817 2.27 0.023 
AGE2 0.0195 0.0094 2.08 0.038 
NDEP -0.2446 0.3004 0.81 0.416 
DMARRIED -1.6558 0.7951 2.08 0.037 
DEDU2 0.0725 0.6957 0.10 0.917 
DEDU3 1.2995 0.6495 2.00 0.046 
DEDU4 3.1827 0.6753 4.71 0.000 
DINC2 0.2839 0.6466 0.44 0.661 
DINC3 2.0641 0.8119 2.54 0.011 
DINC4 2.4833 1.1817 2.10 0.036 
DINC5 -0.7106 1.9988 0.36 0.722 
DCINC2 2.6323 0.7208 3.65 0.000 
DCINC3 3.1202 0.8134 3.84 0.000 
DCINC4 2.7465 1.0883 2.52 0.012 
DCINC5 4.0693 1.7557 2.32 0.021 
DNASS2 -3.9618 1.4806 2.68 0.008 
DNASS3 -3.3609 1.2862 2.61 0.009 
DNASS4 -0.9039 1.3103 0.69 0.490 
DNASS5 1.8870 1.351 1.40 0.163 
Adjusted R-squared  = 0.2128         F-stat = 33.25 (P-value = 0.000) 
Wald Tests of Coefficient Equality: (DINC2 = DINC3 = DINC4 = DINC5)                 P-value = 0.032 
                                                           (DINC4 = DINC5)                                          P-value = 0.091 
                                                           (DCINC2 = DCINC3 = DCINC4 = DCINC5)         P-value = 0.767 
                                                           (DNASS2 = DNASS3 = DNASS4 = DNASS5)       P-value = 0.000 
                                                           (DNASS4 = DNASS5)                                     P-value = 0.000 
 
This table presents a summary of the estimated regression output for the equation fitted to a restricted dataset of 
respondents aged 60+: 
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where RTSi is the FinaMetrica RTS for individual i, Age is the age expressed in years, NDEP is the number of 
financial dependents, D are dummy variables for gender (FEM), marital status (MARRIED), education (EDU), 
income (INC) and combined income (CINC), and α are the coefficients to be estimated. 
 67
 
 
3.3.4. Marital Status and Risk Tolerance 
 
Marital status is a potentially important demographic which impacts on the preferred level of 
risk in the investment process.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between marital 
status and risk tolerance remains unresolved: although there is some evidence that single 
investors are more risk tolerant, a number of studies has failed to identify any significant 
relationship (McInish, 1982; Masters, 1989; and Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). The 
exploratory study reported in Chapter 2 found a negative relationship between marital status 
and risk tolerance: in contrast, the evidence from the examination of the larger database, 
provided in Table 3.3 and discussed in Section 3.3.2, suggests marriage is a significant 
determinant of RTS.  Accordingly, it is worthwhile considering this result in more detail using 
an extended analysis of the FinaMetrica database.  Table 3.6 presents a summary of the RTS 
by marital status and various demographics. 
 
 68 
Table 3.6 Risk Tolerance Score Summary for Married Respondents 
 
 
Panel A: Risk Tolerance Score by Marital Status and Gender 
 Married Unmarried Married Males  Unmarried Males Married Females Unmarried Females 
 Mean  58.83  60.29  61.00  64.01  53.97  55.72 
 Median  59.00  60.00  61.00  64.00  54.00  56.00 
 Maximum  95.00  95.00  95.00  95.00  93.00  91.00 
 Minimum  20.00  21.00  20.00  23.00  20.00  21.00 
 Std. Dev.  12.65  13.43  12.26  12.83  12.15  12.73 
Panel B: Risk Tolerance Score by Marital Status and Education-Based Subgroups 
 Married Unmarried 
 
Education  DNC* 
 
High Sch. 
 
Trade/Dip University DNC* 
 
High Sch. 
 
Trade/Dip University 
 Mean  52.43  55.03  58.13  61.71  50.41  55.76  59.33  63.06 
 Median  52.00  55.00  58.00  62.00  48.00  56.00  59.00  63.00 
 Maximum  91.00  92.00  95.00  95.00  89.00  92.00  94.00  95.00 
 Minimum  20.00  21.00  20.00  24.00  21.00  21.00  25.00  21.00 
 Std. Dev.  13.02  12.46  12.77  11.72  13.36  13.85  13.57  12.34 
Panel C: Risk Tolerance Score by Marital Status and Income-Based Subgroups 
 Married Unmarried 
Income Band < $30,000 $30,000-
$50,000 
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
>$200,000 < $30,000 $30,000-
$50,000 
$50,000-
$100,000 
$100,000-
$200,000 
>$200,000 
 Mean  51.23  56.58  61.13  64.71  63.79  55.55  59.36  63.62  62.35  65.11 
 Median  51.00  56.00  61.00  65.00  63.50  55.00  59.00  63.00  63.00  66.00 
 Maximum  93.00  93.00  94.00  95.00  95.00  92.00  93.00  95.00  95.00  95.00 
 Minimum  20.00  20.00  20.00  26.00  27.00  21.00  22.00  23.00  26.00  31.00 
 Std. Dev.  11.67  12.06  11.86  11.50  10.98  13.34  13.43  12.22  11.92  13.92 
 
Note: * DNC – did not complete high school. 
All of these RTS scores are significantly different except the RTS for married and unmarried individuals with INC >$2m 
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All of the reported RTS scores are significantly different except the RTS for married and 
unmarried individuals with income greater than $200,000 (Panel C). Panel A presents a 
summary of our data classified by marital status and gender.  Married individuals are found to 
exhibit a lower RTS and gender does not impact on this trend.  Panel B considers the RTS of 
individuals by marital status and education and Panel C presents information on the RTS 
classified by marital status and income.  Comparing the RTS of married and unmarried 
individuals across these various demographics reveals no obvious differences.   
 
As a final step in investigating whether marriage impacts on RTS, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present 
the estimation output of our regression based model of the determinants of RTS (equation 3.1) 
applied to married survey respondents and unmarried survey respondents respectively. 
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Table 3.7 Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance on Demographic Variables for Married 
Respondents 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
α0 64.0951 1.5159 42.28 0.000 
DFEM -6.1047 0.2433 -25.08 0.000 
AGE -0.1107 0.0658 -1.68 0.092 
AGE2 -0.0021 0.0006 -3.13 0.001 
NDEP -0.1225 0.0780 -1.56 0.116 
DEDU2 0.3445 0.4100 0.84 0.400 
DEDU3 1.4212 0.3854 3.68 0.000 
DEDU4 2.3884 0.3805 6.27 0.000 
DINC2 1.0598 0.3342 3.17 0.001 
DINC3 2.8119 0.3593 7.82 0.000 
DINC4 4.3958 0.4460 9.85 0.000 
DINC5 2.8315 0.6789 4.17 0.000 
DCINC2 1.1273 0.4694 2.40 0.016 
DCINC3 2.4067 0.4552 5.28 0.000 
DCINC4 3.3554 0.5013 6.69 0.000 
DCINC5 3.7085 0.6417 5.77 0.000 
DNASS2 0.6225 0.4675 1.33 0.183 
DNASS3 0.3661 0.4338 0.84 0.398 
DNASS4 2.0632 0.4719 4.37 0.000 
DNASS5 2.8158 0.5118 5.50 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  = 0.2420          F-stat = 215.89 (P-value = 0.000) 
 
This table presents a summary of the estimated regression output for the equation fitted to a restricted dataset of married 
respondents: 
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where RTSi is the FinaMetrica RTS for individual i, Age is the age expressed in years, NDEP is the number of financial 
dependents, D are dummy variables for gender (FEM), marital status (MARRIED), education (EDU), income (INC) and 
combined income (CINC), and α are the coefficients to be estimated. 
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Table 3.8 Regression of Financial Risk Tolerance on Demographic Variables for 
Unmarried Respondents 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
α0 57.4524 2.0176 28.47 0.000 
DFEM -6.3104 0.4093 15.42 0.000 
AGE 0.1844 0.0972 1.90 0.058 
AGE2  -0.0054 0.0011 5.06 0.000 
NDEP -0.3780 0.2311 1.64 0.102 
DEDU2 2.2355 0.9188 2.43 0.015 
DEDU3 4.1150 0.9149 4.50 0.000 
DEDU4 5.9265 0.8663 6.84 0.000 
DINC2 0.7175 0.5338 1.34 0.179 
DINC3 3.4654 0.5775 6.00 0.000 
DINC4 1.5450 0.5723 2.70 0.007 
DINC5 3.9942 1.3852 2.88 0.004 
DCINC2 0.6850 1.2189 0.56 0.574 
DCINC3 -0.2572 1.3063 0.20 0.844 
DCINC4 1.7019 1.6748 1.02 0.310 
DCINC5 -0.4819 2.6974 0.18 0.858 
DNASS2 1.7736 0.6025 2.94 0.003 
DNASS3 2.2670 0.6451 3.51 0.000 
DNASS4 3.9164 0.8287 4.73 0.000 
DNASS5 5.0402 1.0066 5.01 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  = 0.2363          F-stat = 58.350 (P-value = 0.000) 
 
This table presents a summary of the estimated regression output for the equation fitted to a restricted dataset of 
unmarried respondents: 
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where RTSi is the FinaMetrica RTS for individual i, Age is the age expressed in years, NDEP is the number of financial 
dependents, D are dummy variables for gender (FEM), marital status (MARRIED), education (EDU), income (INC) and 
combined income (CINC), and α are the coefficients to be estimated. 
 
Comparing the estimated coefficients of the two samples some notable differences are 
apparent: Firstly, all levels of education of an unmarried individual are associated with a 
significant monotonic increase in RTS, whereas the results for married individuals indicate 
that a trade/diploma level of education was required before a significant positive relationship 
was observed.  A similar monotonic relationship between the range of net asset categories and 
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RTS is observed for unmarried individuals; however, married individuals must record a level 
of net assets of at least $500,000 before a significant relationship with RTS is observed. On 
the other hand, while all income categories were individually significant and positive for 
married individuals, unmarried respondents needed an income of at least $30,000 before a 
significant relationship was observed. Interestingly, the $100,000-$200,000 category is 
associated with the largest increase in RTS (4.4 points) for married respondents but with the 
smallest increase (1.6 points) in RTS for unmarried respondents. 
 
Thus, while the data provides support for the notion that single investors are more risk 
tolerant, it contrasts with the existing body of evidence (McInish, 1982; Masters, 1989; and  
Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995) which finds that marital status has no material impact on 
investment decisions. 
3.3.5. Education and Wealth 
 
One interesting issue that the data enables exploration of is the relationship between education 
and wealth.  For this generation of investors, a university degree was far less common 
compared to current trends and at the time, the general perception was that a tertiary 
education would secure a financial future.  The data enables exploration of the relationship 
between respondents answers to their level of assets and completed education.  A cross 
tabulation summary of the data is presented in Table 3.9 and reveals that as expected, almost 
half (48.59%) of elderly millionaires are university educated and only a small fraction did not 
complete high school (9.12%).  Of those individuals who fall into the lowest asset sub-
grouping, the majority did not complete any education beyond high school.  A trend is 
apparent across the three middle asset sub-groupings as a higher level of education is 
associated with a higher level of net assets, ie. 34.55% of those with assets of $50,000 - 
$100,000 did not complete high school, 31.57% of those with assets of $150,000 - $500,000 
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completed trade school or a diploma, and 35.29% of those with assets of $500,000 - 
$1,000,000 completed university. Thus, the evidence suggests that the wealth of retiring-age 
individuals reflects their level of education. 
 
Table 3.9 Cross Tabulation of Net Assets and Education for Respondents Aged Over 
60 
 
 
Net Asset Band  < $50,000 $50,000-
$150,000 
$150,000-
$500,000 
$500,000-
$1,000,000 
>$1,000,000 
Panel A: No. of Observations 
DNC* 4 57 209 90 55 
High Sch. 11 39 199 147 84 
Trade/Dip 5 46 280 205 171 
University 3 23 199 241 293 
Panel B: Percentage of Responses 
DNC* 17.39 34.55 23.56 13.18 9.12 
High Sch. 47.83 23.64 22.44 21.52 13.93 
Trade/Dip 21.74 27.88 31.57 30.01 28.36 
University 13.04 13.94 22.44 35.29 48.59 
 
Note: * DNC – did not complete high school. 
 
 
3.4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between demographic factors and 
financial risk tolerance.  The study employs a large database that contains a psychometrically 
derived risk tolerance score (RTS) measured by FinaMetrica. While it is found that peoples 
self-assessed risk tolerance and FinaMetrica RTS generally accord, there is considerable 
variation with a tendency for respondents to under-estimate their risk tolerance. This suggests 
that financial planners who rely largely on subjective assessments of risk tolerance run the 
risk of suggesting inappropriate, and in the majority of cases overly conservative, investment 
strategies for their clients. 
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The analysis of the relationship between participant demographics and risk tolerance reveals 
that gender, income and wealth are significantly associated with financial risk tolerance.  A 
detailed investigation of the relationship between risk tolerance and age as well as marital 
status was also performed.  The results suggest that a negative relationship between age and 
risk tolerance exists which, while in line with generally held industry beliefs, contradicts some 
of the more recent research findings.  Further, it was found that the relationship between age 
and risk tolerance exhibits a significant nonlinear structure.  Finally, a negative relationship 
between marital status and risk tolerance was found. 
 
As suggested above, assessment of an investor’s risk profile is a highly influential factor in 
the construction of an appropriate investment portfolio. This research, in providing support 
for the widely held view that women have lower risk tolerance than men and that, at least in a 
cross-sectional sense, age has an inverse, though non-linear, relationship with risk tolerance, 
has significant implications for the funds management industry: as the baby boomer cohort 
ages and moves into retirement we could expect to see demand shift away from the relatively 
more risky growth asset classes towards the less risky income asset classes, reflecting the 
decline in risk tolerance associated which increasing age. Moreover, this effect would be 
compounded by the greater life expectancy of women: as the population ages the gender 
composition will shift in favour of women, who on average have lower risk tolerance. Thus, 
the changing age and gender demographics of the population will provide a duel force for 
change in the composition of the overall demand for investment products.   
 
The relationship between gender and risk tolerance is explored in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
 Chapter 4:  Women and Risk Tolerance in an Aging World 
 
 
 “While boys outnumber girls in all countries, gender differences in mortality eventually produce a changing sex 
balance within a population. By age 30 or 35, women start to outnumber men, and the absolute female 
advantage increases with age. Elderly women greatly outnumber elderly men in most nations, and therefore the 
health and socioeconomic problems of the elderly are, to a large extent, the problems of elderly women.” 
(Kinsella and Gist, 1998) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The above quotation from a U.S. Census Bureau report draws attention to looming health and 
welfare problems arising from demographic aging of populations around the world (Kinsella 
and Gist, 1998).  Health and welfare issues have understandably captured the attention of 
researchers and governments because of their fiscal implications. One issue that has received 
relatively little attention, however, is the implications for financial markets of a population 
that is ageing and becoming more predominantly female. If women have different attitudes to 
investing than men, then a shift in the control of personal wealth to women could be expected 
to impact not just upon the investment management industry, but upon the welfare of the 
investors themselves.  In particular, the influence of women’s risk tolerance on their 
investment decisions will be an important determinant of their financial well-being in 
retirement.  
 
The truth of this conjecture depends on whether women display a different attitude towards 
financial risk-taking relative to men. While stereotypical beliefs about gender differences are 
prevalent, there are now a number of studies that suggest women may be more risk averse 
than men in general business decision-making, and specifically in financial decision-making. 
Why is this significant? Studies in the US have found that while only 12% of women who 
have partners have sole responsibility for the family’s investments, the greater longevity of 
females as well as the increasing divorce rate, mean that nine out of ten women will find 
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themselves responsible for their family’s finances and investments (Kover, 1999). Moreover, 
a 1997 report by the Bank of America found that the average age of widowhood for an 
American female is 56 years (Aguilar 2001). Given these factors, it should not come as a 
surprise that the report suggested that women had control of about 75% of total personal 
wealth in America. The implications of this are most apparent in the managed funds industry: 
as the baby boomer bulge moves through the age profile, the gender composition will shift 
further in favor of women.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 presented evidence that the women respondents did differ from men in their 
attitude to financial risk taking. This chapter contributes to the literature by further examining 
this finding, through further analysis of the large database used in the research described in 
Chapter 3 (psychometrically-derived risk profiles for around 20,000 adult Australians).  As 
much of the extant literature uses US data, the use of Australian data provides an important 
response to the concerns raised by Jiankoplos and Bernasek (1998) that much of what we 
know about investor risk tolerance could be country specific. To the extent that Australia 
shares a number of demographic and cultural similarities with other developed countries, the 
results of this study are relevant for these countries as well. For example, demographic 
similarities are apparent in the population pyramids depicted in Figure 4.1, with both 
Australia and the United States forecast to experience an increase in the elderly female 
segment of the population.  
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Figure 4.1 Population Pyramids 
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From a somewhat different perspective, data from the U.S. Census Bureau reproduced in 
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows the impact of the baby boomers on the populations of developed 
countries outside Western Europe. Again, each country is forecast to experience significant 
increases in its elderly population, with the proportion of the population aged 65 and over 
increasing by, for example, 59 percent in the United States and 70 percent in Australia (from 
the year 2000 to 2030). 
 
Table 4.1 Aging Population Projections for United States, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand 
 
Over 65 Years of Age  Over 80 Years of Age   
Country 
2000 2015 2030 2000 2015 2030 
Panel A: Percent of Population 
United States 12.6 14.7 20.0 3.3 3.8 5.3 
Australia 12.4 15.8 21.1 3.0 4.1 6.0 
Canada  12.7 16.1 22.9 3.1 4.3 6.2 
New Zealand 11.5 13.7 17.8 2.9 3.5 5.0 
Panel B: Sex Ratio of Populationa 
United States 71 79 80 50 66 61 
Australia 78 82 81 55 62 66 
Canada  74 77 79 52 56 61 
New Zealand 77 79 79 53 60 62 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2000 
a  Sex ratio is defined as the number of men per 100 women in a given population or age category. 
 
While the proportion of elderly in the population is increasing we also need to examine 
whether there are expected to be any significant changes in the gender composition of the 
population over 65. This is done through a simple measure of gender composition, the sex 
ratio, defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as the number of men per 100 women in a given 
population or age category. In Panel B of Table 4.1 it is apparent that while each country 
listed is expected to experience some increase in the ratio over the period 2000 – 2030, the 
sex ratios peak at around 80. For the very old, those aged 80 and over, there is a similar 
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pattern of increase although the ratios are much more in favor of women initially, ranging 
from 50-55 in 2000 to 61-66 in 2030.  
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter proceeds as follows.  Building on the overview of 
research into the determinants of financial risk tolerance contained in Chapters 2 and 3, a 
review of research specifically relating to risk tolerance and gender is presented in Section 
4.2. Regression analysis is used to examine the determinants of financial risk tolerance in the 
database and indicates that, consistent with the results of the research in Chapter 3, all of the 
demographic characteristics are found to be significant. The role of gender is then considered 
by focusing on the differential impact of gender on each of the demographic factors.  Finally, 
a test for the presence of non-linearities in our relationships is undertaken. 
. 
 
4.2. Gender and Risk Tolerance 
 
As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1), gender is frequently tested as a determinent of risk 
tolerance and females typically show a lower preference for risk than males, although the 
research in this area is by no means uniform. 
 
Slovic (1966) documents what is considered to be the prevalent belief in western culture that 
men should, and do, take greater risks than women. Early psychological research on 
differences in decision-making generally was consistent with this belief. Eagly (1995) surveys 
research from the general psychology literature into gender differences relating to behavior, 
attitudes, cognitive ability, decision making and personality traits in the context of risk and 
decision-making and concluded that the bulk of the research suggests women are less 
aggressive, less confident, more cautious and possessing inferior leadership and problem 
solving abilities. However, these conclusions are not unanimous: Johnson and Powell (1994) 
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reviewed earlier literature specifically on business decision-making and found the results to 
be ambiguous. For example, Powell (1990) found no significant differences in managers’ 
decision-making style, and Masters and Meier (1988) were unable to differentiate between the 
risk-taking propensity of male and female entrepreneurs [although more recently Verheul, 
Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) found gender differences in a range of other dimensions -  in 
path traveled to entrepreneurship, strategy and type of leadership]. 
 
Schubert, Brown, Gysler and Brachinger’s (1999) research suggests that gender-specific risk 
behavior is due more to contextual factors than a general trait, a finding consistent with 
Hudgens and Fatkin’s (1985) experimental evidence that gender differences occur only in 
situations where the probability of success is low. In a similar vein, Siegrist, Cvetkovich and 
Gutscher (2002) examined biases in predicting the risk preferences of other people. While 
reporting that both women and men overestimated males' risks preferences, their research 
suggests that participants' predictions were influenced by knowledge about risk preferences 
incorporated in gender stereotypes and by their own feelings.  
 
Another strand of research sought evidence of gender differences in financial literacy and 
attitudes towards money. Prince (1992) found that while both sexes saw money as closely 
linked with esteem and power, males were more prone to feel more involved and competent 
in money handling, and more prepared to take risks to build wealth. More recently, Chen and 
Volpe (2002) found statistically significant differences between male and female college 
students’ financial literacy. Echoing Prince’s (1992) findings, they found female students less 
interested and willing to learn about personal finance topics and less confident in dealing with 
these topics. Similarly, Stinerock, Stern and Solomon (1991) analyzed consumers use of 
professional financial advisers and found women had a higher degree of anxiety and lower 
risk preference when making financial decisions, and a stronger desire to use financial 
advisers. When examining both general and expert investors, Estes and Hosseini (1988) found 
females less confident in financial decision making, with gender the most important 
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explanatory factor affecting confidence, ahead of age, experience, education, knowledge and 
asset holdings. Barber and Odean (2001) use gender as a proxy for overconfidence and find 
men trade more and perform worse than women. 
 
In a related vein, Hawley and Fujii (1993) drew on data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer 
Finances which included questions asking respondents to state their preferences for taking 
financial risks. They found female heads of household were the most risk averse followed by 
single women. Interestingly, married women reported the lowest risk aversion. 
 
Outside of the United States, Clark-Murphy and Gerrans (2001) examined survey responses 
from 2,399 Australian university staff and found women significantly more likely than men to 
consider themselves to have a lower level of knowledge, and more likely to seek advice from 
a financial advisor. 
 
Turning to evidence of gender differences in financial decision-making, there are a number of 
studies which examine the composition and risk profile of an individual’s entire portfolio. 
Early research by Cohn et al. (1975) and Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978) 
found that gender was significantly related to the proportion of risky assets held, and that 
female investors hold less risky portfolios. Riley and Chow (1992) analyzed asset allocation 
data provided by the Survey of Income and Participation and found some evidence that 
women are slightly more risk averse than men. The US Federal Reserve Board sponsored 
triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) has enabled a number of researchers to explore 
the issue of stated preference and revealed preference by examining the relationship between 
stated risk aversion, gender and asset allocation. For example, Schooley and Worden (1996) 
examined the 1989 SCF and compared household’s reported willingness to take financial risk 
to the riskiness of their portfolios, measured as the proportion of risky assets to wealth. They 
found that overall households did allocate portfolio holdings consistent with their stated 
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attitudes toward risk. They also found that the portfolios of households headed by females had 
significantly lower ratios of risky assets to wealth, although a coding procedure used in the 
creation of the data set meant that the extent of this gender difference could not be fully 
ascertained.   
 
Jiankoplos and Bernasek (1998), using the same survey data found that as wealth increases, 
the proportion of wealth held as risky assets increased by a smaller amount for single women 
than for single men and married couples. Interestingly, they report that about 60% of female 
respondents and 40% of male respondents stated they were not prepared to accept any 
financial risk.  Bajtelsmit et al.(1999), again using the 1989 SCF, investigated pension 
allocations as part of the household’s overall portfolio, finding significant gender differences 
in the overall allocation of wealth, with women exhibiting greater relative risk aversion in 
their allocation of wealth into defined contribution pension assets. Halek and Eisenhaeur 
(2001) used life insurance data to estimate relative risk aversion coefficients and then 
examined these in relation to demographic characteristics. They found men were less risk 
averse than women and that the difference in risk aversion across gender was highly 
significant.  
 
Pension schemes that give the beneficiary some degree of control over asset allocation have 
enabled researchers to further explore the impact of gender.  Bajtelsmit and Vanderhai (1997) 
examined the asset allocation decisions of a sample of nearly 17,000 management employees 
of a large United States employer. These employees were able to select from a choice of five 
investment alternatives offering different risk/return characteristics. It was found that women 
were significantly more likely to invest in fixed income securities and less likely to invest in 
employer stock.  Hinz, McCarthy and Turner (1997) used data from the Thrift Savings Plan 
for United States Federal Government employees both found that women allocated a smaller 
proportion of their funds to equities than did men. Sunden and Surette (1998), using data from 
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the 1992 and 1995 SCF, and after controlling for a range of demographic, financial and 
attitudinal characteristics, report that gender and marital status interact to significantly affect 
how individuals choose to allocate assets in defined-contribution plans: single women and 
married men were less likely than single men to choose the riskier portfolio option. Bernasek 
and Shwiff (2001) found that among university faculty, gender was the most significant factor 
in explaining the proportion of the pension invested in risky assets, with women more 
conservative investors than men. Interestingly, when interactive effects were added to the 
model, it was found that married and cohabiting women and men reacted in different ways to 
the attitudes towards risk of their partners: men were prepared to take on more risk than their 
partners while women were prepared to take less risk. 
 
Barber and Odean (2001) examine the common stock portfolio holdings of men and women 
and find men invest in riskier positions than women when measured against four risk 
measures (portfolio volatility, individual stock volatility, beta and size). Dwyer, Gilkeson and 
List (2002) using data from a survey of 2000 randomly selected mutual fund investors, found 
that women exhibited less risk taking than men in their mutual fund investment decisions. 
Importantly, the impact of gender was significantly weakened when investor-specific 
financial investment knowledge was controlled for in the analysis, suggesting that the 
apparently lower risk tolerance of women is not an inalterable trait. 
 
Researchers have also placed professional investors under the spotlight. Olsen and Cox (2001) 
investigate gender differences in attitudes towards risk for professionally trained investors. It 
was found that women investors weight risk attributes, such as possibility of loss and 
ambiguity, more heavily than their male colleagues. In addition, women tend to emphasize 
risk reduction more than men in portfolio construction. While gender differences appear to 
influence perceptions of risk and recommendations to clients, these differences tend to be the 
most significant for assets and portfolios at risk extremes. Bliss and Potter (2002) explore 
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whether gender affects fund manager performance and/or behavior, in particular whether 
female fund managers are more risk-averse and less confident. Their exploration of whether 
equity mutual funds managed by women differed systematically in performance or 
operationally from those managed by men produced negative findings. Atkinson, Baird and 
Frye (2003) examined fixed income mutual fund managers and failed to find significant 
differences in terms of performance, risk or other fund characteristics. The difference 
appeared to be in the behavior of investors, with lower net asset flows into funds managed by 
women, suggesting gender stereotypes affect investor decision making. 
 
4.3. Description of Survey Sample  
 
 
As in Chapters 2 and 3, the data for the research in this chapter was provided by  FinaMetrica. 
Accompanying the risk tolerance test is a set of eight demographic questions dealing with age, 
gender, postcode, education, income, marital status, dependents and net assets. In the case of 
education, income (individual and combined) and net assets; ordered categorical variables are 
created and the details of these are provided in Table 4.2.  
 
The data sample comprised 20,353 Australian respondents who completed the survey in May 
1999 – February 2002.20  
                                                 
20 Consistent with the approach noted in Chapters 2 and 3, and following consultation with FinaMetrica, 
respondents who recorded their age as less than 20 years or older than 80 years, and respondents who generated 
a RTS outside the range 20-95 were omitted from the analysis, as such responses were not considered plausible. 
A total of 356 respondents were excluded on these criteria. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of Ordered Categorical Variables  
 
Ordered 
Categorical 
Variable 
Value 
 
Education (EDU)a 
 
 
Income (INC)b 
 
Combined 
Income (CINC)c 
 
Net Assets 
(NASS)d 
1 Did not complete high 
school 
Under $30,000 Under $30,000 Under $50,000 
2 Completed high school $30,000 - 
$50,000 
$30,000 - 
$50,000 
$50,000 - 
$150,000 
3 Trade or diploma 
qualification 
$50,000 - 
$100,000 
$50,000 - 
$100,000 
$150,000 - 
$500,000 
4 University degree or 
higher qualification 
$100,000 - 
$200,000 
$100,000 - 
$200,000 
$500,000 - 
$1,000,000 
5 nae Over $200,000 Over $200,000 Over $1,000,000 
 
a The highest education level attained, or the closest equivalent. 
b The income bracket for the respondent’s personal before-tax income (having in mind income from all 
sources – work, investment, family and government). 
c If married (or defacto), the income bracket for the respondent’s combined before-tax income. 
d The respondent’s own net assets, including the family home and other personal-use assets, minus any 
amounts owed  (if married or  de facto, the respondent includes their share of jointly owned assets). 
e ‘not applicable’ 
 
 
A summary of the demographic information for the investors captured in this database is 
presented in Table 4.3.  Unfortunately, not all of the respondents who completed the survey 
and received an assessment of their financial risk tolerance also completed all of the 
demographic questions.  As such, the number of observations for each demographic will be 
less than the total size of the RTS database. For example, 2726 respondents did not indicate 
their gender which reduced the sample to 17,627 comprising 11566 males (65.62%) and 6061 
females (34.38%). More specifically, Panel A of Table 4.3 reveals that the majority of the 
survey respondents are married (76.82%). Panel B shows that proportionately more males 
(52.47%) than females (45.39%) had a university degree or higher qualification.   
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Table 4.3 Dataset Partitioning Summary – Observation Counts 
 
  Males Females 
Grand 
Total 
  Age (years) Total Age (years) Total  
  <=30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >60  <=30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >60   
Panel A: Marital Status 
Unmarried 997 470 325 254 162 2208 597 291 328 327 234 1777 3985 
Married 728 1937 2327 2667 1471 9130 536 922 1070 1099 451 4078 13208 
Total 1725 2407 2652 2921 1633 11338 1133 1213 1398 1426 685 5855 17193 
Panel B: Educationa 
Edu1 31 110 154 238 254 787 29 70 111 214 156 580 1367 
Edu2 200 254 330 476 252 1512 148 207 338 402 223 1318 2830 
Edu3 276 599 726 897 525 3023 159 290 316 329 156 1250 4273 
Edu4 1210 1417 1404 1275 569 5875 790 629 607 457 134 2617 8492 
Total 1717 2380 2614 2886 1600 11197 1126 1196 1372 1402 669 5765 16962 
Panel C: Incomeb 
Inc1 307 116 131 356 543 1453 287 310 386 575 380 1938 3391 
Inc2 527 377 403 600 429 2336 436 300 421 342 143 1642 3978 
Inc3 577 969 1068 1023 371 4008 279 344 348 281 73 1325 5333 
Inc4 175 600 636 547 144 2102 39 134 115 77 15 380 2482 
Inc5 30 228 326 264 63 911 6 34 37 29 7 113 1024 
Total 1616 2290 2564 2790 1550 10810 1047 1122 1307 1304 618 5398 16208 
Panel D: Combined Incomec 
Cinc1 47 42 45 155 326 615 41 24 33 161 177 436 1051 
Cinc2 90 149 152 361 377 1129 71 78 110 215 126 600 1729 
Cinc3 369 678 832 966 460 3305 255 347 420 394 119 1535 4840 
Cinc4 262 790 880 825 203 2960 170 324 361 249 39 1143 4103 
Cinc5 52 307 420 350 81 1210 44 156 159 96 20 475 1685 
Total 820 1966 2329 2657 1447 9219 581 929 1083 1115 481 4189 13408 
 87 
  Males Females 
Grand 
Total 
  Age (years) Total Age (years) Total  
  <=30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >60  <=30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >60   
Panel E: Net Assetsd 
Nass1 856 237 69 32 11 1205 610 140 46 30 11 837 2042 
Nass2 466 499 254 144 96 1459 262 265 179 112 62 880 2339 
Nass3 291 1004 1067 878 551 3791 183 492 585 542 284 2086 5877 
Nass4 35 378 688 870 454 2425 24 158 310 391 171 1054 3479 
Nass5 24 194 474 857 430 1979 13 81 197 253 107 651 2630 
Total 1672 2312 2552 2781 1542 10859 1092 1136 1317 1328 635 5508 16367 
a Education groups are classified as follows: ‘Edu1’: did not complete high school; ‘Edu2’: completed high school; ‘Edu3’: trade or diploma qualification; ‘Edu4’: 
university education. 
b Income groups are classified as follows: ‘Inc1’: under $30,000; ‘Inc2’: $30,000 - $50,000; ‘Inc3’: $50,000 - $100,000; ‘Inc4’: $100,000 - $200,000; ‘Inc5’: over 
$200,000. 
c Combined income groups are classified as follows: ‘Cinc1’: under $30,000; ‘Cinc2’: $30,000 - $50,000; ‘Cinc3’: $50,000 - $100,000; ‘Cinc4’: $100,000 - $200,000; 
‘Cinc5’: over $200,000. 
d Net asset groups are classified as follows: ‘Nass1’: under $50,000; ‘Nass2’: $50,000 - $150,000; ‘Nass3’: $150,000 - $500,000; ‘Nass4’: $500,000 - $1,000,000; 
‘Nass5’: over $1,000,000. 
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Panel C shows the breakdown of respondents’ personal before-tax income. It is interesting to 
note that although 45.47% of total respondents reported incomes below $50,000, a much 
greater proportion of females (66.32%) than males (35.05%) were in this category. As might 
be expected this disparity is reduced when combined incomes are considered: Panel D shows 
that 24.73% of females and 18.92% of males report combined family incomes of less than 
$50,000.  
 
Finally, Panel E shows that 75.47% of males and 68.83% of females have more than $150,000 
in net assets, with both groups recording their highest proportions in the $150,000 and 
$500,000 bracket.  Taken in conjunction with the age information discussed earlier, this tends 
to suggest that the typical survey respondent is nearing or at retirement and is asset rich and 
income poor. 
 
4.4. Empirical Framework 
 
In order to test the determinants of risk tolerance, a number of different demographic factors 
may be considered.  It is possible to quantify the effect of each of these demographic 
characteristics on the risk tolerance of an individual using statistical analysis.  The model to 
be tested in this paper hypothesizes that the RTS for individual i is a function of each of these 
demographic characteristics, i.e.: 
 
( ) εααα
αααααα
++++
+++++=
NASSCINCDMARRINC
EDUAGENDEPDMARRDFEMRTS
876
543210
*
  (4.1) 
where: 
RTS is the financial risk tolerance score for each surveyed individual provided by FinaMetrica 
based on the answers to their Risk Tolerance Questionnaire and takes a value somewhere in 
the range between zero to 100 and;  
DFEM is a dummy variable that signifies a respondent is female. 
DMARR is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the respondent is married (legally 
or defacto). 
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NDEP is the number of people in the family whom are financially dependent on the 
respondent. 
AGE is the age (in years) of the respondent. 
EDU is an ordered categorical variable representing the educational background of 
respondents, 1 (4) representing the minimum (maximum) education level. Table 4.2 
defines the four categories.  
INC is an ordered categorical variable representing the income of respondents, 1 (5) 
representing the minimum (maximum) income level. Table 4.2 defines the five 
categories.  
CINC is an ordered categorical variable representing the combined income of respondents 
(and their partner), 1 (5) representing the minimum (maximum) income level. Table 
4.2 defines the five categories.  
NASS is an ordered categorical variable representing the net assets of respondents, 1 (5) 
representing the minimum (maximum) income level. Table 4.2 defines the five 
categories.  
 
The correlations between all these potential independent variables are reported in Table 4.4. 
As might be expected, the strongest correlation (0.7940) is found between the respondent’s 
income and the respondent’s combined family income. The relationships between the 
respondent’s net assets and age (0.5422) and net assets and combined family income (0.4012) 
exhibit moderate positive associations while weaker positive correlations are observed 
between marriage and the number of dependents (0.3576), marriage and combined family 
income (0.3461) and marriage and the respondents net assets (0.3627). Similarly weaker 
positive correlations are observed between the respondent’s income and net assets (0.3433) 
and income and education (0.3358). Focusing on the dummy variable for gender (DFEM), all 
the correlation coefficients between this variable and the other independent variables (with the 
exception of the dummy variable for marriage (DMARR)) indicate weak negative 
relationships. Interestingly, the relationship between the respondent’s gender and their income 
displays the strongest negative correlation (-0.3210), indicating a tendency for female 
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respondents to have lower income. Table 4.4 provides some comfort that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to affect the estimation of the coefficients in the regression equations.21  
 
The strongest correlation coefficient (0.7940), between the respondent’s income and the 
respondent’s combined family income, is insufficiently high to indicate severe 
multicollinearity between these two independent variables. In any case these two variables do 
not enter the regression together as such – referring to equation (4.1) CINC is included 
interactively with DMARR. Additionally, the absence of high R2 values in company with low 
t-statistic values for the regression results also supports this conclusion. Notwithstanding this, 
the possibility that three or more of the variables are collinear but no two taken alone display 
evidence of this cannot categorically be ruled out. 
                                                 
21 While the absence of high R2 values in conjunction with low t-statistic values for the regressions strongly 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem, further analysis involving the calculation of Variance Inflation 
factors was undertaken. The results of this analysis support the conclusion that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 91 
 
Table 4.4 Correlation between Independent Variables 
 
 
 DFEM DMARR NDEP AGE EDU INC CINC NASS 
DFEM 1 - - - - - - - 
DMARR 0.0502 1 - - - - - - 
NDEP -0.2054 0.3576 1 - - - - - 
AGE -0.0552 0.2771 -0.0213 1 - - - - 
EDU -0.1097 -0.0602 0.0751 -0.2556 1 - - - 
INC -0.3210 0.1229 0.2739 -0.0772 0.3358 1 - - 
CINC -0.1127 0.3461 0.2609 -0.0770 0.2981 0.7940 1 - 
NASS -0.1032 0.3627 0.2017 0.5422 -0.0030 0.3433 0.4012 1 
 
 
DFEM is a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the respondent is female and zero for males. DMARR is a dummy variable 
taking the value of unity if the respondent is married and zero if unmarried. NDEP is a variable measuring the number of family 
dependents. AGE is the respondent’s age in years. Ordered categorical variables for education (EDU); income (INC); combined income 
(CINC) and net assets (NASS) as defined in Table 4.2. 
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Model (4.1) can easily be modified to consider a range of special cases, for example: 
 
The general model for males is (i.e. DFEM = 0): 
( ) εααα
ααααα
++++
++++=
NASSCINCDMARRINC
EDUAGENDEPDMARRRTS
876
54320
*
   (4.1a) 
 
The general model for females is (i.e. DFEM = 1): 
( ) εααα
αααααα
++++
+++++=
NASSCINCDMARRINC
EDUAGENDEPDMARRRTS
876
543210
*
  (4.1b) 
 
The model for married males is (i.e. DFEM = 0 and DMARR = 1): 
εααα
ααααα
++++
++++=
NASSCINCINC
EDUAGENDEPRTS
876
54320     (4.1c) 
 
The model for unmarried males is (i.e. DFEM = 0 and DMARR = 0): 
εαααααα ++++++= NASSINCEDUAGENDEPRTS 865430  (4.1d) 
 
The model for married females is (i.e. DFEM = 1 and DMARR = 1): 
εααα
αααααα
++++
+++++=
NASSCINCINC
EDUAGENDEPRTS
876
543210    (4.1e) 
 
The model for unmarried females is (i.e. DFEM = 1 and DMARR = 0): 
εαα
ααααα
+++
++++=
NASSINC
EDUAGENDEPRTS
86
54310     (4.1f) 
 
4.5. Basic Regression Results  
 
Estimation results for the model specified in equation (4.1) are reported in Table 4.5. All of 
the demographic characteristics tested in equation (4.1) were found to be significant at the 1% 
level for our sample group. The constant term in this model, 65.79, represents a baseline risk 
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tolerance score which will be adjusted up or down according to the characteristics of the 
individual respondent. The coefficients for the independent variables indicate the direction 
and magnitude of the effect on risk tolerance. For example, gender is the most significant of 
the specified determinants of risk tolerance and a female will exhibit a RTS 5.87 points less 
than a demographically equivalent male. Marriage is also an important determinant, reducing 
the RTS by 2.29 points. The results also support the view held by many in the investment 
industry that investors become more risk averse with age: the RTS decreases by 3.24 points 
for each decade of birthdays. 
 
Table 4.5 Basic Aggregate Regression Results 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 65.794** 0.587 112.06 0.000 
DFEM -5.8687** 0.210 -28.01 0.000 
DMARR -2.2940** 0.511 -4.49 0.000 
NDEP -0.1989** 0.073 -2.73 0.006 
AGE -0.3240** 0.009 -34.74 0.000 
EDU 1.0997** 0.103 10.73 0.000 
INC 1.7050** 0.120 14.21 0.000 
DMARR*CINC 0.5855** 0.137 4.28 0.000 
NASS 0.8651** 0.105 8.23 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.242 
Number of observations  = 15,916 
 
This table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the respondent’s risk tolerance score 
(created by FinaMetrica) and the independent variables are: DFEM, a dummy variable taking the value of unity 
if the respondent is female and zero for males; DMARR, a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the 
respondent is married and zero if unmarried; NDEP, a variable measuring the number of family dependents; 
AGE, the respondent’s age in years; EDU, an ordered categorical variable measuring education level; INC, an 
ordered categorical variable measuring income; DMARR*CINC, an interactive variable created by the product 
of DMARR and CINC, where CINC is an ordered categorical variable measuring combined income and NASS, 
an ordered categorical variable measuring net assets. The ordered categorical variables for education (EDU); 
income (INC); combined income (CINC) and net assets (NASS) are defined in Table 4.2. White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance are used. 
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level 
  
On the other hand, RTS is positively related to both income and education, with the former 
increasing the RTS by 1.70 points per category (as defined in Table 4.2) and the latter by 1.10 
points per category. Risk tolerance is also positively related to the respondent’s net assets, 
although this variable has less influence than income and education per category: the RTS 
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increases 0.87 points per category. The interactive variable, DMARR*CINC, captures the 
impact of the combined income effect associated with marriage (or defacto relationships) and 
shows that RTS increases by 0.59 points per combined income category. 
 
Overall, the results, based on the responses of a large-sample of investors, indicate that all of 
the demographic characteristics are significant in explaining financial risk tolerance. From a 
statistical significance point of view it seems that the most influential demographics are: Age, 
Gender, Education and Income. 
 
4.6. Exploring the Role of Gender  
 
Good reason exists to believe that males and females behave differently with regard to risk 
tolerance and this can be explored further in the context of model (4.1) by extending it into 
the following dummy variable enhanced regression specification: 
 
εδ
δδδ
δδδδ
δδδδδδδδ
++
+++
++++
+++++++=
∆
∆∆∆
∆∆∆∆
NASSDFEM
CINCDMARRDFEMINCDFEMEDUDFEM
AGEDFEMNDEPDFEMDMARRDFEMDFEM
NASSCINCDMARRINCEDUAGENDEPDMARRRTS
*
)*(***
***
)*(
7
654
3210
76543210
  (4.2) 
In this form the model can test the increment in each coefficient derived from being female 
relative to the base case of being male, and thereby provide deeper insight into the impact of 
gender on risk tolerance. 
 
Model (4.2) can be easily converted into a range of special cases, for example: 
 
The general model for males is (i.e. DFEM = 0): 
 
εδδδδδδδδ ++++++++= NASSCINCDMARRINCEDUAGENDEPDMARRRTS 76543210 )*(  
      (4.2a) 
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The general model for females is (i.e. DFEM = 1): 
 
εδδδδδδ
δδδδδδδδδδ
+++++++
+++++++++=
∆∆∆
∆∆∆∆∆
NASSCINCDMARRINC
EDUAGENDEPDMARRRTS
)()*)(()(
)()()()(
776655
4433221100 (4.2b) 
 
Estimation results for the model specified in equation (4.2) are reported in Table 4.6. Table 
4.6 is partitioned with the upper panel showing a baseline case for males and the lower panel 
showing the incremental effect of gender. In other words, the lower panel shows the 
incremental effect for each coefficient of being female relative to the base case of being male, 
and thereby identifies those characteristics that are differentially important for females.  
 
Table 4.6 Dummy Variable Regression Results – Conditioned on Gender 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 67.304** 0.733 91.77 0.000 
DMARR -3.6307** 0.730 -4.98 0.000 
NDEP -0.2876** 0.088 -3.27 0.001 
AGE -0.3390** 0.012 -28.31 0.000 
EDU 1.0883** 0.131 8.30 0.000 
INC 1.2486** 0.176 7.09 0.000 
DMARR*CINC 1.0236** 0.200 5.12 0.000 
NASS 1.0374** 0.133 7.78 0.000 
DFEM -9.6019** 1.178 -8.15 0.000 
DFEM*DMARR 2.6589* 1.030 2.58 0.010 
DFEM*NDEP 0.4096* 0.163 2.52 0.012 
DFEM*AGE 0.0485* 0.019 2.49 0.013 
DFEM*EDU 0.0515 0.212 0.24 0.808 
DFEM*INC 0.9786** 0.251 3.89 0.000 
DFEM*DMARR*CINC -0.7822** 0.279 -2.81 0.005 
DFEM*NASS -0.4823* 0.218 -2.22 0.027 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.244 
Number of observations  = 15,916 
 
This table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is respondent’s risk tolerance 
score (created by FinaMetrica) and the independent variables are combinations of: DFEM, a dummy 
variable taking the value of unity if the respondent is female and zero for males; DMARR, a dummy 
variable taking the value of unity if the respondent is married and zero if unmarried; NDEP, a variable 
measuring the number of family dependents; AGE, the respondent’s age in years. Ordered categorical 
variables for education (EDU); income (INC); combined income (CINC) and net assets (NASS) are 
defined in Table 4.2. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance are used. 
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level 
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First, it is noticed that the fixed (constant) component of RTS is lower for females by 9.6 
points. However, the magnitude of this impact is generally tempered once the other 
demographic characteristics are taken into account. Most noticeably, marriage is a 
differentially important characteristic, having a less negative impact on risk tolerance for 
females than the negative impact found for males. That is, for males, being married reduces 
RTS by 3.63 points, whereas for females, being married reduces RTS by about 1 point (i.e. 
3.63- 2.66). Similarly, the number of dependents is positively related to risk tolerance for 
females but negatively related for males, although in each case the magnitude of the impact is 
relatively small. Interestingly, while age reduces risk tolerance by 3.39 points per decade for 
males, its differential impact for females is positive but negligible, being associated with a 
decrease of 2.91 points per decade (i.e. 0.48 points lower in magnitude). 
 
On the other hand, the combined income effect derived from marriage and the level of net 
assets of the respondent, which have a positive impacts of 1.02 and 1.03 points per category 
respectively for males, have correspondingly incremental negative impacts of –0.78 and –0.48 
points for females. 
 
Education was not found to be a significant differentiating variable in explaining the RTS of 
females. While important for both males and females in the sense that it is associated with an 
increase by 1.09 points per education category, the results show that no more or less 
importance is attached to it by females.  
 
As an example, a 40 year old, university educated, married female with one dependent, 
earning $50,000 - $100,000, a combined income of $100,000 - $200,000 and net assets of 
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$150,000 - $500,000 would have a risk tolerance of: 59.1.22 This compares to the 
demographically equivalent male with a risk tolerance of 65.1. 
 
The combined model reported in Table 4.5 somewhat obscures the direct effects of the 
demographic variables on female RTS. Accordingly, as noted above, the general model for 
evaluating the determinants of RTS [equation (4.1)] can be converted to a general model for 
females [Equation (4.1b)]: 
 
( ) εααα
αααααα
++++
+++++=
NASSCINCDMARRINC
EDUAGENDEPDMARRRTS
876
543210
*
  (4.1b) 
 
Section 4.6 reported the basic regression results for the general model and established that all 
the demographic characteristics were important determinants of an individual’s attitude to 
risk.  When the general model for females was tested on the data, it was found that the 
respondent’s age, education, income and net assets were the most important determinants of 
risk tolerance. To investigate further the influence of these factors on the RTS, a parsimonious 
version of equation (4.1b) may be estimated in which only the most important components of 
equation (4.1b) are retained. The parsimonious model that focuses on these determinants may 
be specified as: 
 
εχχχχχ +++++= NASSINCEDUAGERTS 43210  (4.3) 
 
The estimated output for equation 4.3 is presented in Table 4.7. All of the estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Here the constant term of 57.59 represents the 
                                                 
22 This is calculated as: 67.304 + (- 9.6019) + (-3.6307 + 2.6589) + (-0.2876 + 0.4096) + (40*-0.3390 + 
40*0.0485) + (4*1.0883 +4*0.0515) + (3*1.2486+ 3*0.9786) + (4*1.0236 + 4*-0.7822) + (3*1.0374 + 3*-
0.4823) = 59.10 
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baseline for females. The impact of the respondent’s age, education, income and net assets 
can be estimated by examining the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients for these 
variables. For example, we can see that a female’s RTS declines by 2.98 points with each 
passing decade but increased levels of education, income and net assets (as defined by the 
categories in Table 4.2) will increase her RTS by 1.16, 2.30 and 0.62 points per category, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.7 Parsimonious Model for Female Respondents 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 57.588** 0.881 65.37 0.000 
AGE -0.2982** 0.014 -20.78 0.000 
EDU 1.1591** 0.164 7.05 0.000 
INC 2.2987** 0.167 13.78 0.000 
NASS 0.6240** 0.156 4.01 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.187 
Number of observations  = 5,323 
 
This table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is respondent’s risk tolerance 
score (created by FinaMetrica) and the independent variables are: AGE, the respondent’s age in years. 
Ordered categorical variables for education (EDU); income (INC); and net assets (NASS) are defined 
in Table 4.2. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance are used. 
* Significant at the 5% level ** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate some cases that are derived from the results reported in Tables 
4.6 and 4.7.23 In Figure 4.2 we have chosen male and female examples from each end of the 
socio-economic spectrum to observe how the risk tolerance score varies with age. In each case 
the negative and monotonic relationship between age and risk tolerance can be clearly seen 
and the impact of socio-economic factors is readily apparent. 
                                                 
23 The top panel of Table 4.6 represents the parsimonious model for males and Table 4.7 the comparable model 
for females. 
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Figure 4.2 Predicted RTS from Basic Parsimonious Male/Female Models 
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Note: This Figure displays four illustrative cases from the regression equations estimated for Tables 
4.6 and 4.7. All cases represent unmarried respondents. ‘FEM1’ and ‘MALE1’ represent a female and 
male pair that habitate the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum. Specifically, ‘FEM1’ represents 
female respondents who have any number of family dependents; have completed a high school 
education only; have an income in the range $30,000 - $50,000; and have net assets in the range 
$50,000 - $150,000. ‘MALE1’ represents male respondents who have four family dependents; have 
completed a high school education only; have an income in the range $30,000 - $50,000; and have net 
assets in the range $50,000 - $150,000. In contrast, ‘FEM2’ and ‘MALE2’ represent a female and 
male pair that habitate the upper end of the socio-economic spectrum. Specifically, ‘FEM2’ represents 
female respondents who have any number of family dependents; have university qualifications; have 
an income in the range $100,000 - $200,000; and have net assets in the range $500,000 - $1,000,000. 
‘MALE2’ represents male respondents who have no family dependents; have university qualifications; 
have an income in the range $100,000 - $200,000; and have net assets in the range $500,000 - 
$1,000,000. 
 
In Figure 4.3 a young (20 year old) male and a matching young female and an elderly (70 year 
old) male and a matching elderly female, each with high school education, have been selected 
to illustrate how the risk tolerance score varies with changes in the income and wealth 
positions for each. Age and gender differences are clearly evident and are maintained as 
income and wealth increase. 
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Figure 4.3  Predicted RTS from Basic Parsimonious Male/Female Models across 
Income/Combined Income/Net Assets Groups 
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Note: This Figure displays four illustrative cases from the regression equation estimated for Tables 
4.6 and 4.7. All four cases are based on (a) one dependent family member; and (b) high school as the 
highest educational qualification. Males are married, whereas females may be married or unmarried. 
The Income / Combined Income / Net Asset groups are defined as follows:  
 
I/CI/NA Group Income Combined Income Net Assets 
1 < $30,000 < $30,000 < $50,000 
2 < $30,000 $30,000 - $50,000 < $50,000 
3 < $30,000 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
4 < $30,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
5 < $30,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
6 $30,000 - $50,000 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
7 $30,000 - $50,000 $30,000 - $50,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
8 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
9 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
10 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
11 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
12 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
13 $50,000 - $100,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
14 $50,000 - $100,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
15 $100,000 - $200,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
16 $100,000 - $200,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
17 $100,000 - $200,000 $100,000 - $200,000 > $1,000,000 
18 $100,000 - $200,000 > $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
19 $100,000 - $200,000 > $200,000 > $1,000,000 
20 > $200,000 > $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
21 > $200,000 > $200,000 > $1,000,000 
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4.7. The Presence of Non-linearities in the Model 
 
Consistent with the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3, an interesting extension of the 
research in this chapter is to test the robustness of the linearity assumption implicit in the 
specification of the model. Indeed, while Chapters 2 and 3 picked up on previous research by 
Riley and Chow (1992) and Bajtelsmit and VanDerhai (1997) that pointed to non-linearities in 
the relationship between age and risk tolerance, non-linearities are plausible also for the 
following variables: NDEP; INC; CINC and NASS.24 Once again, a simple test for the 
presence of non-linearities is to introduce quadratic versions of the independent variables.  
Accordingly, the non-linear model takes the form: 
εγγγγγ
γγγγγγγγ
++++++
+++++++=
NASSCINCDMARRCINCDMARRINCINC
EDUAGEAGENDEPNDEPDMARRDFEMRTS
12
2
1110
2
98
7
2
65
2
43210
**
 
 (4.4) 
Table 4.8 Non-Linear Regression Results 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic P-value 
Constant 59.192** 1.191 49.70 0.000 
DFEM -5.9086** 0.212 -27.93 0.000 
DMARR -4.4117** 0.852 -5.18 0.000 
NDEP -0.6373** 0.188 -3.38 0.001 
NDEP2 0.0893* 0.042 2.12 0.034 
AGE -0.0964 0.052 -1.86 0.063 
AGE2 -0.0024** 0.001 -4.40 0.000 
EDU 1.1006** 0.103 10.68 0.000 
INC 3.5264** 0.413 8.53 0.000 
INC2 -0.3430** 0.076 -4.54 0.000 
DMARR*CINC 2.0101** 0.538 3.74 0.000 
DMARR*CINC2 -0.2260** 0.087 -2.61 0.009 
NASS 0.8837** 0.106 8.32 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.247 
Number of observations  15,916 
 
This table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is respondent’s risk tolerance 
score (created by FinaMetrica) and the independent variables involve linear and/or quadratic versions 
of: DFEM, a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the respondent is female and zero for males; 
DMARR, a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the respondent is married and zero if 
unmarried; NDEP, a variable measuring the number of family dependents; AGE, the respondent’s age 
in years. Ordered categorical variables for education (EDU); income (INC); combined income (CINC) 
and net assets (NASS) are defined in Table 4.2. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
& Covariance are used. 
* Significant at the 5% level ** Significant at the 1% level 
                                                 
24 The non-linear effect in NASS is dropped due to insignificant results. 
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The estimated regression results are presented in Table 4.8.  The significance of all of the 
estimated coefficients provides clear evidence of nonlinear effects in the relationship between 
RTS and NDEP, AGE, INC and CINC. Specifically, it can be seen that RTS decreasing at a 
decreasing rate as the number of dependents increases and decreasing at an increasing rate as 
reported age increases. On the other hand, RTS increases at a decreasing rate as income and 
combined income increase. A more insightful impression of this nonlinearity may be obtained 
using the estimated coefficients of the parsimonious model specified in equation (4.4) and 
plotting the predicted RTS for a collection of characterized cases.  Figure 4.4 presents a plot 
of the predicted RTS for a young (20 year old) male and a similar female and an elderly (70 
year old) male and a similar female who, in each case, are married, have one dependent 
family member and have completed high school. Similar to the counterpart plots given in 
Figure 4.3, age and gender differences are clearly evident and are maintained as income and 
wealth increase. Compared to Figure 4.3, the non-linear model provides lower RTS estimates 
on a case by case basis, suggesting that ignoring non-linearities may induce overestimation of 
RTS (at least for these types of individuals).  
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Figure 4.4 Predicted RTS from Non-Linear Model across Income/Combined 
Income/Net Asset Groups 
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Note: This Figure displays four illustrative cases from the regression equation estimated for Table 
4.8. All four cases are based on (a) a married respondent; (b) one dependent family member; and (c) 
high school as the highest educational qualification. The Income / Combined Income / Net Asset 
groups are defined as follows:  
 
I/CI/NA Group Income Combined Income Net Assets 
1 < $30,000 < $30,000 < $50,000 
2 < $30,000 $30,000 - $50,000 < $50,000 
3 < $30,000 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
4 < $30,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
5 < $30,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
6 $30,000 - $50,000 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
7 $30,000 - $50,000 $30,000 - $50,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
8 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
9 $30,000 - $50,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
10 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $150,000 
11 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
12 $50,000 - $100,000 $50,000 - $100,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
13 $50,000 - $100,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
14 $50,000 - $100,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
15 $100,000 - $200,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $150,000 - $500,000 
16 $100,000 - $200,000 $100,000 - $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
17 $100,000 - $200,000 $100,000 - $200,000 > $1,000,000 
18 $100,000 - $200,000 > $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
19 $100,000 - $200,000 > $200,000 > $1,000,000 
20 > $200,000 > $200,000 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
21 > $200,000 > $200,000 > $1,000,000 
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4.8. Conclusion 
 
Attitudes towards risk and their impact on asset allocation decisions will be an important 
determinant of financial well-being in retirement. This analysis, of a very large database of 
psychometrically-derived risk profiles of Australians aged between 20 and 80 years, provides 
evidence that women differ from men in their attitude to financial risk taking. The 
examination of a large Australian database also provides a response to the observation made 
by Jiankoplos and Bernasek (1998) that most of the risk tolerance research uses United States 
data and consequently the results could be country specific.  
 
Regression analysis of risk tolerance scores (RTS) on the demographic characteristics of 
gender, marital status, number of dependents, age, education, income, combined income and 
net assets revealed each of these characteristics to be significant at the 1% level, with the first 
four characteristics having a negative relationship with RTS. The impact of gender was 
explored through dummy variable enhanced regression analysis constructed to test the 
increment in each demographic coefficient derived from being female relative to the base case 
of being male. While it was found that the fixed component of the RTS was 9.6 points lower 
for females, the magnitude of this impact is reduced once the other demographic 
characteristics are taken into account. Marriage and number of dependents were found to be 
differentially important characteristics, with marriage having a less negative impact on risk 
tolerance for females than the negative impact found for males. Age reduces risk tolerance by 
3.39 points per decade for males, and its differential impact for females is positive but 
negligible, being associated with a decrease of 2.91 points per decade (i.e. 0.48 points lower 
in magnitude). 
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On the other hand, the combined income effect derived from marriage and the level of net 
assets of the respondent, which have positive impacts per category for males, have 
correspondingly incremental negative impacts for females. Education was not found to be a 
significant differentiating variable in explaining the RTS of females. While important for both 
males and females in the sense that it is associated with an increase in RTS per education 
category, the results show that no more or less importance is attached to it by females. Finally, 
the research revealed evidence of nonlinear effects in the relationship between RTS and the 
number of dependents, age and income and combined income. 
 
In the context of an aging and increasingly female world, the key implications of this research 
are most apparent in the managed funds industry over a medium to longer term timeframe 
(looking at 2030 and beyond). As the baby boomer bulge moves through the age profile, the 
gender composition will shift further in favor of women. The extent to which women do have 
more conservative risk profiles and the extent to which this conservatism is exacerbated with 
age, we expect to see asset allocation decisions leading to an overall shift to less risky 
investment portfolios. Importantly, the existence of a positive equity premium means that 
such a shift in overall asset allocation has the potential to lead to lower levels of wealth for 
women in their retirement years. At a macro level, in the absence of countervailing forces at 
play, it may lead to lower levels of ‘speculative’ capital being available for venture capital 
and other extreme risk projects that currently attract funding.  
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Part B:  Supply Side Studies 
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Chapter 5: An Examination of Australian Equity Trusts for 
Selectivity and Market Timing Performance25 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The issue of managed fund performance has been the subject of increased interest in both the 
academic and practitioner communities in recent years.26 Given that the majority of fund 
managers classify themselves as either stock pickers or market timers, it is not surprising that 
a major focus of the literature on managed fund performance has been the identification and 
differentiation of security selection (microforecasting) skills and market timing 
(macroforecasting) skills on the part of investment managers.  While changes in the 
composition of stocks in a portfolio can impact on the fund’s systematic risk, it is the latter 
activity which is more likely to have the greatest impact on the fund’s systematic risk. 
 
It is in the area of macroforecasting, namely the identification of market timing ability, in 
which the current chapter focuses its attention. Here the logic of the analysis is to establish a 
relationship between the systematic risk of a fund and market timing ability on the part of a 
fund manager. Timing ability is usually summarised as a decision by a manager to be in or out 
of the equity market, where being out of the (higher risk) equity market implies being in the  
(lower risk) fixed income market. As a result of fund managers effecting changes in the risk 
level of the portfolio, the relationship between portfolio returns and market returns will be 
non-linear.  Studies generally have attempted to accommodate this non-linearity and identify 
changes in the systematic risk of funds through the use of some form of quadratic regression 
technique (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966, Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer and Ross, 1986), or 
                                                 
25 Parts of this chapter are drawn from a paper published by the candidate: Hallahan, T. and Faff, R (1999). An 
Examination of Australian Equity Trusts for Selectivity and Market Timing Performance, Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, 9, 387-402. 
26 Surveys conducted by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Ippolito (1993) and Shukla and Trzcinka 
(1994) document the renewed interest in portfolio performance and provide an overview of the themes which 
have emerged in the literature. 
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the application of a ‘dual beta’ specification (Henriksson and Merton, 1981, Jagannathan and 
Korajczyk, 1986, Sinclair, 1990 and Fletcher, 1995). 
 
The pioneering work of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) recognised that active market timing by a 
fund manager would induce nonstationarity of fund systematic risk.  If successful, market 
timing would result in curvature of the fund’s characteristic line, and it was suggested that this 
non-linearity could be captured by including a quadratic term in the regression used to 
estimate Jensen’s Alpha. The appeal of the Treynor and Mazuy model lies in its simplicity: 
the alpha value identifies security selection skills and the coefficient on the quadratic term 
measures market timing ability.  Their test of the model on a sample of 57 mutual funds found 
that only one of the funds displayed significant timing ability. 
 
Subsequent studies of fund managers’ macroforecasting skills have either refined the Treynor 
and Mazuy quadratic regression approach by, for example, incorporating time-varying betas 
Chen and Stockum (1986) or conditioning on public information variables Ferson and Schadt 
(1996), or have invoked an alternative definition of market timing ability Hendrickson and 
Merton (1981).  An interesting feature of the literature is the number of studies (for example, 
Kon, 1983, Chang and Lewellen, 1984, Henriksson, 1984, Grinblatt and Titman, 1989, 
Lehmann and Modest, 1987, Cumby and Glen, 1990, Connor and Korajczyk, 1991, Coggin 
and Hunter, 1993) which report negative market timing skills and a negative relationship 
between selectivity and timing.  However, Lee and Rahman (1990) found that 28 of the 93 
funds in their sample exhibited significantly positive timing ability.  This figure reduced to 16 
funds when the regression estimates were adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Fletcher (1995) conducted a study of the selectivity and market timing performance of a 
sample of UK unit trusts over the ten-year period 1980 to 1989. He applied an approach that 
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assessed market timing performance using two different empirical specifications. First, a 
quadratic market model framework was used following the work of Chen and Stockum 
(1986). Second, the Henriksson and Merton (1981) ‘dual-beta’ market model was also 
applied. In general, he found, like Sinclair (1990), that the funds tended to exhibit ‘perverse’ 
market timing performance but that this seemed to be typically offset by superior security 
selection ability. As observed by Fletcher (1995) this apparent trade-off between selectivity 
and market timing is consistent with existing US evidence – for example, Henriksson (1984); 
Connor and Korajcyzk (1991); and Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993).  An explanation of 
this phenomenon is yet to be found. 27 
 
Bello and Janjigian (1997) extended the Treynor and Mazuy model to incorporate two 
additional indices to take account of the inclusion of non-S&P 500 stocks in mutual fund 
portfolios. The data set comprised 633 funds classified by investment objective as either 
aggressive, small company, growth, equity-income or balanced. Comparing the extended 
model to the standard Treynor and Mazuy model, it was found that where the former 
indicated superior selectivity only for the growth and equity-income categories, the latter 
found superior selectivity across all categories. With regard to timing, the former model 
showed negative timing which was significant for all but the balanced category, whereas the 
extended model found evidence of significant positive timing for the aggressive, small 
company and growth funds and negative timing in the other categories. These results call into 
question earlier findings which suggested timing skills were predominantly negative and 
negatively correlated with selectivity skills. 
 
Whilst much of the evidence indicates that fund managers possess perverse market timing 
ability, studies by Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Kothari and Warner (2001) suggest that the 
                                                 
27  See Fletcher (1995, pp. 153-4) for a good discussion of the possible reasons for the trade-off between 
selectivity and timing, explored in the literature. 
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models commonly used to measure market timing ability are misspecified, and that this 
misspecification may explain the reported results.  
 
The investigation of fund market timing performance using Australian data is an area of very 
limited research activity. Sinclair (1990) provided the first published Australian evidence on 
the market timing issue. His study involved a sample of sixteen pooled superannuation funds 
over the seven-year period 1981 to 1987.  He applied an approach that combined two 
empirical strategies. First, to try and identify shifts in fund risk, the Brown, Durbin and Evans 
(1975) and Quandt (1958, 1960) techniques were applied. Second, the market timing evidence 
was directly assessed in terms of the Henriksson and Merton (1981) ‘dual-beta’ market 
model. In general, he found that the funds tended to exhibit ‘perverse’ market timing 
performance. However, this seemed to be typically offset by superior security selection 
ability. 
 
The principal issue to be examined in this chapter therefore is the market timing ability of a 
segment of the Australian investment fund industry, namely, Australian equity trusts. 
Following others in the literature (for example, Clare, Priestly and Thomas, 1998), this study 
takes on board the arguments of Leamer (1983) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) who question 
the appropriateness of continued testing of an hypothesis using data from which the 
hypothesis was developed originally. Most of the previous studies of market timing use US 
mutual fund data. This study therefore extends the market timing literature by examining data 
from an alternative major capital market and by providing evidence on a more extensive 
Australian dataset than has been previously published. The approach followed involves 
running both quadratic excess returns market model and dual-beta excess returns market 
model regressions. In addition, some specification tests suggested by Jagannathan and 
Korajczyk  (1986) are also applied. 
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the methodology.  
Section 5.3 discusses the data set used in the study. Section 5.4 presents the results of the 
empirical analysis, while Section 5.5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
5.2. Empirical Framework 
5.2.1. Basic Excess Returns Market Model 
 
The starting point for analysis in this paper is the standard excess returns market model: 
 rit = αi + βi rmt + eit (5.1) 
where 
 rit   is the excess return (the raw return less the risk-free rate) on fund i in month t; 
αi   is a measure of the abnormal performance of fund i; 
βi   is a measure the market beta risk for fund i; 
rmt   is the excess return on a benchmark market index; and  
eit  is a mean zero error term. 
 
This model assumes that funds have no market timing ability. This specification can be 
altered to allow for market timing ability in two different ways. Following Fletcher (1995), 
this study utilises (a) the quadratic market model approach of Chen and Stockum (1986) and 
(b) the dual-beta market model specification of Henriksson and Merton (1981). 
5.2.2. Quadratic Market Model 
 
The quadratic version of the excess market model of Chen and Stockum (1986) takes the 
following form: 
 rit = αi + βi rmt + γi rmt2 + eit (5.2) 
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where 
 γi is a measure of the market timing ability and all other variables are defined as 
above. 
The alpha in equation (5.2) is a measure of the fund’s security selection ability, whereas the 
gamma is an indication of the fund’s market timing ability. Specifically, a positive (negative) 
gamma is consistent with a superior (perverse) market timing. This can be most easily seen by 
isolating the implied time-varying market model beta from the quadratic market model: 
 
 βit =  βi + γi rmt  (5.3) 
 
With a positive gamma value, there is a positive relationship between the time-varying beta 
and the excess return on the market index. Hence, market timing ability is reflected by a 
higher market exposure when excess market returns are higher and a lower market exposure 
when excess market returns are lower. 
 
5.2.3. Dual-Beta Market Model  
 
Alternatively, the dual-beta excess returns market model of Henriksson and Merton (1981) 
takes the form: 
 
 rit = αi + β1i rmt +β2i D rmt + eit (5.4) 
 
where 
 D is a dummy variable which takes a value of negative unity for months in which 
rmt is negative and a value of zero otherwise and all other variables are defined as above. 
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The alpha in equation (5.4) is a measure of the fund’s security selection ability, whereas the 
second beta term is an indication of the fund’s market timing ability. Specifically, a positive 
β2i is consistent with superior market timing performance. 
 
5.2.4. Specification Tests 
 
Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) suggested exclusion restrictions specification tests for 
these market timing models and they are applied in the current paper.28 Specifically, the 
exclusion restriction test is one in which the market-timing model is augmented by additional 
variable(s) of a higher order. The additional variables should not have significant estimated 
coefficients if the market-timing model is appropriate. Such specification tests are applied to 
both of the market-timing models outlined above, following Jagannathan and Korajczyk  
(1986). 
 First, consider the quadratic market model which Jagannathan and Korajczyk  (1986) 
augment by a cubic term.  
 
 rit = αi + βi rmt + γi rmt2 + δi rmt3 + eit (5.5) 
 
Interestingly, this cubic market model is not merely an artificial empirical specification. 
Recently, Fang and Lai (1997) building on work by Scott and Horvath (1980) and others, 
devise and tested a four-moment (co-kurtosis) CAPM utilising this cubic market model 
framework. Hence, the extent to which we uncover a significant cubic term may reflect on the 
empirical applicability of the four-moment CAPM. 
                                                 
28 They also suggest performing a White’s (1980) test of linearity. Since all regressions in this study are 
estimated using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity adjustment, the associated linearity tests are not undertaken. 
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On the other hand consider the exclusion restriction test which Jagannathan and Korajczyk  
(1986) suggest for the dual-beta market model specification, namely, to augment the model 
with a quadratic term. 
 
 rit = αi + β1i rmt +β2i D rmt + γi rmt2 + eit (5.6) 
 
5.3. Data  
 
The data were supplied by Morningstar29, an independent research house that monitors the 
funds industry. The sample comprises Australian equity trusts with complete monthly returns 
over the period January 1988 to September 1997. This produces a total sample size of 65 
trusts. Further, the sample consists of trusts classified as (a) Diversified Growth Equity Trusts 
(37); (b) Diversified Income Equity Trusts (8); (c) Property Equity Trusts (9); (d) Diversified 
Resources Equity Trusts (6); and (e) Other Equity Trusts (5). Whilst all the funds fall within 
the broad category of Equity Trusts, the classifications represent a range of investment 
objectives with differing attendant risk profiles.  
  
The choice of this sample period, in particular, the fact that it is entirely post-1987 and hence 
doesn’t include the 1987 crash, is also important relative to some of the studies (such as 
Sinclair, 1990 and Fletcher, 1995) which have examined market timing performance. 
Specifically, applying a quadratic market model specification over a time interval including 
such an outlier can have quite dramatic effects since the impact has the great potential to be 
substantially magnified by squaring effect. Consequently, the current study tries to overcome 
this problem by choosing a post-crash sample. 
 
                                                 
29 At the time the research was undertaken, the data were supplied by FPG Research. Subsequently, the business 
and operations of FPG Research were acquired by Morningstar and the Morningstar name replaced FPG 
Research. 
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The index series reflects changes in the value of an investment in a fund over time, and is 
based on a notional $10,000 investment in the fund.  Monthly index values are calculated by 
reference to the month-end exit price of the fund, which is net of management fees and 
assumes reinvestment of all cash and bonus unit distributions.  The index series therefore 
gives representative returns which an actual investor may have achieved and measures the 
monthly performance of the fund.  
 
Continuous monthly return data were calculated from the index series produced by FPG 
Research for each fund. The Reserve Bank three-month Treasury Bill rate was used as a 
proxy for the risk-free rate.  As the Reserve Bank data was in the form of annualised monthly 
figures these were transformed into equivalent monthly figures. The return on the All 
Ordinaries Accumulation Index was used as a market return proxy. 
 
5.4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical analysis begins with an assessment of the performance of our sample of 
Australian equity trusts using the standard excess returns market model framework. The 
results are presented in Table 5.1. First consider the estimates of beta risk across our sample. 
It can be seen that in all cases except one, the trust betas are significantly different from zero 
at the 5 % level. The single exception is Advance Properties Securities Fund (FPG 905) from 
the property trust group. Indeed, property trusts as a group are typified by their low beta risk 
compared to the rest of our sample. The estimated property trust betas mostly fall in the range 
0.07 to 0.4 and in all cases are significantly less than unity. This group of trusts provides the 
lowest beta risk case for our full sample - AMP Property Securities Trust (FPG 907), with a 
beta estimate of 0.0747. 
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Table 5.1 Excess Returns Market Model Performance of Australian Equity Trusts 
 
Panel A:  Diversified Growth Equity Trusts 
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Phi (AR(1))a R-squared D-W 
1 22 -0.0003 
(-0.12) 
0.5856** 
(12.54)b 
- 0.489 2.082 
2 74 -0.0025 
(-0.44) 
0.8306** 
(6.37) 
- 0.249 2.657 
3 76 -0.0059 
(-0.68) 
0.7194** 
(4.53) 
0.1650** 
(1.97) 
0.137 1.995 
4 77 -0.0040 
(-0.96) 
0.7645** 
(6.49) 
- 0.337 2.459 
5 82 -0.0017 
(-0.98) 
0.8258** 
(12.58) 
-0.3262** 
(-2.64) 
0.696 2.041 
6 120 0.0008 
(0.95) 
0.9547** 
(32.38) 
-0.2173** 
(-2.21) 
0.928 2.044 
7 122 0.0003 
(0.20) 
0.7890** 
(18.03) 
- 0.809 2.246 
8 158 0.0004 
(0.18) 
0.8233** 
(11.92) 
- 0.696 1.711 
9 159 -0.0001 
(-0.06) 
0.8497** 
(13.15) 
- 0.730 1.850 
10 261 -0.0024 
(-0.58) 
0.6892** 
(7.76) 
- 0.283 1.734 
11 266 -0.0006 
(-0.14) 
0.6986** 
(9.20) 
- 0.291 1.856 
12 269 0.0004 
(0.14) 
0.6010** 
(10.17) 
0.2574** 
(3.49) 
0.523 2.062 
13 271 0.0013 
(0.38) 
0.7003** 
(8.49) 
- 0.379 1.910 
14 272 0.0023 
(0.76) 
0.8103** 
(11.44) 
- 0.513 1.848 
15 273 -0.0000 
(-0.00) 
0.7210** 
(10.08) 
0.1805** 
(2.00) 
0.521 2.025 
16 274 0.0001 
(0.03) 
0.7294** 
(9.01) 
0.1843** 
(2.21) 
0.433 2.044 
17 275 0.0003 
(0.10) 
0.7216** 
(8.77) 
- 0.445 1.637 
18 276 0.0015 
(0.55) 
0.7257** 
(9.40) 
- 0.493 1.849 
19 277 0.0004 
(0.14) 
0.6932** 
(10.00) 
- 0.484 1.933 
20 278 -0.0017 
(-0.96) 
0.6602** 
(9.85) 
-0.3105** 
(-2.25) 
0.566 2.055 
21 296 0.0013 
(0.69) 
0.7151** 
(14.64) 
- 0.695 2.000 
22 305 -0.0045** 
(-2.20) 
0.7796** 
(12.97) 
- 0.670 1.982 
23 334 0.0011 
(0.58) 
0.6541** 
(12.36) 
- 0.637 1.840 
24 398 -0.0000 
(-0.01) 
0.9226** 
(23.10) 
-0.3721** 
(-4.21) 
0.844 2.198 
25 434 0.0018 
(0.56) 
1.0396** 
(13.21) 
- 0.594 2.347 
26 508 -0.0001 
(-0.11) 
0.8475** 
(22.26) 
-0.3644** 
(-2.86) 
0.841 2.123 
27 524 -0.0016 
(-0.44) 
0.6570** 
(7.15) 
- 0.332 1.981 
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 FPG Code Alpha Beta Phi (AR(1))a R-squared D-W 
28 611 -0.0005 
(-0.26) 
1.0201** 
(20.27) 
- 0.781 2.281 
29 613 -0.0062 
(-0.71) 
0.7788** 
(4.14) 
- 0.101 2.150 
30 636 0.0033 
(1.61) 
0.8771** 
(19.17) 
- 0.727 1.870 
31 638 0.0017 
(0.95) 
0.9263** 
(18.59) 
- 0.805 2.123 
32 733 -0.0048 
(-1.17) 
0.6975** 
(8.59) 
0.2908** 
(3.28) 
0.530 2.013 
33 741 0.0001 
(0.09) 
0.8214** 
(18.24) 
-0.2368** 
(-2.37) 
0.771 2.010 
34 766 -0.0004 
(-0.39) 
0.9743** 
(25.68) 
-0.3363** 
(-3.62) 
0.879 2.299 
35 863 0.0012 
(0.51) 
0.7663** 
(12.51) 
- 0.593 2.631 
36 1753 -0.0000 
(-0.01) 
0.6676** 
(11.36) 
-0.2965** 
(-3.11) 
0.509 2.089 
37 1820 0.0044** 
(3.23) 
0.6018** 
(17.29) 
- 0.738 1.709 
Panel B: Diversified Income Equity Trusts 
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Phi (AR(1))a R-squared D-W 
38 31 0.0021 
(1.61) 
0.6435** 
(17.08) 
-0.4553** 
(-3.46) 
0.607 2.078 
39 33 0.0025* 
(1.70) 
0.6004** 
(16.36) 
- 0.718 2.322 
40 160 0.0016 
(0.94) 
0.8724** 
(17.17) 
- 0.794 1.843 
41 218 0.0043** 
(2.35) 
0.6190** 
(15.80) 
- 0.628 1.992 
42 336 0.0013 
(0.93) 
0.7805** 
(14.98) 
- 0.803 2.091 
43 618 -0.0004 
(-0.37) 
0.8052** 
(28.75) 
-0.4630** 
(-3.06) 
0.838 2.136 
44 639 0.0014 
(0.72) 
0.7960** 
(14.03) 
- 0.703 2.106 
45 855 0.0011 
(0.65) 
0.9378** 
(21.37) 
- 0.823 2.051 
Panel C: Property Equity Trusts 
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Phi (AR(1))a R-squared D-W 
46 337 -0.0045* 
(-1.84) 
0.4011** 
(7.32) 
- 0.277 1.988 
47 366 -0.0031 
(-0.80) 
0.6972** 
(7.37) 
- 0.313 1.844 
48 367 0.0016* 
(1.87) 
0.0907** 
(3.08) 
- 0.128 2.108 
49 401 -0.0039 
(-1.35) 
0.3393** 
(4.67) 
- 0.169 2.360 
50 905 -0.0036 
(-1.31) 
0.1212* 
(1.72) 
- 0.025 2.004 
51 907 -0.0032** 
(-2.12) 
0.0747** 
(2.38) 
- 0.035 1.695 
52 1162 -0.0039 
(-0.57) 
0.3806** 
(2.24) 
- 0.044 1.624 
53 1163 -0.0038 
(-0.41) 
0.6172** 
(2.48) 
- 0.059 1.858 
54 1347 0.0014 
(0.59) 
0.1576** 
(2.94) 
- 0.058 1.995 
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Panel D: Diversified Resources Equity Trusts 
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Phi (AR(1))a R-squared D-W 
55 78 -0.0073 
(-1.24) 
0.9620** 
(7.30) 
- 0.279 1.675 
56 161 0.0037 
(0.86) 
0.7611** 
(6.04) 
- 0.328 1.668 
57 267 -0.0117* 
(-1.72) 
1.1341** 
(4.36) 
- 0.269 1.972 
58 637 -0.0030 
(-0.92) 
1.0754** 
(12.54) 
- 0.606 1.917 
59 640 -0.0109 
(-1.29) 
0.8630** 
(4.83) 
- 0.173 1.985 
60 769 0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.9255** 
(10.28) 
- 0.515 1.862 
Panel E:  Other Equity Trusts 
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Phi (AR(1))a R-squared D-W 
61 262 0.0034 
(0.69) 
0.6916** 
(6.95) 
0.1727** 
(2.16) 
0.328 1.951 
62 406 -0.0125** 
(-2.16) 
0.6150** 
(4.41) 
- 0.141 1.625 
63 407 -0.0044 
(-0.81) 
0.6038** 
(4.64) 
- 0.145 1.746 
64 641 0.0050* 
(1.95) 
0.8311** 
(12.97) 
- 0.603 1.739 
65 773 0.0042 
(1.04) 
0.5115** 
(10.15) 
0.4294** 
(5.11) 
0.538 2.104 
 
Notes: 
a Estimated coefficient on first-order autoregressive error term 
b White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics in parentheses 
 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level 
 
While the full sample of 65 trusts are typically less risky than the market, fourteen reveal a 
beta estimate insignificantly different from unity. However, in only four cases are the 
estimates greater than unity. The Diversified Resources category of trusts are typified by the 
highest beta risk in the sample with five of the six trusts in this category having a beta 
estimate statistically close to unity. Moreover, this group of trusts produces the highest beta 
estimate for the full sample, namely, Tyndall Gold Fund (FPG 267). This low maximum 
value, however, just serves to re-enforce the finding that Australian Equity Trusts over the test 
period were, if anything, of relatively low risk. 
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The alpha estimates in the results reported in Table 5.1 reflect the performance of the trusts. It 
can be seen that in only 5 (10) cases is there any evidence of abnormal performance at the 5 % 
(10%) level of significance. Of these however, only two (five) showed positive performance 
at the 5 % (10 %) level of significance. These funds were: (a) Perpetual’s Industrial Share 
Fund (FPG 1820) and BT Select Markets Trust - Equity Imputation (FPG 218) (5 % level) 
and (b) Advance - Imputation Fund (FPG 33), GEM Property Securities Fund - Income (FPG 
367) and National Mutual - Special Situations Fund (FPG 641) (10 % level). On the other 
hand, the negatively performing funds were: (a) EquitiLink - GrowthLink Trust (FPG 305), 
AMP - Property Securities Trust (FPG 907) and Tyndall - Global Special Situations Fund 
(FPG 406) (5 % level) and (b) Tower - Property Securities Trust (FPG 337) and Tyndall - 
Gold Fund (FPG 267) (10 % level). No other strong patterns emerge from this analysis. 
 
As argued by Sinclair (1990, p. 60), to the extent that trusts successfully engage in market 
timing activities the standard alpha performance discussed above may not provide the 
complete story. Accordingly, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report the outcome of further analysis of the 
sample of equity trusts that looks for evidence of market timing ability.  Specifically, Table 
5.2 presents only those cases which provide some evidence of timing ability in the context of 
the quadratic market model outlined earlier, while Table 5.3 provides the counterpart cases in 
the context of the dual-beta market model 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.2, there are only eight cases for which any evidence of market 
timing is detected. Interestingly, in all cases (a) the quadratic term is positive indicating 
favourable market timing behaviour and (b) the security selection performance (alpha) is 
negative (although not always significantly so). While the results confirm the negative 
association between the security selection and market timing performance documented 
consistently in the literature, this research finds the reverse case to that of Sinclair (1990). 
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That is, where any evidence of market timing ability at all is found, it is of positive market 
timing ability, consistent with Bello and Janjigian (1987), as opposed to the finding of 
“perverse” market timing ability documented by Sinclair (1990).   
 
Table 5.2 Quadratic Excess Returns Market Model Results for 
Australian Equity Trusts 
      
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Gamma R-squared D-W 
Panel A: Diversified Growth Equity Trusts 
1 273 -0.0036 
(-0.88)a 
0.6983** 
(9.73)a 
2.2771** 
(2.21)a 
0.5330 2.0323 
2 274 -0.0037 
(-0.77) 
0.7093** 
(8.84) 
2.3883* 
(1.87) 
0.4441 2.0665 
3 275 -0.0040 
(-0.92) 
0.6744** 
(8.20) 
2.5919* 
(1.82) 
0.4647 1.8964 
4 277 -0.0029 
(-0.91) 
0.6801** 
(9.58) 
2.0304* 
(1.67) 
0.4943 1.8627 
5 741 -0.0037** 
(-2.29) 
0.8103** 
(20.23) 
2.3248** 
(3.38) 
0.7871 2.0228 
Panel B: Diversified Resources Equity Trusts 
6 267 -0.0315** 
(-2.98) 
1.0561** 
(5.62) 
12.0461** 
(2.05) 
0.3464 1.7906 
7 637 -0.0071* 
(-1.84) 
1.0592** 
(12.85) 
2.5136* 
(1.87) 
0.6141 1.8456 
8 640 -0.0217** 
(-2.14) 
0.8226** 
(4.68) 
6.6086** 
(2.41) 
0.2000 1.9924 
 
 
This table shows the results of testing the Quadratic Excess Returns Market Model specified in 
Equation (5.2):  rit = αi + βi rmt + γi rmt2 + eit  
 
Notes: 
a White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics in parentheses 
 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level 
 
 
For four of the funds there is evidence that their managers have had significant market timing 
ability which has been offset by significantly poor stock selection ability. These cases are: (a) 
Mercury - Growth Trust (FPG 741); (b) Tyndall - Gold Fund (FPG 267); (c) National Mutual 
- Resources Fund (FPG 637); and (d) National Mutual - Gold Fund (FPG 640). Comparing 
these cases back to their overall performance using the standard market model allows 
quantification of the component of performance attributable to market timing, and in two 
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cases this exceeded 1 % per month. Specifically, Tyndall - Gold Fund (FPG 267) had an 
overall monthly abnormal performance of -1.17 % (Table 5.2) which decomposes into (a) -
3.15 % abnormal return specific to security selection (Table 5.3) and (b) 1.98 % abnormal 
return specific to market timing activity. Similarly, National Mutual - Gold Fund (FPG 640) 
had an overall monthly abnormal performance of -1.09 % (Table 5.2) which decomposes into 
(a) -2.17 % abnormal return specific to security selection (Table 5.3) and (b) 1.08 % abnormal 
return specific to market timing activity. Overall, there is relatively sparse evidence of any 
market timing ability across our sample using the quadratic market model approach. An 
interesting question is whether this conclusion is sensitive to the market timing model applied. 
This issue is now addressed using the dual-beta market model outlined earlier. 
 
Table 5.3 reveals there are only six cases for which any evidence of market timing is detected 
based on the dual-beta specification. A comparison with Table 5.2 shows that all of these 
were identified as market timing performers according to the quadratic market model too. 
Further, confirming the finding previously, in all cases (a) the ‘down-market’ beta term is 
positive indicating superior market timing behaviour and (b) the security selection 
performance (alpha) is negative (although not always significantly so). Hence, the results 
again confirm the negative association between the security selection and market timing 
performance documented consistently in the literature. 
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Table 5.3 Dual-Beta Market Model Results for Australian Equity Trusts 
       
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Gamma R-squared D-W 
Panel A: Diversified Growth Equity Trusts 
1 273 -0.0057 
(-1.20)a 
0.8788** 
(7.91)a 
0.3468* 
(1.90)a 
0.5300 2.0309 
2 274 -0.0064 
(-1.09) 
0.9140** 
(6.73) 
0.3993* 
(1.67) 
0.4430 2.0617 
3 275 -0.0070 
(-1.30) 
0.8982** 
(5.51) 
0.4346* 
(1.70) 
0.4638 1.8902 
4 741 -0.0058** 
(-2.25) 
0.9942** 
(12.56) 
0.3580** 
(2.46) 
0.7831 2.0253 
Panel B: Diversified Resources Equity Trusts 
5 267 -0.0416** 
(-2.82) 
1.9888** 
(3.33) 
1.8029** 
(2.03) 
0.3247 1.8274 
6 640 -0.0335** 
(-2.64) 
1.5099** 
(4.93) 
1.3610** 
(2.55) 
0.2092 1.9902 
 
This table shows the results of testing the Dual Beta Market Model specified in Equation (5.4): 
rit = αi + β1i rmt +β2i D rmt + eit 
 
Notes: 
a White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics in parentheses 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
• Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level 
 
 
For three of the funds there is evidence that their managers have had significant market timing ability 
which has been offset by significantly poor stock selection ability. These cases are: (a) 
Mercury - Growth Trust (FPG 741); (b) Tyndall - Gold Fund (FPG 267); and (c) National 
Mutual - Gold Fund (FPG 640). Specifically, Tyndall - Gold Fund (FPG 267) had an overall 
monthly abnormal performance of -1.17 % (Table 5.1) which decomposes into (a) -4.16 % 
abnormal return specific to security selection (Table 5.3) and (b) 2.99 % abnormal return 
specific to market timing activity. Similarly, National Mutual - Gold Fund (FPG 640) had an 
overall monthly abnormal performance of -1.09 % (Table 5.1) which decomposes into (a) -
3.35 % abnormal return specific to security selection (Table 5.3) and (b) 2.26 % abnormal 
return specific to market timing activity. Hence, based on the evidence reported in Tables 5.2 
and 5.3 regardless of the timing model applied, there is relatively little evidence of any market 
timing ability across the sample of Australian Equity Trusts.  
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Attention is now given to the issue of the specification tests of the market timing models, 
following the suggestions of Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986). Firstly, this analysis is 
performed in the context of the quadratic market model. Recall that this produces a cubic 
market model and the results of this analysis, for those cases in which the cubic term is found 
to be statistically significant, are reported in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Cubic Market Model Results for Australian Equity Trusts 
 FPG Code Alpha Beta Gamma Delta R-squared D-W 
Panel A: Diversified Growth Equity Trusts 
1 77 -0.0030 
(-0.77)a 
1.2094** 
(8.94)a 
-0.1016 
(-0.04)a 
-116.1693** 
(-3.91)a 
0.4449 1.8863 
2 82 -0.0044** 
(-2.37) 
1.0690** 
(11.69) 
1.8360* 
(1.79) 
-60.5535** 
(-2.49) 
0.7269 2.1021 
3 122 -0.0010 
(-0.58) 
0.8880** 
(15.05) 
0.8534 
(0.98) 
-24.7037** 
(-2.23) 
0.8162 2.2117 
4 158 -0.0002 
(-0.12) 
1.0335** 
(12.20) 
0.4828 
(0.55) 
-50.4310** 
(-5.83) 
0.7218 1.6741 
5 159 -0.0007 
(-0.38) 
1.0571** 
(13.42) 
0.4713 
(0.54) 
-49.7362** 
(-5.46) 
0.7547 1.8549 
6 261 -0.0056 
(-0.83) 
0.4333** 
(3.41) 
1.8217 
(0.92) 
51.9407** 
(2.26) 
0.3243 2.0371 
7 271 -0.0014 
(-0.30) 
0.5340** 
(5.05) 
1.5712 
(0.84) 
36.8980* 
(1.91) 
0.4013 1.7847 
8 278 -0.0014 
(-0.72) 
0.9480** 
(12.31) 
-0.0178 
(-0.02) 
-66.0844** 
(-5.29) 
0.6293 2.0983 
9 733 -0.0053 
(-1.16) 
0.9356** 
(8.52) 
0.4459 
(0.33) 
-57.7272** 
(-2.98) 
0.5589 2.0182 
10 1753 0.0004 
(0.13) 
0.8333** 
(10.53) 
-0.1526 
(-0.13) 
-37.4213** 
(-2.29) 
0.5302 2.1081 
Panel B: Diversified Income Equity Trusts 
11 160 -0.0001 
(-0.03) 
1.0349** 
(15.28) 
1.1114 
(1.53) 
-40.1088** 
(-4.15) 
0.8098 1.7068 
12 336 0.0021 
(1.22) 
0.9754** 
(18.53) 
-0.3204 
(-0.50) 
-45.5653** 
(-5.66) 
0.8349 2.0263 
13 639 0.0004 
(0.18) 
0.9208** 
(11.06) 
0.6812 
(0.71) 
-30.5312* 
(-1.90) 
0.7126 2.1581 
Panel C: Property Equity Trusts 
14 366 -0.0061 
(-1.22) 
0.8679** 
(5.84) 
1.9224 
(1.13) 
-43.2870** 
(-2.25) 
0.3253 1.8557 
15 367 0.0011* 
(1.81) 
0.1959** 
(5.76) 
-0.1000 
(-0.26) 
-24.7257** 
(-5.20) 
0.2370 1.8007 
16 1162 -0.0107 
(-1.35) 
0.6694** 
(2.17) 
4.3356* 
(1.920) 
-74.8800* 
(-1.72) 
0.0651 1.6353 
17 1163 -0.0109 
(-1.11) 
1.2232** 
(2.75) 
4.6680* 
(1.66) 
-150.3476** 
(-2.63) 
0.0917 1.8816 
Panel D: Diversified Resources Equity Trusts 
18 161 0.0013 
(0.32) 
0.9231** 
(5.45) 
1.5558 
(0.76) 
-40.6680* 
(-1.95) 
0.3368 1.6822 
19 267 -0.0246** 
(-2.89) 
0.2864 
(1.09) 
7.3896** 
(2.30) 
189.0300** 
(3.38) 
0.4157 1.6805 
 
This table shows the results of testing the Cubic Market Model specified in Equation (5.5): 
  rit = αi + βi rmt + γi rmt2 + δi rmt3 + eit  
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Notes: 
a White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics in parentheses 
 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level 
 
From Table 5.4 we see that there are fifteen (nineteen) cases, or almost a quarter (29 %) of the 
sample, that reveal a significant cubic term at the 5 % (10 %) level. This suggests a non-trivial 
degree of mis-specification of the quadratic market model. Of these cases it is found that the 
vast majority produce an estimated parameter on the cubic term which is negative. Indeed, 
only three of the nineteen produce a positive estimated coefficient. Interestingly, only one 
included trust coincides with the trusts modelled by the quadratic specification results of 
Table 5.2, namely the Tyndall Gold Fund (FPG 267). 
 
Finally, augmenting the Henriksson and Merton (1981) dual-beta market model is augmented 
with a quadratic term and the results are presented in Table 5.5. The table reveals that there 
are eight (eleven) cases in which the coefficient on the augmented variable is significant at the 
5 % (10 %) level. Only one of these, namely, IOOF - Equity Common Fund No. 7 (FPG 
1753) is common to both sets of significant results reported in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. 
Interestingly, only one included trust coincides with the trusts modelled by the original 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) specification results of Table 5.4, namely the Mercury - 
Growth Trust (FPG 741). 
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Table 5.5 Augmented Dual-Beta Market Model Results for Australian Equity 
Trusts 
      
 FPG Code Alpha Beta1 Beta2 Gamma R-squared D-W 
Panel A: Diversified Growth Equity Trusts 
1 76 -0.0137 
(-0.86)a 
1.5631** 
(2.28)a 
1.6398 
(1.32)a 
-12.2287* 
(-1.84)a 
0.1341 1.6814 
2 120 0.0026 
(1.31) 
0.7494** 
(6.71) 
-0.3909* 
(-1.89) 
2.8860** 
(2.46) 
0.9311 2.0600 
3 276 -0.0067 
(-1.20) 
1.2458** 
(4.46) 
1.0244** 
(1.97) 
-5.3291** 
(-2.01) 
0.5032 1.8903 
4 278 -0.0083** 
(-2.15) 
1.2712** 
(4.69) 
1.1815** 
(2.19) 
-7.9112** 
(-2.32) 
0.5934 2.0596 
5 636 0.0076 
(1.57) 
0.5189** 
(2.36) 
-0.6952* 
(-1.66) 
4.4165** 
(2.22) 
0.7328 1.8545 
6 741 -0.0018 
(-0.49) 
0.6913** 
(3.48) 
-0.2341 
(-0.62) 
3.5616** 
(1.96) 
0.7879 2.0208 
7 1753 -0.0053 
(-1.15) 
1.1300** 
(4.12) 
0.8946* 
(1.66) 
-5.8122* 
(-1.73) 
0.5235 2.0913 
Panel B: Property Equity Trusts 
8 367 -0.0008 
(-0.40) 
0.3293** 
(2.61) 
0.4603* 
(1.85) 
-3.1556** 
(-2.04) 
0.1814 1.9862 
Panel C: Diversified Resources Equity Trusts 
9 161 -0.0087 
(-1.27) 
1.4969** 
(3.92) 
1.4543* 
(1.80) 
-7.1761** 
(-1.96) 
0.3401 1.6823 
10 769 -0.0111* 
(-1.75) 
1.5928** 
(3.91) 
1.3193* 
(1.85) 
-6.4713* 
(-1.79) 
0.5256 1.8503 
Panel D: Other Equity Trusts 
11 406 -0.0300** 
(-1.97) 
2.0139** 
(2.68) 
2.7210* 
(1.90) 
-16.8379** 
(-2.42) 
0.1734 1.6158 
 
This table shows the results of testing the Augmented Dual-Beta Market Model specified in Equation 
(5.6): rit = αi + β1i rmt +β2i D rmt + γi rmt2 + eit 
 
Notes: 
a White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics in parentheses 
 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level 
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5.5. Conclusion 
 
Surveys conducted by Lakonishok et al. (1992), Ippolito (1993) and Shukla and Trzcinka 
(1994) document the renewed interest in portfolio performance and provide an overview of 
the themes which have emerged in the literature.  One important area deals with the 
evaluation of active portfolio management and asset allocation and, in particular, the 
identification of market timing ability on the part of fund managers. 
 
The principal issue examined in this chapter therefore was the market timing ability of a 
segment of the Australian investment fund industry, namely, Australian equity trusts. The 
approach followed involved running both quadratic excess returns market model and dual-
beta excess returns market model regressions. In addition, some specification tests suggested 
by Jagannathan and Korajczyk  (1986) were also applied. 
 
The results suggested that for the sample over the period examined, there is little evidence of 
market timing ability. Further, there is no clear dominance of one market timing model over 
the other.  It is found however, that a cubic market model specification does fit the data quite 
well for nearly one third of our sample. This suggests a possible area worthy of further 
research effort, namely, an examination of performance in the context of higher moment 
models (see Prakash and Bear 1986; Stephens and Proffitt 1991 and Chunhachinda, 
Dandapani, Hamid & Prakash 1994)]. 
 
While this Chapter found little evidence of successful risk-shifting behaviour in relation to 
macro-level timing ability, the following two Chapters explore whether tournament theory 
can be used to establish that fund managers engage in another type of risk-shifting behaviour 
related to there relative performance ranking each year. 
  
Chapter 6:  Tournament Behavior in Australian Superannuation 
Funds: A Non-parametric Analysis 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In a tournament, players compete for prizes where their effort level and their share of the 
prizes depends upon their ranking. Tournament theory therefore focuses on relative, rather 
than absolute, performance. Its provenance is in the area of personnel economics, with an 
initial normative focus on effort responses to the incentive structures specific to rank-order 
based compensation schemes. Theoretical analysis indicated that under certain circumstances, 
for example, where participants are risk averse and output disturbances are caused by a 
common shock, the incentive effects of rank-order compensation schemes are considered to 
induce optimal levels of effort among participants. The scope of the investigation was soon 
extended to the issue of whether tournament compensation structures impacted upon 
participant risk-taking as well as effort responses. 
 
The application of tournament theory to the analysis of managed funds can be understood by 
looking at the explicit and implicit incentive structures that characterize the industry. First, 
funds typically charge a management fee that is a fixed percentage of funds under 
management. Consequently, a goal of fund management companies is to maximize funds 
under management, and an incentive therefore exists to pursue those strategies that will help 
achieve that goal.30 Second, relative fund performance, often highlighted in semi-annual or 
annual performance or “league” tables, is an important source of information to investors 
seeking to maximize investment returns. Ippolito (1992), Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince 
(1996) and, more recently, Wilcox (2003) confirm this in respect of retail fund investors. 
Third, there appears to be convexity in the flow-performance relationship: Sirri and Tufano 
                                                 
30 Chordia (1996) and Barclay, Pearson and Weisbach (1998) propose models incorporating different fee 
structures. However, the ultimate goal remains the maximization of funds under management.  
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(1992, 1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Goetzman and Peles (1997) found that while 
those funds which recorded the highest performance during a period attracted the largest 
increases in funds under management, those funds which had performed poorly were not 
penalized by proportionate outflows of funds under management. Similarly, Berkowitz and 
Kotowitz (2000) found that net new fund investment is positively related to a distributed lag 
of past fund performance with significant nonlinearity in the performance-fund flow 
relationship at the extreme levels of performance, particularly for extremely good 
performance. 
 
Finally, fund manager compensation typically has a variable component related to the 
performance of the fund over the annual tournament period: an incentive therefore exists for 
fund managers to invest to maximize tournament period performance. 
 
Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) 
[hereafter BHS] applied the tournament model to the funds domain. They hypothesized, and 
found supporting evidence, that fund managers who were interim losers were likely to 
increase fund volatility in the latter part of the assessment period to a greater extent than 
interim winners. Subsequent research, discussed in Section 6.2, failed to confirm conclusively 
BHS’s findings: some studies found that it was interim winners who appeared to increase risk 
the most in subsequent periods, some found interim winners adopting this behavior, while 
other studies failed to find support for the tournament effect. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 explore for evidence of the tournament effect in the behavior of Australian 
superannuation fund managers over the period 1989-2004. The Australian funds management 
setting is chosen for this study because it presents a unique opportunity to examine the 
tournament question. Specifically, in contrast to other markets, three types of tournament 
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might exist since the calendar year, financial/tax year and reporting year may not coincide. 
Specifically, it is quite common for the Australian financial press to emphasize calendar year 
investment performance. However, media attention is also focused on fund performance over 
the July-June period as retail investors typically have June financial (tax) year-ends. As a final 
complication, in a number of prominent cases, funds adopt an October-September reporting 
year. 
 
Against this background, this chapter uses a non-parametric methodology to look for evidence 
of tournament (gaming) behavior in the performance of a group of Australian retail 
superannuation funds classified as “multi-sector growth funds” by Morningstar. In particular, 
this chapter investigates the two competing hypotheses put forward in the recent theoretical 
developments by Taylor (2003), who argued that using an exogenous (endogenous) 
benchmark, will induce losing (winning) managers to gamble. Accordingly, this research 
extends the tournaments literature by examining three datasets, based on the calendar year, the 
financial year and an October-September year, over the period 1989/90 to 2000/01 using a 
range of within-year assessment periods, against both an exogenous and an endogenous 
benchmark. Chapter 7 further extends the literature by using parametric regression analysis to 
investigate the tournament hypothesis and the impact on this hypothesis of a range of 
conditioning variables. 
 
As with the preceding chapters, a major motivation for choosing an Australian dataset of 
investment funds is to accommodate the general argument of Leamer (1983) and extended by 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) regarding the concern about data snooping in finance research. 
Moreover, as Australia has the most sophisticated retail funds management market outside the 
United States, it is appropriate that finance research initially focusing on the US funds 
management industry should be extended to other developed markets like Australia.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a review of the 
most relevant literature. In Section 6.3 the data and research method are described, while 
Section 6.4 outlines the research goal and hypotheses. The research findings are presented in 
Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 concludes the paper. 
 
6.2. Literature Review 
 
The literature on tournaments initially focused on employment contracts: Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) in a seminal paper put forward what has come to be known as the static tournament 
model, wherein it is assumed that rational, risk-neutral participants decide on an effort level 
before a single-period tournament begins and cannot alter it afterward. Output levels depend 
on the work effort provided by the participants plus a random shock that affects the output 
levels of all participants. Similarly, Holstrom (1982), Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz (1983) focused on the normative aspects of the tournament model: allowing for 
participant risk aversion, additive shocks and/or multiplicative shocks, their theoretical 
analysis indicated that under certain circumstances, the incentive effects of rank-order 
compensation schemes will induce optimal levels of effort among participants. From an 
agency theory perspective, Mookherjee (1984) found that where an agent’s output depended 
on a common shock as well as individual effort and idiosyncratic noise, the optimal 
employment contract may involve relative performance evaluation. 
 
Early empirical research established two important results: First, Bull et al. (1987), examining 
teams inside firms and Ehrenberg and Bonanno (1990a, 1990b) looking at the PGA golf 
tournament, reported that effort levels and performance rise as the difference between payoffs 
to winners and losers increases. Second, participants who are doing poorly in a tournament 
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will adopt high-variance (that is, riskier) strategies. Later research supported these results: For 
example, Knoeber and Thurman (1994) examined differences in ability among poultry 
producers and found that disadvantaged participants adopted high-variance strategies in the 
latter part of the tournament. Oyer (1998) examined revenue seasonality in manufacturing 
industries characterised by nonlinear compensation contracts for salespeople and executives, 
and found evidence of fiscal-timing, where agents manipulate revenues to maximise their own 
incomes. 
 
The extension of the tournament model to the funds management area began with BHS, who 
characterized the managed funds industry as a multi-period, multi-game tournament31 and 
focused on the possible strategic responses of funds identified at interim ranking stages as 
likely to be ultimate “winners” or “losers”. BHS hypothesized that fund managers who were 
interim losers (below the median performance for the first part of the assessment period), 
were likely to increase fund volatility in the latter part of the assessment period to a greater 
extent than interim winners. This strategy of increasing volatility was based on the 
expectation that higher volatility gave the losing manager a better chance of a major 
performance reversal that would redeem their ranking and, hence, secure a major tournament 
prize at year end. While greater volatility also increased the risk of experiencing an even more 
disastrous full year performance, the losing manager would take the view that because of the 
tournament nature of the fund industry, coupled with the asymmetric response of money 
flows to performance, they had nothing much to lose.  
 
BHS’s results indicated that losers did indeed appear to gamble, a result confirmed by Koski 
and Pontiff (1999) looking at US funds and Garcia and Begona (2000) looking at Spanish 
                                                 
31 The restrictive assumptions of the static tournament model mean that it cannot be validly applied to many real-
life situations. In contrast, dynamic tournaments incorporate multiple periods, availability of performance 
feedback, and alteration of effort levels in response to the feedback during the tournament. 
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mutual funds. Acker and Duck (2001) extended the two-period model into a signal-extraction 
framework that incorporates market timing activities by fund managers. They find that 
managers of losing funds adopt extreme market positions, and that these positions are a 
positive function of the distance between the fund and the top performer and the fund’s 
assessment of the likely direction of the movement in the equity market. They also found that 
the tendency to adopt extreme positions increased as the final ranking period approached. 
Both Goriaev, Palomino and Prat (2001) and Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro’s (2002) analyses 
produced results similar to Acker and Duck (2001).  Chen and Pennacchi (2001) developed a 
model wherein managers adjust the tracking error of the fund in response to performance 
deviations from a benchmark. Using US data they found that managers increased the tracking 
error, but not return variance, as performance declines.  Kempf and Ruenzi (2003) extend the 
tournament model to mutual fund families, finding support for the BHS hypothesis in large 
fund families but finding the opposite result, that is, that winners increase risk the most, in 
small fund families. 
 
Chevalier and Ellison, (1997) was the first study to document contradictory evidence, 
suggesting that it is winners rather than losers who gamble, a result confirmed by Qui, (2003). 
However, Busse (2001), using higher frequency data, was unable to find evidence that intra-
year winners or losers actively altered the risk of their portfolio in response to past 
performance.32 
 
Notwithstanding the inconclusive empirical results, recent theoretical developments by Taylor 
(2003) suggest that the choice of the tournament benchmark for deciding winners and losers 
                                                 
32 Busse (2001) found no evidence of a tournament effect when examining daily data for US equity funds. He 
argued that autocorrelation in daily fund returns could bias monthly volatility estimates, leading to the spurious 
appearance of a tournament effect, and suggested intra-period risk changes were due to changes in the volatility 
of stock market common risk factors.  However, Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) find that tests of the 
tournament hypothesis based on monthly data are more robust to autocorrelation effects than tests based on daily 
data. Nevertheless, they also find that cross-correlation in fund returns may lead to spurious tournament effects.   
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will influence strategic responses by participants. Specifically, he argued that using an 
exogenous benchmark, such as a sharemarket index, will induce losing managers to gamble 
while winning managers will index to lock in their lead. In contrast, using an endogenous 
benchmark, such as the median fund performance, will induce winning managers to gamble. 
The intuition behind this result is that the winner will expect the loser to gamble so the winner 
will therefore gamble in order to maintain his or her lead. As the loser recognizes that the 
winner has a higher probability of success, and given the asymmetric nature of the funds 
flow-investment performance relationship, the loser also recognizes that the optimum strategy 
is not to gamble but to index. This result, while contrary to the predictions and empirical 
findings of BHS is consistent with the results of Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and also the 
findings of Palomino and Prat (2003) who examine the impact of contract design on fund 
managers’ decisions regarding effort and risk taking. 
 
In a similar vein, Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro’s (2002) theoretical analysis shows that in 
circumstances where the manager’s benchmark is less risky than the managers normal 
portfolio, managers whose performance is ahead of the benchmark towards the end of the 
tournament have an incentive to reduce their risk and mimic the index. On the other hand, 
managers whose performance is lagging the index will increase their risk exposure until they 
reach an extremum at some critical level of underperformance.  
 
While theoretical work into tournament compensation schemes continues (see, for example, 
Tong and Leung, 2002, and Vandergrift and Brown, 2003), empirical research into risk 
shifting behavior by fund managers is still inconclusive. 
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6.3. Research Framework  
 
6.3.1. Superannuation Funds 
 
A superannuation fund is an ongoing fund designed to provide retirement and death benefits 
to its members. Such funds are an integral part of the retirement income system in Australia. 
The demographic impact of the ageing of the “baby boomer” generation has meant that 
government provision of retirement income through a pension scheme would become 
prohibitively costly. Consequently, access to such a pension has become much more restricted 
and superannuation has become increasingly important in funding retirement. 
 
Mandatory superannuation contributions for all employees were introduced through Federal 
Government legislation in July 1992. Since its introduction, employer contributions have risen 
and they are now required to contribute 9% of an employee’s wage to superannuation.33 The 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)34 classifies superannuation funds into the 
following groups: Corporate (Employer), Industry (Award), Public Sector, Retail (Public 
Offer) and Small Funds. Table 6.1 provides summary information about these different types 
of funds. 
 
Table 6.1 Australia’s Superannuation Industry June 2001 
 
Type of fund Assets (AUD $b) % Members (millions) % 
Corporate 71.7 15.4 1.4 6.1 
Industry 45.0 9.6 6.9 30.3 
Public sector 113.9 24.4 2.8 12.3 
Retail 158.2 33.9 11.3 49.6 
Small Funds 78.2 16.7 0.4 1.8 
Total 467.0  22.8  
 
Source: APRA June 2001 “Superannuation Trends”. 
 
                                                 
33 The Superannuation Guarantee operates in conjunction with award superannuation. For example, if an award 
stipulates a superannuation contribution of 6%, then the Superannuation Guarantee requirement would require 
the employer to contribute an additional 3% to make a total contribution of 9%. 
34 The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial 
services industry. It oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance 
companies, life insurance, friendly societies, and most members of the superannuation industry. 
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As a result of the Australian Government’s aggressive retirement provision policies aimed at 
shifting the burden of funding retirement incomes from the public sector to the private sector, 
superannuation has become the principal retirement savings vehicle for Australians. 
Consequently, as reflected by the figures shown in Table 6.1, superannuation funds constitute 
a significant part of the managed funds industry in Australia.  
 
6.3.2. Data and Sampling 
 
The data were supplied by Morningstar, an independent research house which monitors the 
managed funds industry.  The database consists of monthly index series return data for the 
period 1989/90 to 2000/01 for retail superannuation funds classified as multi-sector growth 
and comprises all such funds in existence over this period. A fund was included in the 
analysis for each full year in which it was present in the database, thereby largely avoiding the 
major survivorship bias problem created when funds which do not survive for the full sample 
period are absent from the database.35    
 
To be classified as multi-sector, the funds in the sample invest across at least two asset 
classes, and have between 60 per cent and 80 per cent of their investments allocated to growth 
oriented assets, defined by Morningstar as equities and property. Growth funds accounted for 
around 50 per cent of total multi-sector superannuation funds over the period. Such funds 
present a relevant environment for assessing tournament-type behavior, since managers have 
a reasonable degree of scope and flexibility to pursue aggressive asset allocation changes.  
 
                                                 
35 A number of studies such as Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Brown, Goetzman, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), 
Carpenter and Lynch (1999) and Carhart, Carpenter, Lynch and Musto (2002) document the economic 
significance of survivorship bias in studies of equity mutual fund performance, particularly in relation to the 
issue of persistence in performance. However, and as noted by Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), studies by Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Goetzmann and Peles (1997) found that survivorship bias does 
not affect inferences about the funds flow-performance relationship and, therefore, is not a major issue in studies 
involving annual tournaments. 
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For each fund in the sample, data are available from either 1989/90 or the first entire year of 
operation, if inception is later than this date. The index series reflects changes in the value of 
an investment in a fund over time, and is based on a notional $10,000 investment in the fund.  
Monthly index values are calculated by reference to the month-end exit price of the fund, 
which is net of management fees and assumes reinvestment of all cash and bonus unit 
distributions. The index series therefore gives representative returns which an actual investor 
may have achieved and measures the monthly performance of the fund.  
 
Consistent with the theoretical insights of Goriaev et al. (2001) and Taylor (2003), 
winners/losers are defined in relation to two alternative types of benchmark: (a) an 
endogenous benchmark – the ‘median’ manager (that is, being above/below the median 
performance of similar funds for the first part of the assessment period), and (b) an 
exogeneous benchmark- the Australian All Ordinaries Accumulation Index (that is, being 
above/below this market index return for the first part of the assessment period). 
 
Unlike the scenario in the United States where the calendar year and the fiscal year coincide, 
the Australian fiscal year ends 30 June. Moreover, a number of major Australian financial 
institutions have reporting years ending 30 September.36 This means there are three annual 
tournament scenarios which are not mutually exclusive: (a) calendar year; (b) fiscal year and 
(c) September year.  
 
Calendar year performance receives substantial coverage in the Australian financial and 
popular press. Fiscal year performance also receives substantial press coverage and because of 
domestic taxation implications is the most likely performance period examined by investors 
                                                 
36 The 30 September financial reporting year is a legacy of the reporting year adopted early in the 20th century by 
a number of banks and insurance offices of British origin. In recent times there has been a move to discard this in 
favor of a standard financial or calendar year reporting period. For example, in 2003 AXA moved from a 
September year to a calendar year reporting period. 
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when reviewing their portfolios. While September year performance receives little attention in 
the press and is unlikely to be of significance to investors, it may be very relevant to fund 
managers whose employers report annual profitability on a September basis. The 
compensation of such fund managers, particularly bonus components, will be affected by 
September year performance. Accordingly, all three variants of the annual performance year 
are used in this study.  
 
6.3.3. Some Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of some descriptive statistics for the dataset. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics for a Sample of Multi-sector Growth Superannuation Funds 
 
 
Financial Year September Year Calendar Year 
Annual Return Statistics (%) Annual Return Statistics (%) Annual Return Statistics (%) Year No. of 
Funds Index 
(1) 
StDev 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
StDev 
(4) 
Year No. of 
Funds Index 
(1) 
StDev 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
StDev 
(4) 
Year No. of 
Funds Index 
(1) 
StDev 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
StDev 
(4) 
1989/90 126 3.5 3.5 9.7 4.1 1989/90 128 -15.1 4.4 0.8 5.6 1990 122 -17.5 4.2 1.4 5.3 
1990/91 135 4.1 4.9 8.5 5.7 1990/91 133 17.8 3.5 15.0 5.1 1991 121 34.2 3.8 18.1 7.2 
1991/92 129 5.9 4.5 10.0 4.9 1991/92 129 -1.1 3.9 5.1 5.3 1992 129 -2.3 3.6 3.6 4.6 
1992/93 139 13.3 3.6 9.9 5.1 1992/93 143 37.5 3.3 21.2 5.1 1993 144 45.4 4.1 23.5 6.1 
1993/94 156 9.9 3.8 6.5 3.2 1993/94 158 7.0 5.3 0.0 2.3 1994 169 -8.7 4.3 -6.8 2.1 
1994/95 170 18.5 5.5 6.3 3.1 1994/95 175 9.8 4.0 8.6 2.8 1995 179 20.2 3.5 15.1 2.5 
1995/96 196 5.7 4.2 9.4 1.8 1995/96 198 11.8 2.9 8.7 1.9 1996 257 13.4 2.6 9.5 1.9 
1996/97 216 15.8 2.7 17.2 2.8 1996/97 220 23.9 2.4 17.8 2.8 1997 284 14.7 3.5 12.1 2.4 
1997/98 231 25.2 2.8 8.1 2.3 1997/98 233 -1.3 4.1 4.1 2.1 1998 294 10.4 3.7 11.3 2.4 
1998/99 260 2.8 3.0 7.4 1.9 1998/99 260 15.4 3.3 8.5 2.3 1999 322 16.1 3.4 8.5 2.4 
1999/00 322 15.3 4.3 11.2 2.2 1999/00 272 16.6 3.0 12.9 2.9 2000 337 3.6 2.7 6.4 1.7 
2000/01 283 13.7 3.2 4.3 2.0 2000/01 278 -4.7 3.9 -4.1 2.8 2001 294 10.1 4.4 2.1 1.9 
2001/02 267 8.8 3.0 -5.5 2.3 2001/02 306 1.6 3.4 -4.5 2.4 2002 312 -8.1 2.5 -8.1 2.9 
2002/03 321 -4.5 3.8 -2.6 2.3 2002/03 347 13.1 2.7 5.5 2.5 2003 343 15.9 3.0 6.4 2.3 
2003/04 319 -1.1 3.1 12.0 2.4             
Maximum  (5) 25.2 5.5 17.2 5.7   37.5 5.3 21.2 5.6   45.4 4.4 23.5 7.2 
Minimum   (6) -4.5 2.7 -5.5 1.8   -15.1 2.4 -4.5 1.9   -17.5 2.5 -8.1 1.7 
Average     (7) 9.1 3.7 7.5 3.1   9.5 3.6 7.1 3.3   10.5 3.5 7.4 3.3 
Std. Dev.    (8) 7.9  5.6    13.2  7.8    16.8  8.8  
 
(1) Index is the return on the All-Ordinaries Accumulation Index for the year indicated. 
(2) StDev is the standard deviation of the return on the All-Ordinaries Accumulation Index for the year indicated. 
(3) Median is the return for the median manager in the sample for the year indicated. 
(4) StDev is the standard deviation of the return for the median manager for the year indicated.  
(5) Maximum is the highest annual return observed in the benchmark indicated. 
(6) Mimimum is the lowest annual return observed in the benchmark indicated. 
(7)  Average is the arithmetic average of the annual returns. 
(8)   Std. Dev. is the standard deviation of the annual returns. 
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The first notable aspect of Table 6.2 is the growth in the number of funds in the sample over 
the period. The financial year sample grew at an average annual rate of nearly 7% and the 
September year and Calendar year sample sizes increased at a compound rate of around 8% 
per year. Our analysis also divides the samples into two roughly equal sub-periods to explore 
for temporal dynamics in fund manager behavior.  When these sub-samples are examined it is 
evident the growth in funds has likely had a significant impact on the level of competition in 
the second sub-period. For example, in both the Financial year and the September year 
samples, the first sub-periods have an average of around 150 funds, compared to around 275 
funds in the second sub-period.  
 
We have included information on the behavior over the period of two benchmarks widely 
used in the analysis of fund manager behavior in Australia. The first is the All-Ordinaries 
accumulation Index which represents the 500 largest companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange, and constitutes around 99% of the Australian market. The second benchmark is the 
median manager, a metric widely used to distinguish “winners” from “losers” in the fund 
management industry. 
 
As might be expected, the index benchmark displays a greater range of values than the 
median manager benchmark across each of the tournament years chosen. Interestingly, the 
average median manager annual returns are similar across each of the tournament years 
(7.1%-7.5%) but the average index return is at least 1% higher for the Calendar year (10.5%) 
than the other tournament years (9.1%, 9.5%). Additionally, the range of values for the index 
and for the median manager in the financial year dataset are much closer to each other than 
the corresponding figures for the September year data and the Calendar year data. For 
example, the difference between the highest (lowest) index return and the highest median 
manager return, annually, is 8.0 (1.0) percentage points in the financial year sample compared 
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to 16.3 (10.6) percentage points in the September year and 21.9 (9.4) percentage points in the 
calendar year samples. Notably, the standard deviation of the financial year Index annual 
returns (7.9%) is much closer to that of the median manager annual returns (5.6%) than is the 
case in the other tournament years, where the difference in magnitude is around 40-50%.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the standard deviation of the annual median manager return 
has decreased from around five to six per cent in the period up to 1992-93 to around two to 
three per cent in the period since then. This reduction in volatility is of interest given the 
increase in the number of funds in the latter part of the sample: one could speculate that an 
increase in competition would lead to greater return volatility as fund managers chase returns 
more aggressively in an attempt to get to the front of the pack. However, the evidence 
indicates that increasing competition has been accompanied by diminished volatility.  This 
finding is also of interest given the risk adjustment metric we use to explore tournament 
behavior.  
 
The final observation in terms of the descriptive statistics concerns the performance required 
by a fund to be classified as a winner or a loser based on the fund’s annual return. For the 
sample used in this Chapter, where the exogenous (index) benchmark is used to identify 
winners and losers, there are nine (out of 35) tournament years in which simply breaking 
even, that is, earning a zero return, would have been sufficient to classify a fund as a winner. 
However, there are other years in which a return of around 20 - 30 per cent would be required. 
For the endogenous benchmark, there are only two instances where a zero annual return 
would have made a fund a winner and two cases where a return in the 20-25 per cent range 
was required. Considered from a different perspective, the average median manager return 
was nearly three percentage points higher than the average index return across the financial, 
September and calendar years. 
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6.3.4. Method of Analysis 
 
This chapter applies a non-parametric ‘contingency table/ CPR’37 framework as the basis of 
The empirical analysis. This choice is founded on several considerations. First, contingency 
tables are the primary framework within which Brown et al. (1996) perform their 
investigation. Given that the purpose of this study is to investigate whether their findings hold 
in a different dataset, for comparability purposes, analysing contingency tables is a natural 
choice. Second, the application of contingency tables and CPRs is common in other areas of 
the fund performance literature, see for example, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994); Kahn and 
Rudd (1995); Phelps and Detzel (1997). Third, the application of the contingency table 
approach is quite straightforward and the consequent relative ease of understanding that it 
affords an audience beyond the academic sphere (e.g. by investment advisors and even 
everyday investors) is a positive. Such wide-ranging penetration of knowledge is of great 
appeal in the funds management research area since it holds such obvious and direct interest 
to investment industry participants. Accordingly, the contingency table/ CPR setup is now 
explained. 
 
                                                 
37 CPR stands for Cross-Product Ratio and it will be explained in the text shortly. 
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Recall that BHS hypothesized that fund managers who are interim losers are likely to increase 
fund volatility in the latter part of the assessment period to a greater extent than interim 
winners. This behavior is captured in the predicted relationship between the “risk adjustment 
ratios” of loser portfolios and winner portfolios: 
 (σ2L/σ1L) > (σ2w/σ1w)      (6.1) 
where σ1 and σ2 refer to portfolio risk levels in the first and second periods (of each year), 
respectively, and the subscripts L and W denote loser and winner.  
 
Accordingly, for each performance year two classifications are established: In the first 
classification interim winners and losers are identified on the basis of the fund’s relative 
return between the commencement of the year and month M, where M ranges from the third 
month to the ninth month of the relevant year. This means that for each performance year 
tournament seven interim ranking periods are calculated ranging from three months to nine 
months. Discrete monthly return data were calculated from the index series produced by 
Morningstar for each fund. Following BHS, the M-month compound return of each fund ‘j’, 
in tournament year ‘y’, is calculated and denoted as RTNjMy: 
RTNjMy  = [(1+rj1y) (1+rj2y)… (1+rjMy)] –1     (6.2) 
where rjMy is the monthly change in the fund’s index series value as reported by Morningstar.  
 
In the second classification the ‘Risk Adjustment Ratio’, RAR, is calculated, which is the 
ratio of fund volatility before and after the interim assessment period. This measures (relative) 
changes in the risk of the fund’s portfolio and is calculated as: 
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The (RTN, RAR) pair is classified for each fund, in each tournament, based upon whether the 
fund is a (a) Winner (above benchmark return in the assessment period) or Loser   (below 
benchmark return in the assessment period) and (b) whether the fund is High RAR (has 
increased its risk in the second period i.e. RAR > 1) or Low RAR (has decreased its risk in the 
second period i.e. RAR < 1). Specifically, cell counts of the four joint RTN/RAR 
classifications of funds are required: (a) NWH – the number of winning funds with high RAR; 
(b) NWL – the number of winning funds with low RAR;  (c) NLH – the number of losing funds 
with high RAR; and (d) NLL – the number of losing funds with low RAR.   Based on these 
classifications 2 x 2 contingency tables are generated upon which tests of association are 
conducted. The non-parametric contingency table analysis is used therefore to identify the 
frequency with which funds defined as winners or losers during the assessment part of the 
tournament period, increased or decreased their risk level in the succeeding period.  
 
To test for independence from period to period, the contingency table results can be 
summarized by the use of the Cross-Product Ratio (Fienberg 1980) or Odds-Ratio 
(Christensen 1990) which gives the ratio: 
)*(
)*(
LHWL
LLWH
NN
NN
CPR =      (6.4) 
The CPR is a basic measure of association for 2 x 2 tables. When CPR = 1, it reflects an equal 
number of observations in each cell of the contingency table and would support the null 
hypothesis that the two classifications are independent. Alternatively, when CPR < 1 (CPR > 
1), it indicates interim losing managers have increased (decreased) second period risk and 
interim winners have decreased (increased) risk. The test statistic for the CPR is referred to as 
the z-statistic. It is the standard deviation of the log of the CPR and is given by the square root 
of the sum of the reciprocals of the cell counts. For large samples it is normally distributed 
with mean log CPR and can be used as an alternative to the chi-square statistic to test for 
independence. 
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6.4. Tournament Behavior in Australian Superannuation Funds: 
Research Goal and Hypothesis Development 
 
In this chapter the managed fund literature is extended by investigating an Australian dataset 
for evidence of tournament behavior. The contribution is related to two specific hypotheses 
concerning the strategic interaction between active fund managers when alternate benchmarks 
are specified.  
 
Stated formally, our null hypothesis is that subsequent period fund risk is independent of 
ranking period performance. Given the research design, failure to reject the null hypothesis 
would occur when the CPR is equal to unity: a CPR of one represents equal counts in each of 
the cells of the contingency table, and indicates an absence of association between fund 
performance over the assessment period and changes in fund risk over the remaining part of 
the tournament.  
H0: CPR = 1 
If the null hypothesis of independence between fund performance and subsequent changes in 
fund risk can be rejected, the alternative hypotheses focus on examining the strategic response 
of fund managers to performance rankings under different benchmark regimes.38 First, 
following Taylor’s (2003) game-theoretic analysis, the study investigates whether, under an 
exogenous benchmark (index) regime, losing managers at the end of the assessment period 
increase the risk of the fund in the subsequent period while winning managers reduce their 
risk.  Evidence supporting this alternative hypothesis would be provided by a CPR less than 
unity: 
H1: CPR < 1 
                                                 
38 Consistent with earlier literature, Taylor (2003) analyses the strategic response of fund managers in terms of 
two-person non-cooperative games where one player is the fund manager and the other player represents the 
benchmark. 
 146
Our second alternative hypothesis concerns the strategic response of fund managers when 
their within tournament performance is assessed against an endogenous benchmark. Under 
this benchmark regime, Taylor’s (2003) analysis predicts that when performance is measured 
against the median manager, winning managers at the end of the ranking period will increase 
their portfolio risk over the remaining period while losing managers will reduce their risk. 
Stated formally: 
H2: CPR > 1 
Support for this hypothesis would contradict the findings of BHS but would be consistent 
with the results reported by Chevalier and Ellison (1997). 
 
This research therefore contributes to the tournaments literature by providing evidence on the 
different predictions for strategic behavior derived under alternative benchmark regimes used 
in ranking fund manager performance within tournaments. The hypotheses are tested under 
three different tournament structures, namely, calendar year, financial year and September 
year, using a dataset of funds from one of the most sophisticated managed fund markets 
outside the United States. 
 
6.5. Results 
 
6.5.1. Analysis Relative to an Exogenous Benchmark 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) is that assessment against an exogenous benchmark, such as a 
sharemarket index, will induce losing managers to gamble and take on more risk in the 
subsequent period while winning managers will index to lock in their lead, and in doing so 
reduce their portfolio risk. This hypothesis is supported where the CPR is less than unity. 
 
Table 6.3 reports the outcome of the contingency table/ CPR analysis applied to Calendar year 
tournaments assessed against the index benchmark. This table reveals the strongest results in 
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support of H1. Primary focus in this table should be directed to the bottom row of figures 
which indicate the aggregate CPR results for the complete set of eleven years of Calendar 
tournaments. Here there is evidence that the overall CPR ratio is less than one for all 
assessment periods – from (3, 9) through to (9, 3).39 Moreover, all these CPRs are found to be 
statistically different from (less than) unity at the 5% level, the sole exception being the (8,4) 
assessment period which, nevertheless, is significant at the 10% level. This evidence is 
strongly in favor of H1: in the sample, in the Calendar-year tournaments assessed against an 
exogenous benchmark, losing (winning) managers appear to gamble (play it safe) and take on 
more (less) risk in the subsequent period.  
                                                 
39 Assessment period (M, 12-M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M 
= 3, 4, …, 9). For example, (3, 9) indicates the tournament in which interim performance is based on the first 3 
months of the relevant year and the post period is the latter 9 months (i.e. months 4 to 12) of that year. 
 148
Table 6.3 Cross-Product Ratios for Calendar-year Tournaments: Index Benchmark 
 
 Assessment Period 
            (3, 9) (4, 8) (5, 7) (6, 6) (7, 5) (8, 4) (9, 3) 
Year CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z 
1990 0.33 -0.68 0.33 -0.68 0.33 -0.68 1.00 0.00 0.59 -0.50 1.00 0.00 5.17 1.05 
1991 1.02 0.01 1.02 0.01 1.02 0.01 1.02 0.01 0.20 -1.04 0.33 -0.67 1.02 0.01 
1992 0.20 -3.76 1.72 0.52 7.46 1.32 2.40 1.70 2.20 2.18 0.61 -0.71 3.00 0.67 
1993 0.14 -1.31 0.42 -0.88 0.42 -0.88 1.00 0.00 0.59 -0.50 0.14 -1.31 0.14 -1.31 
1994 0.33 -0.68 0.92 -0.23 2.00 2.21 6.69 2.70 0.62 -1.51 0.55 -1.40 1.90 2.06 
1995 0.46* -1.93 0.42 -0.87 2.30 2.74 2.00 2.29 1.86 0.77 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 
1996 11.96 3.67 1.01 0.00 5.20 1.06 63.81 2.90 0.31 -4.49 1.38 0.90 2.79 2.13 
1997 0.91 -0.38 0.91 -0.39 0.14 -1.30 1.00 0.00 0.56 -0.74 3.90 4.56 0.27 -1.43 
1998 1.52 1.12 1.07 0.19 1.89 2.28 0.93 -0.20 1.09 0.28 0.98 -0.01 1.72 1.13 
1999 0.00 -4.20 0.00 -4.31 0.00 -4.33 0.00 -4.24 0.00 -4.22 0.06 -7.68 0.07 -7.54 
2000 0.26 -2.17 1.67 0.49 3.00 0.67 0.41 -3.84 2.24 2.67 1.23 0.75 0.43 -3.63 
Total 0.69 -4.45 0.69 -4.29 0.85 -1.90 0.78 -2.86 0.69 -4.39 0.86* -1.78 0.76 -3.31 
 
Note: This table reports cross-product ratios (CPR) and their associated z-statistics (Z) with reference to Calendar-year 
tournaments, against an index benchmark. The CPR is calculated as: 
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where: NWH (NWL) is the number of winning funds with high (low) RAR and NLH (NLL) is the number of losing funds with high 
(low) RAR. The Risk-Adjustment Ratio (RAR) is calculated as: 
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where RARjMy (rjMy) is the Risk-Adjustment Ratio (fund monthly return) for fund ‘j’, over the M-month interim period, in tournament 
year ‘y’. The assessment period (M, 12-M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M = 3, 4, …, 9). 
Winning (Losing) funds are those with interim return performance above (below) the benchmark specified above. High (Low) RAR 
funds are those with a RAR > 1 (RAR < 1). Lighter shading indicates periods supporting H1 (at the 5% level) i.e. where interim Winners 
(Losers) have decreased (increased) second period risk (i.e. CPR < 1). Darker shading indicates periods supporting H2 (at the 5% level) 
i.e. where interim Winners (Losers) have increased (decreased) second period risk (i.e. CPR > 1). * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Due to maximizing the effective sample size, the aggregate results discussed above provide 
the most powerful and, hence, the most reliable test of the tournament hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, it is of interest and worthwhile making a guarded micro-assessment of the 
individual results – keeping a particular eye out for any patterns or trends that may provide 
further insights into tournament-type behavior in the sample. To this end, further examination 
of Table 6.3, does present some supplementary findings. First, it is apparent that some 
variation in the effect occurs over time and across assessment periods. Within the 77 
individual calendar year tournaments, there were 12 instances each of a significant CPR less 
than one and greater than one (at the 5% level). Second, the tournament of 1999 is a ‘stand-
out’ in the sense that it was the only year in which each assessment period had individual 
CPRs less than one, and all were significant at the 5% level.  
 
Third, is the question of whether any ‘within-tournament’ patterns or trends reveal 
themselves? Very little can be detected in this regard, although perhaps there is a weak pattern 
in which assessment periods with shorter (longer) interim periods tend (not) to support H1. To 
the extent that such an effect is real, it would be consistent with losing/winning fund 
managers being more likely to act earlier (or not at all). Fourth, relates to the question of 
whether there are any ‘across-year’ patterns or trends which might suggest changing behavior 
over time? Again, there is very little to go on here. There does however, appear to be a 
concentration of support for H1 in the latter two years of our sample, which may suggest that 
while fund managers historically were not susceptible to the gaming behavior, they may have 
changed in recent years (perhaps due to increasing competition in the industry). However, this 
is only conjecture based on our limited sample and evidence. To be confirmed, it would 
require extended examination in future research.  
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The final and overall comment with regard to the Table 6.3 results is that while strong 
(aggregate) support is found for H1, the volatility underlying this finding warrants a careful 
qualification to the conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis. In particular, the extent to 
which this gaming behavior occurs (for Calendar/index benchmark tournaments), either (a) it 
is a more long-term in nature or (b) it is largely a recent phenomenon (with no guarantee of 
continuation). Either way, given the limited evidence to date, it will be difficult to predict 
over any short-term horizon. 
 
The counterpart September-year and Financial-year results for the exogenous benchmark 
were far less conclusive.40 With regard to the September-year analysis, only nine significant 
CPR results (at the 5% level) emerged from the 84 individual tournaments. However, it is 
notable that seven of these cases favored H1 i.e. they indicated that interim losers increased 
risk. Furthermore, in turn, three of these cases were recorded for the (8,4) tournament periods 
in 1991/92, 1990/2000 and 2000/2001. Moreover, the only overall CPR that was significant at 
the 5% level was the (8,4) period which recorded a CPR of 0.67. The Financial-year 
exogenous benchmark analysis returned only six significant CPR results from the 84 
individual tournaments. Again, H1 was the main beneficiary, with five of these cases 
indicating that interim losers (winners) increased (reduced) risk. However, at an aggregate 
level no tournament assessment period recorded a significant overall CPR.  
 
Taken together, all of the analysis involving exogenous benchmarks does provide a degree of 
support favoring H1. This is particularly so for the Calendar-year results and suggests that the 
extent to which fund managers in the sample are ‘tournament-conscious’, they probably view 
the Calendar year as most important. This is consistent with the argument mounted earlier that 
                                                 
40The results for these two cases are reported in Appendix 6.1 and Appendix 6.2, respectively. 
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Calendar-year investment performance is given considerable prominence by the Australian 
financial press. 
 
6.5.2. Analysis Relative to an Endogenous Benchmark 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) is that assessment against an endogenous benchmark, such as a 
median performance, will induce winning (losing) managers to take on more (less) risk in the 
subsequent period. This hypothesis is supported where the CPR exceeds unity. 
 
At a general level, the results for the endogenous (median manager) benchmark produced a 
greater number of significant results compared to the exogenous benchmark. In both the 
Calendar Year and the Financial Year, 43 percent of the individual tournaments recorded 
significant results while in the September year the comparable figure was 39 percent. More 
specific details are discussed below. 
 
Table 6.4 reports the outcome for the September-year results for the endogenous benchmark. 
This analysis returned 33 significant CPR results from the 84 individual tournaments. Of 
these cases, 24 indicated that interim period losers increased risk in the second period – 
thereby providing support for H1. Moreover, the overall CPR results revealed the same 
behavior in five of the seven assessment periods (at the 5% level), with the (3,9) and (8,4) 
periods being the exceptions, although the latter of these two cases was significant at the 10% 
confidence level. The concentration of significant below unity CPR results in the individual 
annual tournaments was highest at five (out of 12 years) in the (4,8) period, with four of those 
results recorded consecutively in the years 1992/93 to 1995/96. Interestingly, the last three 
years of the dataset reveal a similar concentration in the (9,3) assessment period. The year 
1992/93 is notable in as much as the first five assessment periods record significant CPR 
results. That year recorded the highest median manager return of 21.2 percent. At first sight 
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this would suggest that buoyant market conditions created high performance pressures on 
managers. However, a similar pattern is not evident in 1996/97, the year with the next highest 
median manager return of 17.8 percent.  
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Table 6.4 Cross-Product Ratios for September-year Tournaments: Median Benchmark 
 Assessment Period 
            (3, 9) (4, 8) (5, 7) (6, 6) (7, 5) (8, 4) (9, 3) 
Year CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z 
1989/90 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.78 -0.71 0.41 -2.45 0.88 -0.35 0.88 -0.35 0.60 -1.41 
1990/91 0.91 -0.26 1.03 0.09 1.31 0.78 1.89 1.81 1.67 1.47 1.89* 1.81 0.81 -0.61 
1991/92 0.14 -4.99 1.50 1.14 1.17 0.44 2.19 2.19 0.49 -2.01 1.50 1.14 1.32 0.79 
1992/93 0.39 -2.74 0.31 -3.38 0.49 -2.08 0.49 -2.08 0.39 -2.74 0.78 -0.75 0.78 -0.75 
1993/94 0.57 -1.74 0.21 -4.50 0.86 -0.48 2.97 3.30 0.63 -1.43 0.95 -0.16 0.86 -0.48 
1994/95 1.86 2.03 0.47 -2.48 0.56* -1.88 0.23 -4.51 0.47 -2.48 0.74 -0.98 1.17 0.53 
1995/96 0.46 -2.68 0.30 -4.06 0.59* -1.84 0.89 -0.43 0.59* -1.84 1.22 0.71 1.22 0.71 
1996/97 2.83 3.73 1.34 1.08 0.52 -2.42 0.75 -1.08 0.93 -0.27 0.60* -1.88 0.38 -3.47 
1997/98 0.72 -1.24 1.25 0.85 1.09 0.33 0.95 -0.20 1.34 1.11 1.17 0.59 1.77 2.15 
1998/99 1.98 2.72 1.45 1.49 0.50 -2.72 0.50 -2.72 0.65* -1.73 0.57 -2.23 0.39 -3.69 
1999/00 2.61 3.84 1.81 2.42 0.89 -0.49 0.89 -0.49 0.89 -0.49 0.34 -4.31 0.55 -2.42 
2000/01 0.77 -1.08 0.61 -2.03 1.46 1.56 0.92 -0.36 0.48 -2.98 1.37 1.32 0.43 -3.45 
Total 0.95 -0.57 0.82 -2.42 0.80 -2.76 0.83 -2.26 0.72 -4.00 0.86* -1.84 0.72 -3.91 
Note: This table reports cross-product ratios (CPR) and their associated z-statistics (Z) with reference to September-year tournaments, 
against a median benchmark. The CPR is calculated as: 
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where: NWH (NWL) is the number of winning funds with high (low) RAR and NLH (NLL) is the number of losing funds with high (low) RAR. 
The Risk-Adjustment Ratio (RAR) is calculated as: 
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where RARjMy (rjMy) is the Risk-Adjustment Ratio (fund monthly return) for fund ‘j’, over the M-month interim period, in tournament year ‘y’. The 
assessment period (M, 12-M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M = 3, 4, …, 9). Winning (Losing) funds are 
those with interim return performance above (below) the benchmark specified above. High (Low) RAR funds are those with a RAR > 1 (RAR < 1). Lighter 
shading indicates periods supporting H1 (at the 5% level) i.e. where interim Winners (Losers) have decreased (increased) second period risk (i.e. CPR < 1). 
Darker shading indicates periods supporting H2 (at the 5% level) i.e. where interim Winners (Losers) have increased (decreased) second period risk (i.e. CPR 
> 1). * indicates significant at the 10% level 
.
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The basic thrust of the September/ Median Benchmark results provides reasonably strong 
support for H1, contrary to the prediction (based on Taylor, 2003) of H2, namely, that interim 
winners (losers) will increase (decrease) risk. There is however, some weak evidence that may 
point to this latter hypothesis being relevant in the latter years of the sample. Specifically, in 
the years 1994/95, 1996/97, 1998/99 and 1999/00 the CPR significantly exceeds unity (at the 
5% level) for the (3,9) period, possibly suggesting that winning (losing) managers are more 
likely to act earlier to increase (decrease) risk. 
 
The Financial-year analysis for the endogenous benchmark is shown in Table 6.5. Again, 
initial attention should be directed to the bottom row of figures which indicate the aggregate 
CPR results for the complete set of twelve years. Here the results show that the overall CPR 
ratio exceeds unity in all but two cases, but in both of those it is very close to unity. Of these 
aggregate CPRs, two are statistically significant and greater than unity (at the 5% level) – 
namely, the (3,9) and (8,4) cases. This represents reasonable support in favor of H2, consistent 
with the prediction of Taylor’s (2003) model for the endogenous benchmark case. When the 
individual results are more closely assessed, 36 (44) of the 84 individual tournaments were 
significant at the 5% (10%) level. Notably, a considerable majority of 21 (29) cases indicate 
that it was the interim winners (losers) who subsequently increased (reduced) their risk. This 
provides substantial reinforcing support for H2, just as predicted for analysis based on 
endogenous benchmarks. While the individual tournament period results do not reveal a 
pattern of concentration within any assessment period, it is notable that 10 of the significant 
CPRs greater than unity are recorded in the two years 1996/97 and 1997/98. 
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Table 6.5 Cross-Product Ratios for Financial-year Tournaments: Median Benchmark 
 Assessment Period 
            (3, 9) (4, 8) (5, 7) (6, 6) (7, 5) (8, 4) (9, 3) 
Year CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z 
1989/90 0.56 -1.60 0.73 -0.89 0.56 -1.60 0.73 -0.89 1.21 0.53 1.07 0.18 0.94 -0.18 
1990/91 3.74 3.63 1.39 0.95 1.39 0.95 2.25 2.31 2.89 2.98 2.25 2.31 1.76* 1.63 
1991/92 1.93* 1.84 0.91 -0.26 0.43 -2.36 0.38 -2.70* 0.63 -1.32 0.71 -0.97 0.71 -0.97 
1992/93 0.69 -1.10 0.87 -0.42 0.30 -3.43 0.77 -0.76 0.69 -1.10 0.48 -2.11 0.38 -2.77 
1993/94 1.11 0.32 1.67 1.60 1.51 1.28 0.81 -0.64 0.25 -4.08 0.90 -0.32 1.67 1.60 
1994/95 0.30 -3.78 0.49 -2.29 2.25 2.59 1.68* 1.68 0.65 -1.38 0.65 -1.38 0.33 -3.48 
1995/96 1.00 0.00 0.37 -3.39 0.85 -0.57 1.28 0.86 1.28 0.86 1.78 1.99 1.78 1.99 
1996/97 2.47 3.24 2.12 2.71 1.68* 1.90 3.68 4.55 3.13 4.03 1.35 1.09 1.68* 1.90 
1997/98 2.45 3.33 3.06 4.09 1.98 2.55 1.84 2.29 1.60* 1.77 1.72 2.03 2.64 3.58 
1998/99 2.40 3.45 0.73 -1.24 1.28 0.99 0.47 -2.96 0.61 -1.98 1.64 1.98 1.06 0.25 
1999/00 1.00 0.00 0.83 -0.74 1.63 1.96 1.53* 1.72 1.73 2.21 1.53* 1.72 1.06 0.25 
2000/01 0.87 -0.60 0.55 -2.49 0.23 -5.71 0.69 -1.55 1.45 1.55 0.87 -0.60 0.46 -3.20 
Total 1.26 2.75 0.94 -0.75 0.97 -0.33 1.11 1.25 1.13 1.50 1.18 2.00 1.02 0.25 
Note: This table reports cross-product ratios (CPR) and their associated z-statistics (Z) with reference to Financial-year tournaments, 
against a median benchmark. The CPR is calculated as: 
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where: NWH (NWL) is the number of winning funds with high (low) RAR and NLH (NLL) is the number of losing funds with high (low) RAR. 
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where RARjMy (rjMy) is the Risk-Adjustment Ratio (fund monthly return) for fund ‘j’, over the M-month interim period, in tournament year ‘y’. The assessment period (M, 12-
M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M = 3, 4, …, 9). Winning (Losing) funds are those with interim return performance above 
(below) the benchmark specified above. High (Low) RAR funds are those with a RAR > 1 (RAR < 1). Lighter shading indicates periods supporting H1 (at the 5% level) i.e. 
where interim Winners (Losers) have decreased (increased) second period risk (i.e. CPR < 1). Darker shading indicates periods supporting H2 (at the 5% level) i.e. where 
interim Winners (Losers) have increased (decreased) second period risk (i.e. CPR > 1). * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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The Calendar-year analysis is revealed in Table 6.6. In broad terms the results are quite 
similar to the counterpart Financial-year results just discussed, again with some reasonable 
support for H2. As such, only a few brief additional comments will be made here. It does seem 
that, if anything, H2 is a little less favored here than in the previous Financial-year analysis. 
Specifically, while 32 (39) of the 77 individual tournaments record significant CPRs, 14 (16) 
cases support H1, i.e. they indicate interim losers (winners) increase (decrease) second period 
risk and 18 (23) cases indicate the opposite i.e. support for H2 at the 5% level (10% level) of 
significance. This is a little more balanced split than was observed above for the Financial-
year analysis. The overall CPR results show losers increasing risk in the (4,8) assessment 
period and the winners increasing risk in the (8,4) and (9,3) periods. Moreover, it does seem 
that support for H2 is generally concentrated in these longer interim period tournaments – 
there are five (four) such individual year CPRs that are significantly greater than unity for 
(8,4) and (9,3), respectively. This is suggestive that winning (losing) managers are more likely 
to act later to increase (decrease) risk in this Calendar-year setting. 
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Table 6.6 Cross-Product Ratios for Calendar-year Tournaments: Median Benchmark 
 Assessment Period 
            (3, 9) (4, 8) (5, 7) (6, 6) (7, 5) (8, 4) (9, 3) 
Year CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z 
1990 0.55 -1.62 0.55 -1.62 0.82 -0.54 0.42 -2.34 0.82 -0.54 1.07 0.18 3.14 3.04 
1991 0.69 -1.00 0.46 -2.08 1.18 0.45 1.18 0.45 2.02* 1.90 1.54 1.18 0.53* -1.72 
1992 0.25 -3.71 1.93* 1.84 1.70 1.49 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 1.50 1.14 2.50 2.53 
1993 0.45 -2.32 0.80 -0.67 0.72 -1.00 1.96 1.99 0.89 -0.33 1.96 1.99 1.00 0.00 
1994 1.50 1.31 1.13 0.38 1.81* 1.92 0.93 -0.23 0.70 -1.15 0.77 -0.85 1.65 1.61 
1995 0.98 -0.08 1.84 2.01 2.42 2.89 2.01 2.30 1.68* 1.71 2.01 2.30 1.53 1.42 
1996 1.22 0.81 0.51 -2.67 1.11 0.43 1.08 0.31 0.31 -4.49 0.70 -1.43 0.90 -0.44 
1997 1.49* 1.66 0.62 -2.01 1.18 0.71 0.31 -4.68 0.33 -4.45 10.09 8.31 4.65 6.02 
1998 1.07 0.29 0.49 -2.96 0.73 -1.34 2.47 3.76 1.16 0.64 5.99 6.95 1.10 0.41 
1999 0.84 -0.78 1.10 0.45 1.16 0.68 1.10 0.45 1.87 2.78 2.99 4.74 1.69 2.34 
2000 0.73 -1.47 0.69* -1.69 0.45 -3.63 0.45 -3.63 1.98 3.09 0.53 -2.88 0.60 -2.34 
Total 0.87 -1.63 0.78 -3.03 1.02 0.19 0.98 -0.27 1.02 0.27 1.83 7.24 1.37 3.85 
Note: This table reports cross-product ratios (CPR) and their associated z-statistics (Z) with reference to Calendar-year tournaments, 
against a median benchmark. The CPR is calculated as: 
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where: NWH (NWL) is the number of winning funds with high (low) RAR and NLH (NLL) is the number of losing funds with high (low) 
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where RARjMy (rjMy) is the Risk-Adjustment Ratio (fund monthly return) for fund ‘j’, over the M-month interim period, in tournament year 
‘y’. The assessment period (M, 12-M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M = 3, 4, …, 9). 
Winning (Losing) funds are those with interim return performance above (below) the benchmark specified above. High (Low) RAR funds 
are those with a RAR > 1 (RAR < 1). Lighter shading indicates periods supporting H1 (at the 5% level) i.e. where interim Winners (Losers) 
have decreased (increased) second period risk (i.e. CPR < 1). Darker shading indicates periods supporting H2 (at the 5% level) i.e. where 
interim Winners (Losers) have increased (decreased) second period risk (i.e. CPR > 1). * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Viewed as a package, the analysis involving endogenous benchmarks is quite supportive of 
H2. This is particularly so for the Financial-year investigations (and to a lesser extent also 
with the Calendar-year results). Once again, this is consistent with the argument mounted 
earlier that Financial and Calendar-year investment performance is given considerable 
prominence by the Australian financial press and investors. 
 
6.6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The funds management industry has proven to be fertile ground for theoretical and empirical 
research over the past forty years. Since the performance and risk-shifting behavior of fund 
managers was initially put under the spotlight by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Jensen 
(1968), it is possible to identify an evolving strand in the research where performance 
assessment is examined within the framework of the principal-agent literature. One focus that 
has emerged in this literature is the tournament model developed by Brown et al. (1996). 
Specifically, they hypothesized that fund managers who were interim losers were likely to 
increase fund volatility in the latter part of the assessment period to a greater extent than 
interim winners. While the empirical results are mixed, recent theoretical developments by 
Taylor (2003) argue that using an exogenous (endogenous) benchmark, will induce losing 
(winning) managers to gamble. This presents two competing testable hypotheses. 
 
Using a sample period covering 1989 to 2001, this chapter investigated the tournament 
induced risk-shifting behavior of Australian “multi-sector growth funds”. Specifically, 
following Taylor (2003), the ability of the two competing hypotheses to predict risk-shifting 
behavior in the sample was tested. To this end, the non-parametric Cross-Product Ratio 
methodology was applied to examine tournaments based on the calendar year, the financial 
year and an October-September year, using a range of within-year assessment periods, against 
both an exogenous and an endogenous benchmark. 
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The research findings can be summarized as follows. At a broad level the study found 
evidence in support of Taylor’s model. Specifically, when an exogenous benchmark is used 
(i.e. market index return), support was uncovered for the hypothesis that losing managers at 
the end of the interim assessment period increase the risk of the fund in the subsequent period, 
while winning managers reduce their risk (H1). This support is particularly evident for the 
Calendar-year analysis. However, the volatility underlying this finding warrants a careful 
qualification to the conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis. In particular, the extent to 
which this gaming behavior occurs (for Calendar/index benchmark tournaments), either (a) it 
is a more long-term in nature or (b) it is largely a recent phenomenon (with no guarantee of 
continuation). Either way, given the limited evidence to date, it will be difficult to predict 
over any short-term horizon. 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) which comes from the Taylor (2003) model, is that assessment 
against an endogenous benchmark, such as a median fund performance, will induce winning 
(losing) managers to take on more (less) risk in the subsequent period. Viewed as a whole, the 
analysis involving endogenous benchmarks is also quite supportive of H2. This is particularly 
so for the Financial-year investigations (and to a lesser extent also with the Calendar-year 
results). Once again, this is consistent with the view that the Australian financial press and 
investors are particularly fixated on Financial and Calendar-year investment performance. 
 
The research in this chapter therefore extends the empirical literature on fund manager 
behavior, by seeking evidence of tournament effects in a dataset from one of the most 
sophisticated funds management market outside the United States. Moreover, the study 
employed three different representations of the annual tournament period and examined 
behavior against two ranking benchmarks, one endogenous and one exogenous. While the 
 160 
study is concerned primarily with evidence of risk-taking behavior on the part of fund 
managers, it can also be viewed as providing, albeit indirectly, empirical evidence on the 
question of whether benchmark choice may affect such behavior. 
 
Chapter 7 continues the examination of tournament behaviour by using a more powerful 
parametric regression-based methodology to examine risk-shifting behaviour by fund 
managers.
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Appendix 6.1:  Cross-Product Ratios for September-year Tournaments: Index Benchmark 
 
 Assessment Period 
            (3, 9) (4, 8) (5, 7) (6, 6) (7, 5) (8, 4) (9, 3) 
Year CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z 
1989/90 2.41 0.89 2.16 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.33 -0.68 0.33 -0.68 0.33 -0.68 0.33 -0.68 
1990/91 0.98 -0.01 2.37 0.87 1.31 0.61 1.89 1.73 1.16 0.29 5.23 1.06 0.78 -0.68 
1991/92 0.22 -1.66 1.11 0.25 0.88 -0.33 3.48 3.04 0.78 -0.34 0.15 -3.11 1.55 1.06 
1992/93 1.01 0.01 0.34 -2.28 1.01 0.01 0.60 -0.49 0.60 -0.49 0.60 -0.49 0.60 -0.49 
1993/94 0.33 -0.68 0.19 -1.05 0.09 -1.66 0.54 -0.76 0.09 -1.66 0.26 -1.45 0.16 -2.03 
1994/95 0.99 -0.02 0.99 -0.02 0.62 -0.85 0.99 -0.02 0.48 -2.35 0.56 -1.20 1.53 0.90 
1995/96 0.26 -1.44 3.03 0.68 1.00 0.00 1.84 0.76 1.00 0.00 0.33 -0.68 1.41 0.41 
1996/97 1.00 0.00 0.33 -0.68 0.71 -0.41 1.00 0.00 1.04 0.02 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1997/98 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 -0.01 3.05 1.17 0.99 0.00 3.00 0.67 
1998/99 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1999/00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 -1.05 0.80 -0.75 0.97 -0.12 0.27 -5.04 9.27 1.49 
2000/01 1.57 1.24 1.27 0.69 0.24 -4.08 10.67 2.73 1.00 0.00 0.08 -4.85 0.33 -0.68 
Total 1.16 1.74 0.97 -0.31 0.85 -1.85 1.11 1.30 0.92 -0.93 0.67 -4.48 1.00 0.02 
Note: This table reports cross-product ratios (CPR) and their associated z-statistics (Z) with reference to September-year tournaments, 
against an index benchmark. The CPR is calculated as: 
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where: NWH (NWL) is the number of winning funds with high (low) RAR and NLH (NLL) is the number of losing funds with high (low) RAR. 
The Risk-Adjustment Ratio (RAR) is calculated as: 
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where RARjMy (rjMy) is the Risk-Adjustment Ratio (fund monthly return) for fund ‘j’, over the M-month interim period, in tournament year 
‘y’. The assessment period (M, 12-M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M = 3, 4, …, 9). 
Winning (Losing) funds are those with interim return performance above (below) the benchmark specified above. High (Low) RAR funds 
are those with a RAR > 1 (RAR < 1). Lighter shading indicates periods supporting H1 (at the 5% level) i.e. where interim Winners (Losers) 
have decreased (increased) second period risk (i.e. CPR < 1). Darker shading indicates periods supporting H2 (at the 5% level) i.e. where 
interim Winners (Losers) have increased (decreased) second period risk (i.e. CPR > 1). * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 6.2:  Cross-Product Ratios for Financial-year Tournaments: Index Benchmark 
 
 Assessment Period 
            (3, 9) (4, 8) (5, 7) (6, 6) (7, 5) (8, 4) (9, 3) 
Year CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z CPR Z 
1989/90 3.05 0.68 3.05 0.68 0.80 -0.33 1.00 0.00 2.41 0.89 1.06 0.18 1.63 0.84 
1990/91 1.15 0.25 0.19 -1.06 0.99 -0.01 1.67 0.49 0.98 -0.02 1.86 1.43 1.12 0.22 
1991/92 0.24 -2.23 0.33 -0.67 4.78 1.69 1.89 0.79 0.78 -0.49 1.02 0.04 2.40 1.70 
1992/93 0.32 -0.69 0.32 -0.69 0.32 -0.69 1.40 0.40 2.37 0.87 0.43 -1.40 0.34 -2.55 
1993/94 0.33 -0.68 1.03 0.01 3.04 0.68 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 3.04 0.68 1.69 0.50 
1994/95 3.04 0.68 1.00 0.00 1.11 0.23 1.00 0.00 0.81 -0.33 0.45 -2.22 0.31 -2.69 
1995/96 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1996/97 1.76 1.82 7.20 1.30 0.19 -1.84 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1997/98 1.31 0.88 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.33 -0.68 4.49 1.64 3.11 1.53 1.94 1.11 
1998/99 4.05 3.55 0.94 -0.25 0.42 -0.88 1.99 1.27 0.42 -0.88 1.00 0.00 0.33 -0.68 
1999/00 0.20 -1.05 0.55 -0.76 1.32 1.12 1.00 0.00 1.54 1.22 1.17 0.56 1.14 0.51 
2000/01 0.50 -1.71 1.00 0.00 0.32 -2.41 0.54 -1.20 1.43 1.46 0.84 -0.71 1.59 0.67 
Total 1.07 0.84 0.99 -0.16 0.98 -0.29 1.01 0.07 1.08 0.92 0.97 -0.32 0.98 -0.29 
Note: This table reports cross-product ratios (CPR) and their associated z-statistics (Z) with reference to Financial-year tournaments, 
against an index benchmark. The CPR is calculated as: 
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where: NWH (NWL) is the number of winning funds with high (low) RAR and NLH (NLL) is the number of losing funds with high (low) RAR. 
The Risk-Adjustment Ratio (RAR) is calculated as: 
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where RARjMy (rjMy) is the Risk-Adjustment Ratio (fund monthly return) for fund ‘j’, over the M-month interim period, in tournament year 
‘y’. The assessment period (M, 12-M) involves an interim period of M months and a ‘post’ period of 12-M months (M = 3, 4, …, 9). 
Winning (Losing) funds are those with interim return performance above (below) the benchmark specified above. High (Low) RAR funds 
are those with a RAR > 1 (RAR < 1). Lighter shading indicates periods supporting H1 (at the 5% level) i.e. where interim Winners (Losers) 
have decreased (increased) second period risk (i.e. CPR < 1). Darker shading indicates periods supporting H2 (at the 5% level) i.e. where 
interim Winners (Losers) have increased (decreased) second period risk (i.e. CPR > 1). * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
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Chapter 7:  Exploring Tournament Behavior among Australian 
Superannuation Funds: A Parametric Analysis 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 looked for evidence of tournament behavior in Australian “multi-sector growth 
funds” using the non-parametric contingency table approach.  In this chapter tournament 
induced risk-shifting behavior among this segment of Australian superannuation fund 
managers is further investigated using parametric analysis. Specifically, a regression-based 
methodology is applied to examine tournaments based on the calendar year, the financial year 
and an October-September year over a sample period extended to 2004. Apart from the 
standard tournament hypothesis the research in this chapter also explores: (a) a stability 
hypothesis; (b) a non-linearity hypothesis; (c) a fund age hypothesis; and (d) a fund size 
hypothesis. 
 
7.2. Data and Sampling 
 
7.2.1. Superannuation Funds 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Australian Government’s aggressive retirement 
provision policies are aimed at shifting the burden of funding retirement incomes from the 
public sector to the private sector, and superannuation has become the principal retirement 
savings vehicle for Australians. Consequently, superannuation funds have become the 
dominant component of the managed funds industry in Australia, increasing from around 65 
per cent of total managed funds in 1989 to around 83 per cent in 2004.41 
 
 
                                                 
41 Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Statistical Tables, Table B18 Managed Funds, June 2005. 
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7.2.2. Data  
 
Consistent with the research in Chapter 6, updated data were supplied by Morningstar, the 
independent research house which monitors the managed funds industry.  The updated sample 
consists of monthly index series return data for the period 1989/90 to 2003/04 for retail 
superannuation funds classified as multi-sector growth and comprises all such funds in 
existence over this period.  Monthly index values are calculated by reference to the month-end 
exit price of the fund, which is net of management fees and assumes reinvestment of all cash 
and bonus unit distributions.  Again, a fund was included in the analysis for each full year in 
which it was present in the database which, as noted in Chapter 6, mitigates the survivorship 
bias problem created when funds which do not survive for the full sample period are absent 
from the database. Given the characteristics of the Australian commercial environment 
discussed in Chapter 6, three annual tournament scenarios: (a) Calendar year; (b) Financial (or 
fiscal) year and (c) September year were investigated. 
 
As noted in the preceding chapter, managers of Multi-sector funds have discretion to invest 
across asset classes, and have between 60 per cent and 80 per cent of their investments 
allocated to growth oriented assets. Such funds therefore present a relevant environment for 
assessing tournament-type behavior, since managers have a reasonable degree of scope and 
flexibility to pursue aggressive asset allocation changes.  
 
7.3. Research Framework 
 
7.3.1. Definition of Core Variables 
 
This chapter reports a number of models analyzing intra-period changes in fund risk in 
relation to a range of fund characteristics. As discussed in Section 6.1, the original BHS 
hypothesis was that fund managers who are interim losers are likely to increase fund volatility 
in the latter part of the assessment period to a greater extent than interim winners. This 
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hypothesis implies a negative relationship between interim period fund performance and latter 
period fund risk. 
 
As in Chapter 6, for each performance year an interim performance measure and a risk 
change-type variable are defined. The method of calculation follows that detailed in Section 
6.3.4: with the fund’s return between the commencement of the year and month M, where M 
ranges from the fourth month to the eighth month of the relevant year, calculated as follows:  
RTNjMy  = [(1+rj1y) (1+rj2y)… (1+rjMy)] –1     (6.2) 
where rj1y … rjMy are the percentage monthly change in the fund’s index series value.  
 
Once again the (relative) changes in the risk of the fund’s portfolio is defined as the ratio of 
fund volatility before and after the interim assessment period and is captured in the ‘Risk 
Adjustment Ratio’, RAR,  calculated as: 
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     (6.3) 
A value of RAR > 1 (= 1) [< 1] indicates that the ‘end of tournament’ risk for a given fund 
exceeds (is equal to) [is lower than] its interim period risk level. 
 
As noted earlier, the calculation of returns and RARs is done on an annual basis. To maximize 
the effective sample size and explore the longer period dynamics of the tournament 
hypothesis. both variables are standardized by subtracting the median value of that variable 
for the particular year from the fund-specific observations and dividing the difference by the 
variable’s standard deviation. This enables aggregation of the yearly results and construction 
of a (stacked) single series for each variable covering the full period of analysis. 
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7.3.2. Model and Hypothesis Development 
 
To explore the basic relationship between interim period performance and subsequent period 
risk the following equation is estimated:42 
jMyjMyjMy errorbRTNaRAR ++= **       (7.1) 
 
Stated formally, the null hypothesis is that subsequent period fund risk is independent of 
ranking period performance. In the context of equation (7.1), we would fail to reject the null 
hypothesis when the estimated coefficient is equal to zero, H0: b = 0. 
 
If the null hypothesis of independence between fund performance and subsequent changes in 
fund risk can be rejected, the alternative hypotheses focus on examining the central prediction 
of the tournament hypothesis: funds with below benchmark returns in the first part of the year 
(losers) increase their total risk in the remaining part of the year, relative to better performing 
funds (winners). If this is the case it would be expected that an inverse relationship between 
ranking period returns and subsequent period Risk Adjustment Ratio would be found. 
Evidence supporting this alternative hypothesis would be provided by a slope coefficient less 
than zero, H1: b < 0. 
 
To explore temporal dynamics in the tournament hypothesis the sample period is divided into 
two sub-periods. These sub-periods are: 1989/90 – 1995/96 and 1996/97 – 2003/04 for both 
the September year and the Financial year tournaments and 1990-1996 and 1997-2003 for the 
Calendar year tournaments. This analysis is motivated by the contention that the level of 
competition increased dramatically across this sector of the funds management industry, 
between these two periods. In support of this view, attention is drawn to the numbers reported 
                                                 
42 Both variables in the equation are asterisked to indicate that the standardisation process has been applied, as 
discussed at the end of the preceding sub-section. 
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in Table 6.2 – specifically, the average number of funds in the later sub-period was 84 
percent, 73 percent and 95 percent greater than the average number in the earlier sub-period 
for the September year, Financial year and Calendar year tournaments respectively. As such, 
this suggests that a much different competitive dynamic might have an influence on 
managers’ risk taking behavior. To explore for temporal dynamics a dummy variable 
enhanced version of equation (7.1) is employed: 
jMyjMyjMyjMy errorRTNDbRTNbDaaRAR ++++= )*( *22*1221*    (7.2) 
where D2 = 1 if in second half of sample period. In this specification, b1 represents the base 
case gaming coefficient – for the first half of the full sample period. The second coefficient, 
b2, is the incremental gaming impact for the second sub-period relative to the first. The 
following hypothesesare tested: H1: b1 < 0; H2: b1 + b2 < 0; H3: b2 = 0; H4: b2 < 0. Indeed, H4 
supports the argument that increased competitive pressure leads to a stronger incentive for 
managers to engage in tournament/gaming behaviour. 
 
The basic model specified in equation (7.1) posits a linear relationship between prior period 
performance and subsequent period risk shifts. However, it is plausible that the relationship 
has a non-linear functional form, for example, because of the likely accelerated incentives for 
risk-shifting behaviour at the extremes of interim performance. Evidence as to the potential 
nonlinear relationship between performance and risk shifting may be ascertained by using a 
quadratic model: 
jMyjMyjMyjMy errorcRTNbRTNaRAR +++= 2***     (7.3) 
Apart from the tests of the linear term, the sign and significance of the quadratic term in this 
model are of interest. Logically, the quadratic term could be negative, positive or zero. A zero 
coefficient provides support for the base case linear model of equation (7.1). Alternatively, c 
> 0 (c < 0) would indicate a departure from linearity and a convex (concave) relation.  
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However, it’s the relative magnitudes of the linear and quadratic terms that have a big bearing 
over whether the overall relation is a negative or positive one and whether its increasing or 
decreasing in strength.   
 
Strategic interaction is further explored by combining temporal dynamics and nonlinearity to 
see whether there is a change in fund behavior in the more competitive second sub-period. 
Equation (7.4) investigates these structural features and embodies a number of testable 
hypotheses: 
jMyjMyjMyjMyjMyjMy errorRTNDcRTNcRTNDbRTNbDaaRAR ++++++= )*()*( 2*222*1*22*1221*  
(7.4) 
In this specification, b1 (c1) represents the base case linear (quadratic) gaming coefficient – for 
the first half of the full sample period. The second coefficient, b2 (c2), is the incremental 
gaming impact for the second sub-period relative to the first.   
 
The final two models explore whether two (potentially related) fund characteristics impact 
upon tournament behavior: fund age and fund size. First, with regard to the age of a fund it is 
hypothesized that newer/younger funds have a greater incentive, and greater freedom, to 
chase returns than more established funds. It is likely that investors would be more strongly 
influenced by poor short-term performance for a fund with a short performance history than 
for a fund that has been around for some time. To test this hypothesis fund age is partitioned 
into three categories: Funds are classified as “Young” if they were in existence less than two 
years at the beginning of each annual tournament and as “Old” if they were in existence for 
more than four years at the beginning of each annual tournament. The remaining funds in the 
sample fall in to the middle group, namely, those in existence from two to less than four 
years.   
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The following dummy variable augmented version of equation (7.1) is used to test this 
hypothesis: 
jMyjMyOldojMyMMjMyYOldOMMYjMy errorRTNDbRTNDbRTNbDaDaaRAR ++++++= )*()*( ****    (7.5) 
 
In this specification, the coefficient bY represents the base case gaming coefficient – 
applicable to the ‘young’ funds in the sample. The second (third) coefficient, bM (bO), is the 
incremental gaming impact for the ‘mid-age’ funds (‘old’ funds) group relative to the ‘young’ 
funds. The formal hypotheses to be tested are as follows: H1: bY < 0; H2: bY + bM < 0; H3: bM = 
0; H4: bY + bO > 0; H5: bO = 0.    
 
The final model tests whether fund size impacts on tournament behavior. It is plausible that 
the smaller the assets of a fund, the easier it is for the fund to alter its risk. Conversely, the 
larger the assets of a fund, the greater the implementation problems associated with changing 
the risk profile of the fund. Moreover, larger funds are likely to face greater scrutiny from the 
investment community than smaller funds, which could also act as an impediment.  
Accordingly, the fund sample is partitioned into three categories based upon asset size at the 
beginning of each annual tournament.  Funds are classified as ‘small’ if the size of the fund 
falls within the bottom quartile for the tournament year. ‘Big’ funds are those in the top 
quartile and those in the remaining two quartiles are classified as ‘intermediate’. Accordingly, 
the model to test this takes the following form:  
jMyjMyBBjMyIIjMySBBIISjMy errorRTNDbRTNDbRTNbDaDaaRAR ++++++= ****           (7.6) 
In this specification, the coefficient bS represents the base case gaming coefficient – 
applicable to the ‘small’ funds in the sample. The second (third) coefficient, bI (bB), is the 
incremental gaming impact for the ‘intermediate’ size funds (‘big’ funds) group relative to the 
‘small’ funds. The formal hypotheses relating to this model are: H1: bS < 0; H2: bS + bI < 0; H3: 
bI = 0; H4: bS + bB > 0; H5: bB = 0.  
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7.4. Results 
7.4.1. Full Period Results 
 
The first hypothesis is that losing managers will gamble and take on more risk in the 
subsequent period while winning managers will index to lock in their lead, and in doing so 
reduce their portfolio risk. Evidence supporting this alternative hypothesis would be provided 
by a negative slope coefficient. Table 7.1 reports the estimation results of Eq. (7.1). 
Table 7.1 Full Period Results for the Risk Shifting-Tournament Model  
 
Tournament (x, y) a b R2adj 
Panel A: September Year End  
 
4,8 
0.147606 
(8.045)** 
-0.063003 
(-3.449)** 
0.0036 
 
5,7 
0.140014 
(7.627)** 
-0.069922 
(-3.822)** 
0.0045 
 
6,6 
0.143276 
(7.849)** 
-0.100450 
(-5.512)** 
0.0097 
 
7,5 
0.114762 
(6.278)** 
-0.109030 
(-5.991)** 
0.0116 
 
8,4 
0.112955 
(6.169)** 
-0.087710 
(-4.806)** 
0.0074 
Panel B: Calendar Year End 
 
4,8 
0.201923 
(11.683)** 
0.019921 
(1.164) 
0.0001 
 
5,7 
0.164939 
(9.620)** 
-0.034119 
(-2.004)* 
0.0009 
 
6,6 
0.147075 
(8.556)** 
-0.036239 
(-2.118)* 
0.0011 
 
7,5 
0.05821 
(5.430)** 
-0.026691 
(-1.520) 
0.0004 
 
8,4 
0.077612 
(4.507)** 
0.139640 
(8.144)** 
0.0194 
Panel C: Financial Year End 
 
4,8 
0.177318 
(27.447)** 
0.027313 
(11.004)** 
0.0355 
 
5,7 
0.098681 
(16.298)** 
0.023455 
(8.975)** 
0.0238 
 
6,6 
0.093012 
(12.120)** 
0.016553 
(5.216)** 
0.0079 
 
7,5 
0.211713 
(6.625)** 
0.066061 
(5.384)** 
0.0085 
 
8,4 
0.535123 
(14.470)** 
0.243432 
(16.016)** 
0.0725 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the tournament risk shifting regression 
model: 
 jMyjMyjMy errorbRTNaRAR ++= **  
where RAR*jMy is the ‘Risk Adjustment Ratio’, which is the ratio of fund volatility 
before and after the interim assessment period; and RTNjMy is the M-month compound 
return of each fund ‘j’, in tournament year ‘y’. Each variable is, in each year, 
standardized by subtracting its yearly median and dividing by its yearly standard 
deviation. The regression is estimated using data covering the full sample period 1989 
to 2004. 
* statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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The September year results reported in Panel A of Table 7.1 reveal the strongest results in 
support of H1, with all the slope coefficients statistically different from (less than) zero at the 
1% level. These results suggest that, in the context of a September year-end tournament, 
losing (winning) managers appear to gamble (play it safe) and take on more (less) risk in the 
subsequent period. In contrast, the Financial year results reported in Panel C provide equally 
strong support for the hypothesis that it is winning managers who gamble and take on more 
risk. Here all the slope coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level. The Calendar 
year results in Panel B are inconclusive: while three of the interim assessment periods reveal 
significant results at the 5% level or higher, two (one) of these record negative (positive) 
slope coefficients. 
 
7.4.2. Sub-period Results 
 
The apparent increase in competition in the second part of the sample period prompts us to 
explore whether some form of temporal dynamic exists in the tournament model. Table 7.2 
presents the results for equation (7.2). 
 
The null hypothesis is that the tournament model is maintained over the entire sample period, 
with no significant difference between sub-periods. Accordingly, changing parameter values 
between the two periods are investigated. Specifically, using equation (7.2), if the tournament 
model is maintained it would be expected that the slope coefficient for the second half of the 
sample period to be not significantly different from zero, and the combined value of the slope 
coefficients to be negative (in addition to the expected negativity of the base slope 
coefficient). 
 172 
Table 7.2 
Risk Shifting-Tournament Model - Subperiod Results 
 
Tournament (x, y) b1 b1 + b2 b2 
Panel A: September Year-end 
4,8 -0.165047 
(-5.414)** 
-0.006204 
(-0.273) 
0.158843 
(4.178)** 
5,7 -0.162186 
(-5.320)** 
-0.016883 
( -0.741) 
0.145303 
(3.818)** 
6,6 -0.142187 
(-4.657)** 
-0.075839 
(-3.337 )** 
0.066348 
(1.743) 
7,5 -0.213493 
(-7.067)** 
-0.050194 
(-2.210 )* 
0.163299 
(4.320)** 
8,4 -0.159561 
(5.245)** 
-0.047186 
(-2.072 )* 
0.112375 
(2.957)** 
Panel B: Calendar Year-end 
4,8 -0.060935 
(-2.074)* 
0.061240 
( 2.914)** 
0.122175 
(3.382)** 
5,7 -0.044648 
(-1.538) 
-0.028922 
(-1.376 ) 
0.015726 
(0.439) 
6,6 0.053027 
(1.811) 
-0.082166 
(-3.905 )** 
-0.135193 
(-3.750)** 
7,5 -0.001804 
(-0.060) 
-0.039841 
(-1.840 ) 
-0.038037 
(-1.027) 
8,4 0.069317 
(2.353)* 
0.175572 
(8.339 )** 
0.106255 
(2.934)** 
Panel C: Financial Year-end 
4,8 0.010347 
(2.915)** 
0.033108 
(8.731 )** 
0.022761 
(4.382)** 
5,7 0.008883 
(2.404)* 
0.035829 
(9.544 )** 
0.026946 
(5.116)** 
6,6 0.014552 
(3.233)** 
0.019536 
(4.200 )** 
0.004984 
(0.770) 
7,5 0.006308 
(0.367) 
0.179323 
(9.865 )** 
0.173015 
(6.918)** 
8,4 -0.027898 
(-0.986) 
0.410219 
(22.962 )** 
0.438117 
(13.095)** 
 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the tournament risk shifting regression model: 
jMyjMyjMyjMy errorRTNDbRTNbDaaRAR ++++= *22*1221*  
where RAR*jMy is the ‘Risk Adjustment Ratio’, which is the ratio of fund volatility before and after 
the interim assessment period; and RTNjMy is the M-month compound return of each fund ‘j’, in 
tournament year ‘y’. Each of these variables is, in each year, standardized by subtracting its yearly 
median and dividing by its yearly standard deviation. The dummy variable, D2, takes a value of 
unity in the second half of the sample period, defined as (a) 1996/7 to 2003/4 for the September and 
Financial year end tournaments and (b) 1997 to 2003 for the Calendar year tournament. The 
regression is estimated using data covering the period 1989 to 2004. 
 
* statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Panel A of Table 7.2 shows the results for the September year tournaments.  Notably, the 
base-case slope coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level for the first sub-
period, but the incremental slope coefficient in the second half of the sample period is positive 
and significant at the 1 per cent level in four of the five tournament periods. This finding 
suggests a different tournament dynamic in the second sub-period. However, the combined 
values of the slope coefficients remain negative in all cases and a Wald test of the combined 
slope coefficients reveals that they are significant in the [6,6], [7,5] and [8,4] tournament 
periods, indicating that although there appears to be some change in the risk shifting behavior 
in the second half of the period, this is not sufficient to invalidate the basic tournament model. 
 
The Calendar year results presented in Panel B are much less clear cut: three of the 
incremental second period slope coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level but two of 
these, for the [4,8] and the [8,4] tournaments, are positive while the coefficient for the [6,6] 
tournament is negative. This pattern is repeated, with significant Wald tests, for the combined 
slope coefficients. 
 
The Fiscal year results reported in Panel C are, similar to Table 7.1, not supportive of the 
basic tournament hypothesis. The first sub-period slope coefficients for the first three 
tournament periods are positive and significant, as are the incremental second period slope 
coefficients for all but the [6,6] tournament. All of the combined slope coefficients have 
positive values and significant t-values for the Wald tests. 
 
7.4.3. Exploring Non-linearities 
 
The possibility of non-linearity in the relationship between interim period ranking and 
subsequent risk-shifting behavior was explored using the quadratic model specified in 
equation (7.3).  Before going on to consider the outcome of these estimations it is worth 
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briefly diverting attention to how the possible cases emanating from this quadratic 
specification could be meaningfully characterized. The first thing to note is that both key 
variables have been standardized such that the slope coefficient tells us what happens to RAR 
for a one standard deviation change in RTN, away from the median. Thus, it can confidently 
be assumed that the relevant range of RTN* over which to consider our model’s estimates is 
(-3, +3) ie -/+ 3 standard deviations away from the median. By definition, the vast mass of 
observations will be captured in this range. Over this range, it is possible to characterize six 
distinct cases and these cases are depicted in Figure 7.1, while Figure 7.2 provides a summary 
of the conditions leading to each characterized case. 
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Figure 7.1 Characterisation of Quadratic Tournament Model 
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Figure 7.2  Summary of Conditions Leading to Characterised Cases in the 
Quadratic Model 
 
This figure sets out a summary of the conditions under which the six characterized cases depicted in Figure 7.1 will take 
place in the context of the quadratic model: 
jMyjMyjMyjMy errorcRTNbRTNaRAR +++= 2***   
Panel A: Coefficient Conditions to Produce Characterised Cases 
 b > 0 b < 0 
 |b| >> |c|* |b| << |c|** |b| >> |c|* |b| << |c|** 
c > 0 Case III Case V Case I Case V 
c < 0 Case IV Case VI Case II Case VI 
Panel B: Summary Description of each Characterised Case  
 Extreme Losers Extreme Winners 
Case I Increasingly chasing high risk Decreasingly chasing low risk 
Case II Decreasingly chasing high risk Increasingly chasing low risk 
Case III Decreasingly chasing low risk Increasingly chasing high risk  
Case IV Increasingly chasing low risk Decreasingly chasing high risk  
Case V Increasingly chasing high risk Increasingly chasing high risk 
Case VI Increasingly chasing low risk Increasingly chasing low risk 
 
* This represents the situation in which the magnitude of the linear term (b) dominates the magnitude of the quadratic term 
(c). 
** This represents the situation in which the magnitude of the linear term (b) dominates the magnitude of the quadratic term 
(c). 
 
From these figures the following can be seen. First, Case I shows a convex relation between 
RAR and RTN, which occurs when b < 0 and c > 0, with the magnitude of the former 
substantially exceeding the magnitude of the latter. This circumstance reflects a scenario in 
which extreme losers (winners) are increasingly (decreasingly) chasing high (low) risk. 
Second, Case II shows a concave relation between RAR and RTN, which occurs when b < 0 
and c < 0, with the magnitude of the former substantially exceeding the magnitude of the 
latter. This circumstance reflects a scenario in which extreme losers (winners) are 
decreasingly (increasingly) chasing high (low) risk. 
 
Third, Case III shows a convex relation between RAR and RTN, which occurs when b > 0 
and c > 0, with the magnitude of the former substantially exceeding the magnitude of the 
latter. This circumstance reflects a scenario in which extreme losers (winners) are 
decreasingly (increasingly) chasing low (high) risk. Fourth, Case IV shows a concave relation 
between RAR and RTN, which occurs when b > 0 and c < 0, with the magnitude of the 
former substantially exceeding the magnitude of the latter. This circumstance reflects a 
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scenario in which extreme losers (winners) are increasingly (decreasingly) chasing low (high) 
risk. 
 
Fifth, Case V shows a convex relation between RAR and RTN, which occurs for b of either 
sign and c > 0, with the magnitude of the latter substantially exceeding the magnitude of the 
former. This circumstance reflects a scenario in which extreme losers and extreme winners 
are both increasingly chasing high risk. Sixth, Case VI shows a concave relation between 
RAR and RTN, which occurs for b of either sign and c < 0, with the magnitude of the latter 
substantially exceeding the magnitude of the former. This circumstance reflects a scenario in 
which extreme losers and extreme winners are both increasingly chasing low risk. 
 
The estimated regression results are presented in Table 7.5. The September year results (Panel 
A) reveal little evidence of non-linearity: the slope coefficients for all tournament periods are 
significant and less than zero, but only one of the quadratic terms has a significant coefficient. 
Specifically, tournament [5,7] conforms to characterization, case I: the magnitude of the 
negatively signed linear term (-0.07), substantially exceeds the magnitude of the positively 
signed quadratic term (0.0195). As pointed out in Figure 7.2, this represents a case in which 
extreme losers increasingly chase high risk, while extreme winners decreasingly chase low 
risk. 
 
The Financial year results presented in Panel C display linear coefficients that are positive and 
significant across all tournament periods. However, there is also some evidence of non-
linearity with the [5,7] and [6,6] tournament periods showing positive and significant 
coefficients on the quadratic term. As such, these two tournaments conform to the Case III 
characterization since the magnitude of the positively signed linear term, substantially exceed 
the magnitude of the positively signed quadratic term. This represents a case in which extreme 
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losers decreasingly chase low risk, while extreme winners increasingly chase high risk. 
However, the coefficient on the quadratic term for the [8,4] period while significant, is 
negative – thereby conforming to Case IV. Hence, here extreme losers increasingly chase low 
risk, while extreme winners decreasingly chase high risk. 
 
It is difficult to draw any consistent inferences from the results for the Calendar year 
regressions. Three of the linear term coefficients are significant but the [5,7] and ]6,6] periods 
have negative coefficients, while the [8,4] period has a positive coefficient. The quadratic 
term for this latter tournament is also significant, but is negative in sign. Hence, it is very 
similar to its counterpart in Panel C, conforming to Case IV.  The only other significant 
quadratic coefficient is for the [4,8] period where it has a positive value. However, the slope 
coefficient for this period is not significant. This is a Case V situation: one in which both 
extreme losers and extreme winners increasingly chase high risk. 
 
The issue of non-linearity was also explored further through equation (7.4) which investigates 
non-linearity in the two sub-periods identified earlier. The quadratic function employed (as in 
equation 7.3) is the standard approximating function to any differential non-linear function. It 
is a second order Taylor Series Expansion, widely used in econometric research to test for 
non-linearity. 
 
Equations 7.4 through 7.6 use dummy variables to test for temporal stability, age and size 
effects, respectively. This also is a well established and widely used technique in finance 
research. 
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Table 7.3 Non-linear Risk Shifting-Tournament Model - Subperiod Results 
 
Tournament (x, y) b1 b1 + b2 b2 c1 c1 + c2 c2 
Panel A: September Year End 
4,8 -0.161199 
(-5.154)** 
-0.007952 
(-0.345) 
0.153248 
(3.945)** 
0.007015 
(0.554) 
0.003027 
(0.463) 
-0.003988 
(-0.280) 
5,7 -0.140673 
(-4.481)** 
-0.020810 
(-0.906) 
0.119863 
(3.082)** 
0.034060 
(2.816)** 
0.009172 
(1.253) 
-0.024888 
(-1.760) 
6,6 -0.127500 
(-4.113)** 
-0.073431 
(-3.212)** 
0.054070 
(1.404) 
0.028913 
(2.656)** 
-0.007525 
(-0.894) 
-0.036438 
(-2.648)** 
7,5 -0.209675 
(-6.936)** 
-0.049406 
(-2.161)* 
0.160269 
(4.229)** 
0.027637 
(2.505)* 
-0.002227 
(-0.288) 
-0.029864 
(-2.216)** 
8,4 -0.142033 
(-4.612)** 
-0.046261 
(-2.029)* 
0.095772 
(2.499)* 
0.040604 
(3.438)** 
-0.003982 
(-0.524) 
-0.044586 
(-3.175)** 
Panel B: Calendar Year End 
4,8 -0.059532 
(-2.003)* 
0.053398 
(2.537)* 
0.112930 
(3.100)** 
-0.002847 
(-0.283) 
0.045604 
(4.191)** 
0.048451 
(3.271)** 
5,7 -0.045520 
(-1.563) 
-0.029106 
(-1.383) 
0.016413 
(0.457) 
0.004445 
(0.419) 
-0.002876 
(-0.253) 
-0.007322 
(-0.470) 
6,6 0.042024 
(1.417) 
-0.080089 
(-3.798)** 
-0.122114 
(-3.355)** 
-0.020184 
(-2.248)* 
0.017199 
(1.309) 
0.037382 
(2.349)* 
7,5 -0.034574 
(-1.096) 
-0.031668 
(1.458) 
0.002906 
(0.076) 
-0.029883 
(-3.325)** 
0.044336 
(3.287)** 
0.074219 
(4.579)** 
8,4 0.031147 
(1.000) 
0.173477 
(8.231)** 
0.142330 
(3.785)** 
-0.031453 
(-3.711)** 
-0.016268 
(1.277) 
0.015185 
(0.992) 
Panel C: Financial Year End 
4,8 0.016188 
(4.235)** 
-0.028122 
(-2.222)* 
-0.044310 
(-3.352)** 
0.003938 
(3.973)** 
-0.013485 
(-5.068)** 
-0.017423 
(-6.136)** 
5,7 0.020427 
(4.009)** 
0.043365 
(4.131)** 
0.022937 
(1.966)* 
0.003974 
(3.285)** 
0.002031 
(0.769) 
-0.001943 
(-0.669) 
6,6 0.020193 
(3.665)** 
0.090770 
(6.341)** 
0.070577 
(4.601)** 
0.002422 
(1.760) 
0.016244 
(5.259)** 
0.013823 
(4.087)** 
7,5 0.009452 
(0.491) 
1.131073 
(18.051)** 
1.121622 
(17.109)** 
0.001510 
(0.319) 
0.175640 
(15.821)** 
0.174131 
(14.430)** 
8,4 0.003870 
(0.124) 
0.562095 
(10.831)** 
0.558225 
(9.208)** 
0.017106 
(2.336)* 
0.028713 
(3.116)** 
0.011607 
(0.986) 
 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the quadratic tournament risk shifting regression model: 
jMyjMyjMyjMyjMyjMy errorRTNDcRTNcRTNDbRTNbDaaRAR ++++++= 2*222*1*22*1221* )()( where 
RAR*jMy is the ‘Risk Adjustment Ratio’, which is the ratio of fund volatility before and after the interim 
assessment period; and RTNjMy is the M-month compound return of each fund ‘j’, in tournament year ‘y’. Each of 
these variables is, in each year, standardized by subtracting its yearly median and dividing by its yearly standard 
deviation. The dummy variable, D2, takes a value of unity in the second half of the sample period, defined as (a) 
1996/7 to 2003/4 for the September and Financial year end tournaments and (b) 1997 to 2003 for the Calendar 
year tournament. The regression is estimated using data covering the period 1989 to 2004. 
 
* statistically significant at the 5% level. 
** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
The results of this analysis, which appear in Table 7.3, are interesting. Initially, consider the 
September Year results in Panel A. First, we see that for the first sub-period the base case, 
linear (b1) and quadratic (c1) coefficients are negative and positive, respectively (significant at 
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the one per cent level).43 As such, given that the magnitude of the former are larger than the 
latter, these results conform to Case I: extreme losers increasingly chase high risk, while 
extreme winners decreasingly chase low risk. This is similar to the overall results for 
September (Table 7.3). Next, we see that with regard to the second sub-period there are some 
differences relative to the base case. In all instances (except [6,6]) the incremental linear 
terms are  positive and statistically significant. Overall however, the latter three tournaments 
still show a significantly negative linear term (b1 + b2). Turning to the quadratic terms in the 
second sub-period we see that the non-linearity evident in sub-period 1 is no longer apparent – 
the incremental coefficient (c2) is significantly negative in four cases, thereby leading to an 
overall insignificance. 
 
Next consider the Calendar Year results presented in Panel B of Table 7.3. It is evident that 
the first sub-period mostly conforms to Case VI: specifically, for Tournaments [6,6]; [7,5] and 
[8,4] the quadratic term is significantly negative and it dominates the linear term (which is 
always insignificant). As such, extreme losers and extreme winners both increasingly chase 
low risk. Once again the evidence of non-linearity in the second sub-period is weaker. Indeed, 
only [4,8] and [7,5] suggest significant quadratic terms (c1 + c2), and when considered 
together with their linear counterparts (b1 + b2) indicate that Case V is applicable. That is, 
extreme losers and extreme winners both increasingly chase high risk 
 
Finally with regard to Table 7.3, the Financial year results are presented in Panel C. Here 
there is one major observation to document: it is evident that Case III is most prevalent – 
across both sub-periods. Specifically, while the quadratic term is often significantly positive, 
it is dominated in magnitude terms by a significantly positive linear term: this is true for 
Tournaments [4,8]; [5,7] and [6,6] in the first sub-period and for  Tournaments [6,6]; [7,5] 
                                                 
43 Tournament (4,8) is the one exception, wherein the quadratic coefficient is insignificant. 
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and [8,4] in the latter sub-period. As such, extreme losers decreasingly chase low risk, while 
extreme winners increasingly chase high risk.  
 
The fund age hypothesis was examined through equation (7.5) and the results appear in Table 
7.4.  As noted earlier, funds are classified as “Young” (“Old”) if they were in existence less 
than two (more than four) years at the beginning of each annual tournament. Panel A of Table 
7.4 indicates that there is little difference in behaviour across funds partitioned on age. 
Specifically, both young and old funds display a significantly inverse relation between interim 
performance and subsequent period risk adjustment.  
 * statistically significant at the 5% level.** statistically significant at the 1% level. 182 
Table 7.4 Risk Shifting-Tournament Model – Conditioned by Fund Age  
Tournament (x, y) by by + bM bM bY + bO bO Radj2 
Panel A: September Year End 
4,8 -0.088419 
(-2.423)* 
-0.014235 
(-0.332) 
0.074185 
(1.318) 
-0.064947 
(-2.670)** 
0.023473 
(0.535) 
0.0040 
5,7 -0.002669 
(-0.072) 
-0.059152 
(-1.351) 
-0.056483 
(-0.987) 
-0.098062 
(-4.091)** 
-0.096393 
(-2.168)* 
0.0089 
6,6 -0.081465 
(-2.214)* 
-0.056638 
(-1.288) 
0.024827 
(0.433) 
-0.115789 
(-4.844)** 
-0.034324 
(-0.782) 
0.0119 
7,5 -0.120927 
(-3.261)** 
-0.089606 
(-2.095)* 
0.031321 
(0.553) 
-0.104320 
(-4.336)** 
0.016607 
(0.376) 
0.0122 
8,4 -0.095496 
(-2.614)* 
-0.073041 
(-1.677) 
0.022455 
(0.395) 
-0.081106 
(-3.358)** 
0.014391 
(0.329) 
0.0095 
Panel B: Calendar Year End 
4,8 0.111517 
(3.091)** 
0.068041 
(1.854) 
-0.043476 
(-0.845) 
-0.027690 
(-1.213) 
-0.139207 
(-3.260)** 
0.0087 
5,7 0.095044 
(2.712)** 
-0.029296 
(-0.7891) 
-0.124340 
(-2.436)* 
-0.086054 
(-3.7743)** 
-0.181097 
(-4.332)** 
0.0084 
6,6 0.087049 
(2.469)* 
-0.034537 
(-0.905) 
-0.121586 
(-2.341)* 
-0.081671 
(-3.598)** 
-0.168720 
(-4.023)** 
0.0099 
7,5 0.159186 
(4.355)** 
0.002818 
(0.075) 
-0.156369 
(-2.979)** 
-0.110797 
(-4.738)** 
-0.269984 
(-6.222)** 
0.0164 
8,4 0.228525 
(6.351)** 
0.221860 
(5.994)** 
-0.006665 
(-0.129) 
0.076437 
(3.378)** 
-0.152088 
(-3.578)** 
0.0355 
Panel C: Financial Year End 
4,8 0.032606 
(6.002)** 
0.020433 
(4.039)** 
-0.012173 
(-1.640) 
0.028534 
(8.457)** 
-0.004072 
(-0.637) 
0.0354 
5,7 0.033722 
(5.887)** 
0.019520 
(3.480)** 
-0.014202 
(-1.771) 
0.020869 
(6.030)** 
-0.012853 
(-1.920) 
0.0244 
6,6 0.020904 
(3.063)** 
0.018164 
(2.690)** 
-0.002740 
(-0.285) 
0.014101 
(3.321)** 
-0.006802 
(-0.846) 
0.0075 
7,5 0.048706 
(1.829)* 
0.098139 
(3.531)** 
0.049433 
(1.284) 
0.060721 
(3.787)** 
0.012015 
(0.387) 
0.0079 
8,4 0.258963 
(7.870)** 
0.214554 
(5.802)** 
-0.044409 
(-0.897) 
0.244474 
(12.567)** 
-0.014489 
(-0.379) 
0.0719 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the tournament risk shifting regression model: 
jMyjMyOldojMyMMjMyYOldOMMYjMy errorRTNDbRTNDbRTNbDaDaaRAR ++++++= ****  
where RAR*jMy is the ‘Risk Adjustment Ratio’, which is the ratio of fund volatility before and after the interim assessment period; and RTNjMy is the M-month compound return of each fund ‘j’, in tournament year 
‘y’. Each of these variables is, in each year, standardized by subtracting its yearly median and dividing by its yearly standard deviation. The dummy variable, DM (DOld), takes a value of unity if the fund is ‘mid-
aged’ (‘old’) defined as being 2-4 years (> 4 years) at the beginning of the given tournament. The regression is estimated using data covering the period 1989 to 2004. 
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The Calendar year results, reported in Panel B, present a quite different picture. In each 
tournament period the slope coefficient for the young funds is positive and significant while 
the counterpart slope coefficient for the old funds is significantly lower (that is, the 
incremental coefficient is significantly negative). Wald tests on the combined slope 
coefficients are significant for all but the [4,8] tournament period. The combined slope 
coefficients are negative for the [5,7], [6,6] and [7,5] periods but positive for the [8,4] period. 
This indicates that generally it is the behavior of the more established funds that is driving the 
tournament effect, while contrary to predictions younger funds tend to chase higher risk, the 
better has been their interim performance. This may reflect a degree of ‘hubris’ on the part of 
managers of new/young funds. 
 
The Financial Year results (Panel C), similar to their Panel A counterparts, reveal that there is 
little difference in behaviour across funds partitioned on age. However, in contrast to the 
Panel A results, here in the case of the Financial Year analysis all three categories of funds 
display a significantly positive relation between interim performance and subsequent period 
risk adjustment. This finding suggests that regardless of fund age, all funds tend to ramp up 
risk on the back of good interim performance. 
 
Finally, the impact of fund size on risk shifting behavior is examined, and these results are 
reported in Table 7.8. In Panel A, we observe that for the September Year tournaments the 
risk shifting tournament behaviour seems to be mostly driven by mid-sized funds: these funds 
generally exhibit the predicted negative relation, while neither the small nor the large fund 
groupings shown any evidence (positive or negative) of a link between RAR and RTN. In 
Panel B, the Calendar Year results indicate that regardless of fund size, there is little evidence 
of risk shifting behaviour at all. Finally, in Panel C of Table 7.8 the Financial Year show a 
different picture. At a general level, there is a strong tendency regardless of fund size toward 
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positive risk shifting. However, it is interesting to note that for the [7,5] and [8,4] tournaments 
there is some suggestion that this tendency is less strong for both the intermediate and large 
funds (as reflected by their significantly negative incremental slope coefficients).   
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Table 7.5  Risk Shifting-Tournament Model – Conditioned by Fund Size  
 
Tournament (x, y) bS bS + bI bI bS + bB 
Panel A: September Year End 
4,8 -0.007494 
(-2.203)* 
-0.014739 
(-0.388) 
-0.007245 
(-0.137) 
-0.007280 
(-0.117) 
5,7 0.057783 
(1.550) 
-0.033456 
(-0.882) 
-0.091239 
(-1.716)* 
-0.080821 
(-1.333) 
6,6 0.002607 
(0.072) 
-0.144114 
(-3.739)** 
-0.146722 
(-2.770)** 
-0.119791 
(-1.953) 
7,5 0.040082 
(1.092) 
-0.158472 
(-4.224)** 
-0.198554 
(-3.783)** 
-0.109624 
(-1.726) 
8,4 0.045360 
(1.203) 
-0.128143 
(-3.418)** 
-0.173503 
(-3.263)** 
-0.103710 
(-1.735) 
Panel B: Calendar Year End 
4,8 0.111154 
(3.156) 
0.001073 
(0.032) 
-0.110081 
(-2.260)* 
0.069760 
(1.181) 
5,7 -0.018522 
(-0.534) 
-0.051057 
(-1.524) 
-0.032534 
(-0.675) 
0.044173 
(0.756) 
6,6 -0.006012 
(-0.173) 
-0.051687 
(-1.502) 
-0.045675 
(-0.934) 
-0.049335 
(-0.902) 
7,5 0.107075 
(2.934)** 
-0.044099 
(-1.239) 
-0.157174 
(-2.965)** 
-0.055045 
(-0.961) 
8,4 0.136917 
(3.822)** 
0.030376 
(0.880) 
-0.106541 
(-2.142)* 
0.120809 
(2.242)* 
Panel C: Financial Year End 
4,8 0.038145 
(8.197)** 
0.024764 
(6.454)** 
-0.013381 
(-2.219)* 
0.030566 
(5.757)** 
5,7 0.023028 
(5.175)** 
0.014782 
(3.671)** 
-0.008247 
(-1.374) 
0.017089 
(3.048)** 
6,6 0.006357 
(0.938) 
-0.013330 
(-2.197)* 
-0.019687 
(-2.164)* 
-0.008581 
(-1.014) 
7,5 0.105587 
(3.369)** 
-0.023806 
(-0.865) 
-0.129393 
(-3.102)** 
-0.009754 
(-0.255) 
8,4 0.359693 
(12.122)** 
0.272853 
(10.666)** 
-0.086840 
(-2.217)* 
0.251114 
(7.060)** 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the tournament risk shifting regression model: 
jMyjMyBBjMyIIjMySBBIISjMy errorRTNDbRTNDbRTNbDaDaaRAR ++++++= ****  
where RAR*jMy is the ‘Risk Adjustment Ratio’, which is the ratio of fund volatility before and after the interim assessment period; and RTNjMy 
is the M-month compound return of each fund ‘j’, in tournament year ‘y’. Each of these variables is, in each year, standardized by subtracting 
its yearly median and dividing by its yearly standard deviation. The dummy variable, DI (DB), takes a value of unity if the fund is 
‘intermediate sized’ (‘big) defined as being in the two middles size  quartiles (top size quartile) at the beginning of the given tournament. The 
regression is estimated using data covering the period 1989 to 2004. 
7.5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the tournament induced risk-shifting behavior of Australian “multi-
sector growth funds”, using a sample period covering 1989 to 2004. In contrast to Chapter 6, a 
regression-based methodology was applied and tournaments based on the calendar year, the 
financial year and an October-September year were examined, using a range of within-year 
assessment periods. Apart from the standard tournament hypothesis the following related 
hypotheses were explored: (a) a stability hypothesis; (b) a non-linearity hypothesis; (c) a fund 
age hypothesis; and (d) a fund size hypothesis. 
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The findings can be summarized as follows. First, at the broadest level evidence is found in 
favour of the risk shifting tournament hypothesis when tournaments are defined with a 
September year end. In contrast, risk shifting of an opposite nature is found for financial year 
end tournaments – that is, good (poor) interim performers tend to increase (decrease) risk. 
This latter finding may be a reflection of evidence in favour of the Taylor (2002) ‘active 
competition’ hypothesis. Second, The sub-period investigation revealed a strong pattern of 
less negative (more positive) association between interim performance and risk shifting for 
the September-based (Financial year) tournaments. This is consistent with the argument that 
the latter half of the sample has become more crowded with funds and, hence, more 
competitive. Thus, the findings may again be a reflection of the Taylor ‘active competition’ 
hypothesis. 
 
Third, the investigation of potential non-linearities revealed a mixture of findings. On the one 
hand, September year end tournaments tend to be typified by ‘Case I’: namely, a convex 
relation between RAR and RTN in which extreme losers increasingly chase high risk, while 
extreme winners decreasingly chase low risk. Interestingly this behaviour seems most evident 
in our first sub-period and disappears in the second sub-period – in the latter it reverts to a 
linear risk shifting phenomenon. It is possible that the increased competition in the second 
sub-period has helped bring about this change. On the other hand, Financial year end 
tournaments tend to be typified by ‘Case III’: namely, a convex relation between RAR and 
RTN, reflecting a scenario in which extreme losers (winners) are decreasingly (increasingly) 
chasing low (high) risk. Notably, this phenomenon seems more stable across the two sub-
periods. 
 
Fourth, the analysis of a ‘fund age’ hypothesis produced results that age doesn’t matter in 
either the September or Financial year end tournament scenarios. However, in the case of 
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Calendar years the conventional tournament effect seems to be coming from the more 
established funds. In contrast, younger funds tend to chase higher risk, the better has been 
their interim performance – possibly reflecting ‘hubris’ on the part of these managers. 
 
Finally, the ‘fund size’ hypothesis for (a) the September year tournaments suggests that, if 
anything, it is intermediate sized funds pursuing risk shifting tournament; (b) the Calendar 
year there is little evidence of risk shifting behaviour, regardless of fund size; (c) the Financial 
year there is a general tendency, regardless of fund size, toward positive risk shifting.  
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The investment management industry has proven to be fertile ground for theoretical and 
empirical research over the past forty years, particularly in relation to the nature and 
quantification of risk.  However, as noted in Chapter 1, the dominance of the U.S. industry 
has meant that much of the academic research has focused on the U.S. market. This thesis 
investigates aspects of investment risk using alternative data to that used in much of the prior 
published. As such, it represents a serious contribution towards redressing the imbalance. 
 
This thesis contains an extensive analysis of aspects of risk related to both the demand side 
and the supply side of the managed funds market in Australia.  Among the demand side 
characteristics, attitudes towards risk and their impact on asset allocation decisions will be an 
important determinant of investors’ financial well-being, particularly in retirement. 
Accordingly, Chapters 2 to 4 examine the financial risk tolerance of investors. These chapters 
explore the relationship between subjective financial risk tolerance and a range of 
demographic characteristics that are widely used as a basis for heuristically derived estimates 
of investors’ attitudes towards financial risk.  
 
The analysis of the supply side of the industry focuses on risk-shifting behavior by investment 
fund managers. Since the performance and risk-shifting behavior of fund managers was 
initially put under the spotlight by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Jensen (1968), it is possible 
to identify an evolving strand in the research where performance assessment is examined 
within the framework of the principal-agent literature. One focus that has emerged in this 
literature is the adaption by Brown et al. (1996) of the tournament model to the analysis of 
investment manager behavior, wherein it is hypothesized that fund managers who were 
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interim losers were likely to increase fund volatility in the latter part of the assessment period 
to a greater extent than interim winners.  
 
Against this background, Chapters 5 to 7 examine risk-shifting behavior by Australian fund 
managers. Chapter 5 investigates the ability of fund managers to time the market while 
Chapters 6 and 7 explore the applicability of the tournament model of funds management to a 
segment of the Australian industry.   
 
The purpose of this final chapter is to provide an overview of the analysis and present the 
overall conclusions of the thesis. Additionally, it discusses the contributions, identifies its 
limitations and considers possible directions for future research. 
 
8.2. Overview and Conclusions 
 
The analysis in chapters 2 to 5 draws upon a database that contains a psychometrically 
derived risk tolerance score (RTS) plus responses to eight demographic questions. Chapter 2 
contains an exploratory analysis of a sample of 3214 Australian respondents. The focus of this 
study is an examination of the relationship between subjective risk tolerance and demographic 
factors for a sample group considered representative of those individuals likely to be active 
investors. The analysis provides insight into the effect of certain demographic characteristics 
on individuals’ attitudes towards risk and provides evidence supportive of the validity of 
widely used demographics such as gender, age, income and wealth as determinants of risk 
tolerance. However, the relationships found are not as simple as implied by the demographic 
heuristics: Risk tolerance exhibits a concave relationship with income across all age groups, 
and irrespective of gender. Moreover, education, marital status and dependents, which have 
been found to be significant in previous studies, were not found to be significant determinants 
of an individual’s attitude towards risk in this study.   
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Chapter 3 continues the investigation of the relationship between demographic factors and 
financial risk tolerance.  In this study the sample size ranges between 16461 and 20415 
depending upon which demographic characteristic is being examined. While it is found that 
peoples self-assessed risk tolerance and FinaMetrica RTS generally accord, there is 
considerable variation with a tendency for respondents to under-estimate their risk tolerance. 
The analysis of the relationship between participant demographics and risk tolerance reveals 
that gender, age, income and wealth are significantly associated with financial risk tolerance, 
results consistent with the analysis in Chapter 2. A detailed investigation of the relationship 
between risk tolerance and age as well as marital status was also performed.  The results 
suggest that a negative relationship between age and risk tolerance exists which, while in line 
with generally held industry beliefs, contradicts some of the more recent research findings.  
Further, it was found that the relationship between age and risk tolerance exhibits a significant 
nonlinear structure.  In contrast to the findings of the exploratory study in Chapter 2, a 
trade/diploma level of education or higher, marital status and the number of dependents were 
all found to be significant determinents of an individual’s attitude towards risk. The 
relationship between marital status and risk tolerance was found to be negative. However, 
while the number of dependents was found to be significantly associated with RTS for our 
sample group, the negative impact on RTS is small in magnitude.   
 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of Chapter 3, with particular focus on the issue of whether 
women differ from men in their attitude to financial risk taking.  Consistent with the results of 
the study in Chapter 3, regression analysis of risk tolerance scores (RTS) on the demographic 
characteristics of gender, marital status, number of dependents, age, education, income, 
combined income and net assets revealed each of these characteristics to be significant at the 
1% level, with the first four characteristics having a negative relationship with RTS. The 
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impact of gender was explored through dummy variable enhanced regression analysis 
constructed to test the increment in each demographic coefficient derived from being female 
relative to the base case of being male. While it was found the fixed component of the RTS to 
be 9.6 points lower for females, the magnitude of this impact is reduced once the other 
demographic characteristics are taken into account. Marriage and number of dependents were 
found to be differentially important characteristics, with marriage having a less negative 
impact on risk tolerance for females than the negative impact found for males. Age reduces 
risk tolerance by 3.39 points per decade for males, and its differential impact for females is 
positive but negligible, being associated with a decrease of 2.91 points per decade (i.e. 0.48 
points lower in magnitude). 
 
On the other hand, the combined income effect derived from marriage and the level of net 
assets of the respondent, which have positive impacts per category for males, have 
correspondingly incremental negative impacts for females. Education was not found to be a 
significant differentiating variable in explaining the RTS of females. While important for both 
males and females in the sense that it is associated with an increase in RTS per education 
category, the results show that no more or less importance is attached to it by females. Finally, 
evidence was found of nonlinear effects in the relationship between RTS and the number of 
dependents, age and income and combined income.  
 
Chapter 5 moves the focus to the supply side of the investment market, and focuses on  the 
identification of market timing ability on the part of fund managers. Using both quadratic 
excess returns market model and dual-beta excess returns market model regressions, the 
results suggested that for the sample over the period examined, there is little evidence of 
market timing ability. Further, there is no clear dominance of one market timing model over 
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the other.  It was found, however, that a cubic market model specification does fit the data 
quite well for nearly one third of the sample.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates whether there is evidence of tournament induced risk-shifting behavior 
among managers of Australian “multi-sector growth funds” over a sample period covering 
1989 to 2001. Following Taylor (2003), the study tests the ability of the two competing 
hypotheses to predict risk-shifting behavior in the sample. To this end, a non-parametric 
Cross-Product Ratio methodology is used to examine tournaments based on the calendar year, 
the financial year and an October-September year, using a range of within-year assessment 
periods, against both an exogenous and an endogenous benchmark. 
 
The findings can be summarized as follows. At a broad level the research  finds evidence in 
support of Taylor’s model. Specifically, when an exogenous benchmark is used (i.e. market 
index return), support is uncovered for the hypothesis that losing managers at the end of the 
interim assessment period increase the risk of the fund in the subsequent period, while 
winning managers reduce their risk (H1). This support is particularly evident for the Calendar-
year analysis. However, the volatility underlying this finding warrants a careful qualification 
to any conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis. In particular, the extent to which this 
gaming behavior occurs (for Calendar/index benchmark tournaments), either (a) it is a more 
long-term in nature or (b) it is largely a recent phenomenon (with no guarantee of 
continuation). Either way, given the limited evidence to date, it will be difficult to predict 
over any short-term horizon. 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) which comes from the Taylor (2003) model, is that assessment 
against an endogenous benchmark, such as a median fund performance, will induce winning 
(losing) managers to take on more (less) risk in the subsequent period. Viewed as a whole, the 
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analysis involving endogenous benchmarks is also quite supportive of H2. This is particularly 
so for the Financial-year investigations (and to a lesser extent also with the Calendar-year 
results). Once again, this is consistent with the view that the Australian financial press and 
investors are particularly fixated on Financial and Calendar-year investment performance. 
 
The final empirical chapter of this thesis extends the analysis of Chapter 6 and applies a 
regression-based methodology to investigate the tournament induced risk-shifting behavior of 
Australian “multi-sector growth funds” over the period 1988 to 2004. Tournaments based on 
the calendar year, the financial year and an October-September year are investigated, using a 
range of within-year assessment periods. Apart from the standard tournament hypothesis the 
study also explores: (a) a stability hypothesis; (b) a non-linearity hypothesis; (c) a fund age 
hypothesis; and (d) a fund size hypothesis. 
 
The findings in Chapter 7 can be summarized as follows. First, at the broadest level there is 
evidence in favour of the risk shifting tournament hypothesis when tournaments are defined 
with a September year end. In contrast, the study finds risk shifting of an opposite nature for 
financial year end tournaments – that is, good (poor) interim performers tend to increase 
(decrease) risk. This latter finding may be a reflection of evidence in favour of the Taylor 
(2002) ‘active competition’ hypothesis. Second, the sub-period investigation revealed a strong 
pattern of less negative (more positive) association between interim performance and risk 
shifting for the September-based (Financial year) tournaments. The argument was that the 
latter half of our sample has become more crowded with funds and, hence, more competitive. 
Thus, the findings may again be a reflection of the Taylor ‘active competition’ hypothesis. 
 
Third, the investigation of potential non-linearities revealed a mixture of findings. On the one 
hand, September year end tournaments tend to be typified by ‘Case I’: namely, a convex 
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relation between RAR and RTN in which extreme losers increasingly chase high risk, while 
extreme winners decreasingly chase low risk. Interestingly this behaviour seems most evident 
in the first sub-period and disappears in the second sub-period – in the latter it reverts to a 
linear risk shifting phenomenon. It is possible that the increased competition in the second 
sub-period has helped bring about this change. On the other hand, Financial year end 
tournaments tend to be typified by ‘Case III’: namely, a convex relation between RAR and 
RTN, reflecting a scenario in which extreme losers (winners) are decreasingly (increasingly) 
chasing low (high) risk. Notably, this phenomenon seems more stable across the two sub-
periods. 
 
Fourth, the analysis of a ‘fund age’ hypothesis produced results that age doesn’t matter in 
either the September or Financial year end tournament scenarios. However, in the case of 
Calendar years the conventional tournament effect seems to be coming from the more 
established funds. In contrast, younger funds tend to chase higher risk, the better has been 
their interim performance – possibly reflecting ‘hubris’ on the part of these managers. 
 
Finally, the ‘fund size’ hypothesis for (a) the September year tournaments suggests that, if 
anything, it is intermediate sized funds pursuing risk shifting tournament; (b) the Calendar 
year there is little evidence of risk shifting behaviour, regardless of fund size; (c) the Financial 
year there is a general tendency, regardless of fund size, toward positive risk shifting.  
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8.3. Contribution 
 
The key contributions of this thesis can be classified into two main areas, both dealing with 
aspects of risk in the investment market. First, the thesis examines the relationship between 
subjective risk tolerance and a range of demographic characteristics that are widely used as a 
basis for heuristically derived estimates of investors’ attitudes towards financial risk. The 
thesis departs from previous research in the area by using a very large sample of 
psychometrically derived risk tolerance scores. The examination of a large Australian 
database also provides a response to the observation made by Jiankoplos and Bernasek (1998) 
that most of the risk tolerance research uses United States data and consequently the results 
could be country specific.  
 
The analysis of financial risk tolerance produces a number of findings having practical import 
for the financial services industry. The finding in Chapter 2 that the relationship between risk 
tolerance and income is concave across all age groups refines the understanding of the 
relationship between risk tolerance and this commonly used heuristic and serves as a caution 
against ready acceptance of the widely held belief that there is a simple positive relationship 
between the two variables. Similarly, the finding in Chapter 3 that there is a tendency for 
respondents to under-estimate their risk tolerance suggests that financial planners who rely 
largely on subjective assessments of risk tolerance run the risk of suggesting inappropriate, 
and in the majority of cases overly conservative, investment strategies for their clients. In a 
similar vein, the finding that a trade/diploma level of education is necessary before education 
becomes a significant determinent of risk tolerance deepens our understanding of the 
relationship between risk tolerance and this heuristic.  
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Assessment of an investor’s risk profile is a highly influential factor in the construction of an 
appropriate investment portfolio. The research contained in Chapter 4, in providing support 
for the widely held view that women have lower risk tolerance than men and that, at least in a 
cross-sectional sense, age has an inverse, though non-linear, relationship with risk tolerance, 
has important implications for the funds management industry: as the baby boomer cohort 
ages and moves into retirement we could expect to see demand shift away from the relatively 
more risky growth asset classes towards the less risky income asset classes, reflecting the 
decline in risk tolerance associated which increasing age. Moreover, this effect would be 
compounded by the greater life expectancy of women: as the population ages the gender 
composition will shift in favor of women, who on average have lower risk tolerance. Thus, 
the findings in Chapter 4, coupled with the changing age and gender demographics of the 
population, suggests there will be a duel force for change in the composition of the overall 
demand for investment products.  Accordingly, and in the context of an aging and 
increasingly female world the key implications of the findings in Chapter 4 are most apparent 
in the managed funds industry over a medium to longer term timeframe (looking at 2030 and 
beyond): as the baby boomer bulge moves through the age profile, the gender composition 
will shift further in favor of women. To the extent that women do have more conservative risk 
profiles and the extent to which this conservatism is exacerbated with age, we could expect to 
see asset allocation decisions leading to an overall shift to less risky investment portfolios. 
Importantly, the existence of a positive equity premium means that such a shift in overall 
asset allocation has the potential to lead to lower levels of wealth for women in their 
retirement years. At a macro level, in the absence of countervailing forces at play, it may lead 
to lower levels of ‘speculative’ capital being available for venture capital and other extreme 
risk projects that currently attract funding.  
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The second area where the thesis makes a significant contribution is in relation to risk shifting 
behavior by investment fund managers. In the area of macroeforecasting, or market timing, 
Chapter 5 represents an extension to the scant Australian literature in this area.  The results 
suggested that for the sample over the period examined, there is little evidence of successful 
market timing ability, a result that provides support for a widely held industry belief.  Further, 
it was found that there was no clear dominance of one market timing model over the other, 
although interestingly, it was found that a cubic market model specification does fit the data 
quite well for nearly one third of the sample.  
 
The contribution of Chapters 6 and 7 is to extend the empirical literature on fund manager 
behavior by investigating evidence of tournament effects in a dataset from one of the most 
sophisticated funds management market outside the United States. Chapter 6 employed a non-
parametric contingency table-based methodology and extended the tournament literature 
through the use of three different representations of the annual tournament period and the 
examination of fund manager behavior against two ranking benchmarks, one endogenous and 
one exogenous. While the study in Chapter 6 is concerned primarily with evidence of risk-
taking behavior on the part of fund managers, it can also be viewed as providing, albeit 
indirectly, empirical evidence on the question of whether benchmark choice may affect such 
behavior. 
 
Chapter 7 continued the investigation of tournament behaviour by applying a parametric 
regression-based methodology to the dataset used in Chapter 6, updated to 2004. The 
tournament literature was further extended through investigation of a number of hypotheses 
dealing with the stability of the tournament effect, the presence of non-linearities in the 
relationship, and the impacts of fund age and fund size on tournament behaviour. The results, 
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discussed in Chapter 7, indicate that while there is evidence of risk shifting behaviour, it is 
neither stable, nor as simple in form as earlier research suggested. 
8.4. Limitations 
 
The principle limitation of the demand side studies in this thesis is the dataset. While the data 
represents a large sample of investors seeking investment advice, it may not be representative 
of the population at large, and caution therefore needs to be exercised in drawing conclusions 
or inferences in relation to the broader population. 
 
In relation to the supply side studies, the use of returns-based analysis to examine the 
performance and behavior of fund managers must be considered a less powerful technique 
than holdings-based analysis. However, the lack of access to data on fund holdings prevents 
use of this technique. 
 
8.5. Directions for Future Research 
 
The scope and structure of the thesis, as presented in Section 1.6, has been successfully 
achieved in the preceeding chapters. As with any major research undertaken, a number of 
decisions had to be taken concerning appropriate research design and methods of analysis. 
Given the breadth of the concept of investment risk, it was always apparent that the research 
in this thesis would raise a number of issues that would be beyond the scope of this thesis and 
would be the material for future research.  
 
For example, following the demand side analysis in Chapters 2 to 4, further research into 
financial risk tolerance, using a sample more representative of the general population, may 
confirm the universality of these results. Additionally, further research could explore the 
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ability of these demographics to predict investors risk tolerance score, or classify investors 
into broad risk tolerance groupings, out-of-sample. 
 
From the supply-side analysis, the finding in Chapter 5 that a cubic market model 
specification fits the data quite well for nearly one third of the sample suggests a possible area 
worthy of further research effort, namely, an examination of performance in the context of 
higher moment models. 
 
Finally, the analysis of tournament behaviour in Chapters 7 and 8 suggests that a more 
detailed analysis of the flow-performance relationship and its interaction with fund manager 
compensation could lead to a better understanding of the role of risk shifting and the nature of 
competition between fund managers. 
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